1. These are three connected appeals which raise a point of law. The said point is clearly covered by authorities of this Court. It is sufficient to refer to the Full Bench case of Wahidullah v. Kanhaya Lal 25 A. 174 A. W. N. (1902) 222 and the recent case of Dalip Singh v. Kundan-Singh 22 Ind. Cas. 614 : 36 A. 58 : 12 A. L.J. 21. The three suits in question were instituted in the Court of a Munsif. In each case the defendant objected that the suit had been under-valued. An issue was framed on this point, but was not separately tried. The learned Munsif tried the question of valuation along with the ether issues, after taking all the evidence offered by both parties. He found in favour of the plaintiff on the question of valuation and be decreed the plaintiffs suits on the merits. The defendant appealed to the Court of the District Judge and his appeals were transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge for disposal. That Court has found that, as a matter of fact, the suits had been undervalued and that their correct valuation was such as to bring them beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif's Court. On this finding alone it has set aside the decree of the Court of first instance and has passed in lieu thereof an order that the plaint in each of the three suits should be returned to the plaintiff to be presented to the proper Court, that is to say, to the Court of the Subordinate Judge. There is no reference in the judgment of the Court below to the provisions of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act IX of 1887. It is not clear from the record whether any reference was made to this Section in argument before the lower Appellate Court. We notice that in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, although the defendant challenged the finding of the Court of first instance on the question of valuation, he did not clearly or explicitly take the point that he had been prejudiced by the fact that the suits had been tried in the Court of the Munsif. At any rate the lower Appellate Court has, in deciding the three appeals before it, overlooked the provisions of the Section referred to above. The case is strictly on all fours with the two previous reported decisions of this Court. Following the precedents there set, we must set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court in each of these three cases and remand each of these cases to that Court for disposal with regard to the provisions of the Suits Valuation Act as mentioned above. The costs of each of these appeals will abide the event.
2. I agree. I think Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act clearly throws the burden on the appellant to show not merely that there has been an incorrect valuation, but that the trial of the suit which means of course the decision against himself has been prejudicially affected thereby. I think he ought to take the ground in the memorandum of appeal and to state how he has been prejudicially affected. There is no better method of testing an argument of that kind, than by examining the grounds which are put forward by the person who makes the allegation, and satisfying one's self whether it is made out in fact or whether it is sufficient in law. It seems pretty clear that it was thought by the appellant or by those who conducted the case in the Court below on his behalf that it was sufficient to show that there was an incorrect valuation. It is very hard on the Judge if his attention is not drawn to the Section, and I am inclined to think that his attention was not properly drawn to the matter at all.