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Ram Niranjan Tewari Vs. Khanu Rai Alias Srigopal and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1920All168; 57Ind.Cas.5
AppellantRam Niranjan Tewari
RespondentKhanu Rai Alias Srigopal and ors.
Cases ReferredGulab v. Mulsaddi Lal
Excerpt:
limitation act (ix of 1908) schedule i, article 11 - execution of decree--attachment--objection overruled--suit to establish title--limitation. - - he tried to get rid of it on appeal, but failed. there is another strong reason in my judgment, apart from any authority, why the legislature made this provision. 1 draw precisely the opposite inference......: 7 ind. dec. (n.s.) 931, intended to suggest that it was for the court, in which the subsequent suit was brought, to consider whether the investigation was a proper one or not. 1 draw precisely the opposite inference. they point out that the code does not prescribe the extent to which the investigation should go for very obvious reasons. as their lordships themselves say, it may be the most prudent course to deliver an opinion on such facts as are specified at the time without any further investigation of the court leaving the aggrieved party to bring the suit which the law allows to him. what they meant was to say nothing to discourage the execution court from making the fullest investigation which it thought possible, and of course the investigation ought to be a thorough one, but.....
Judgment:

Walsh, J.

1. I think this is a plain case. Article 11 of the Limitation Act provides in simple language that the suit must be brought -within one year of an order against the plaintiff on an objection made to the attachment of property attached in execution of a decree. In this case there was an objection by the plaintiff. An order was made against him. He tried to get rid of it on appeal, but failed. Whether it is a good order or whether it is a bad order, or whether it was made upon improper or insufficient investigation, has nothing to do with the case. The Statute of Limitation leaves no loophole. It does not provide that it must be an order made upon what a subsequent Court is pleased to consider sufficient investigation. All it provides is that it must be an order against the plaintiff upon an objection. The very root of the contention of the appellant before me and of the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Kunj Bihari Lal v. Kandh Prashad Narain Singh 6 C.L.J. 362, with which I respectfully disagree, and the view of the Munsif in this case is that the investigation ought to be a full one. This is not necessarily so. That is in my humble judgment exactly why the Legislature has given another remedy; it has compelled the objector to bring his suit within a short time. All the considerations of common sense, business and justice demand that such a suit should be brought promptly, while all the facts are present to the minds of the parties and can be proved in evidence, and what is more, to prevent a bona fide purchaser or somebody dealing with the property from being harassed by stale suits and never knowing whether he is secure in his purchase or not. There is another strong reason in my judgment, apart from any authority, why the Legislature made this provision. If the obligation to bring the suit within one year were left to the haphazard and doubtful contingency of deciding whether the investigation was one which another Court would consider a proper one or not, the mortgagee would not know whether he ought to bring his suit within the year or whether he ought to attempt another investigation. With the plain language of the Limitation Act before him, he has no difficulty. No sooner is an objection of his overruled, then he must bring his suit within a year and the object of that is to put right any defects in the investigation. I do not agree with the Calcutta High Court that the Privy Council in the case of Sardhari Lal v. Ambika Pershad 15 C. 521 : 15 I.A. 123 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 172 : 12 Ind. Jur. 210 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 931, intended to suggest that it was for the Court, in which the subsequent suit was brought, to consider whether the investigation was a proper one or not. 1 draw precisely the opposite inference. They point out that the Code does not prescribe the extent to which the investigation should go for very obvious reasons. As their Lordships themselves say, it may be the most prudent course to deliver an opinion on such facts as are specified at the time without any further investigation of the Court leaving the aggrieved party to bring the suit which the law allows to him. What they meant was to say nothing to discourage the execution Court from making the fullest investigation which it thought possible, and of course the investigation ought to be a thorough one, but the remedy for any defects of that kind has been provided for in a subsequent suit. The Calcutta Bench appears to have overlooked the above point.

2. I think this fact gets rid of most of the reasonings underlying the judgment in that case. I have discussed this matter at lengh out of deference to the argument submitted to me by Mr. Iswar Saran based upon the Calcutta and other cases, but as a matter of fact, in my judgment, I am bound by decisions of this Court in the case of Lachmi Narain v. H.C. Martindell 19 A. 253 : A.W.N. (1897) 60 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 166 and in the case of Gulab v. Mulsaddi Lal 50 Ind. Cas. 748 : 17 A.L.J. 674 : 1 U.P.L.R. (A.) 41.

3. I accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.


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