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Gopal Das Vs. Sri Thakur Ganga Behariji Maharaj - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported in66Ind.Cas.148
AppellantGopal Das
RespondentSri Thakur Ganga Behariji Maharaj
Excerpt:
limitation act (ix of 1908), schedule i, article 120 - suit for declaration--entry of name in village papers in 1901--knowledge in 1918--cause of action, when arises. - - we think that the right to sue accrued in the year 1918 and this suit was well within time......the question is, what is the date from which it can be said that the plaintiff's right to bring a suit accrued. we cannot agree with the contention of the defendant-appellant that the right to sue accrued in the year 1901-1902. the mere entry in the village papers would not of itself give the plaintiff a cause of action, and, according to what has been set out in the plaint, this entry in the village papers made in the year 1309 fasli was not brought to the notice of the plaintiff until the month of january 1918, when the verification of the settlement entries was going on in the district. it was then, according to the plaintiff's case, that he became aware for the first time that the name of the defendant was recorded in the village papers.8. in our opinion no right to sue can, on.....
Judgment:

1. We have heard the learned Counsel in support of this appeal and are of opinion that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court mast be maintained.

2. The only point on which the judgment of the Court below is impeached is the ground of limitation. The contention for the defendant-appellant is that the snit is time barred.

3. There can be no doubt that the proper Artiste applicable to the suit was Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The suit was a suit for a declaration of title.

4. The only question which has to be considered is the date from which the plaintiff's right to sue accrued. The plaintiff, in paragraph 8 of his plaint, sets out the date on which his right to sue accrued as being the month of January 1918 and this suit was filed on the 11th of January, 1919.

5. On the other hand, the contention is that limitation began to run from the year 1901, corresponding to the year 1309 Fasli. The reason why this latter date is put forward is because it was in the village papers of that year that the name of the defendant was first entered as being owner of the property in dispute.

6. Both the Courts below are agreed in finding that the property in question is the property of the idol, who was the plaintiff in the snit. They both agreed, moreover, that the defendant Gopal Das got possession of this land not adversely but permissively. He was let into possession by one of the pu(sic)aries of the temple who was, in fast, the manager of the land in dispute.

7. There can be no question, therefore, of any adverse possession on the part of the defendant-appellant, Gopal Das, However, this is a matter with which we are not concerned here. The question is, what is the date from which it can be said that the plaintiff's right to bring a suit accrued. We cannot agree with the contention of the defendant-appellant that the right to sue accrued in the year 1901-1902. The mere entry in the village papers would not of itself give the plaintiff a cause of action, and, according to what has been set out in the plaint, this entry in the village papers made in the year 1309 Fasli was not brought to the notice of the plaintiff until the month of January 1918, when the verification of the Settlement entries was going on in the district. It was then, according to the plaintiff's case, that he became aware for the first time that the name of the defendant was recorded in the village papers.

8. In our opinion no right to sue can, on these facts, be deemed to have accrued to the plaintiff in the year 1309 Fasli. We think that the right to sue accrued in the year 1918 and this suit was well within time. The plea of limitation fails.

9. The only other point whish has been mentioned in argument is with regard to the lower Court's decree. It appears that the Court of first instance, although it declared the plaintiffs title, nevertheless passed an order for maintaining the defendant's possession as manager. The lower Court thought that this was a wrong order, inasmuch as the defendant did not profess to be in possession as manager but was setting up an adverse title. We agree with the learned Judge of the Court below that the order of the first Court maintaining the defendant's possession was not a proper one in the circumstances.

The result is that the appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs.


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