1. In the course of a suit for sale on a mortgage the parties on the 6th September 1918 applied to the Court to refer the dispute to arbitration. On the 28th October 1918 the arbitrators filed their a ward. Objections were taken by the plaintiff within time, but on the 30th of November 1913 these objections were dismissed for default. Immediately after dismissing the objections for default, the Court went on to record that the suit was dismissed in accordance with the award. On the 2nd of January 1919, the plaintiff applied to the Court for restoration of his petition of objections, alleging in an affidavit various grounds which prevented his appearance in Court on the 30th of November 1918. On the 26th of April 1919 the Court rejected this application, not on the merits, but in these word: 'The objections to the validity of the sward being dismissed on 30th November 1918, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in accordance with the award. The restoration of the objections, which is the only prayer made in this application, necessarily affects the decree itself as the decree in the suit is not sought to be set aside. I cannot grant the application for restoration of objections under the circumstances. The application is rejected,'
2. It seems to us that this in itself is no ground for refusing to entertain the application for restoration on its merits. If the Court found that no case had been made out for the plaintiff for the restoration of his objections, it would dismiss that application and the decree would remain unaffected; if, on the other hand, the Court found that there were valid reasons to excuse the absence of the plaintiff on the 30th November 1918, then the Court would have to consider the original objections filed by the plaintiff against the award and the validity of the decree would depend on the result of its finding. It follows, therefore, that the granting of this application for restoration of the objections would not necessarily affect the decree.
3. For these reasons we think that the order of the Court below was wrong. We, therefore, set it aside and direct that Court to entertain the application of the 2nd of January 1.919 and to deal with it on its merits. The costs, which in this Court include fees on the higher scale, will abide the result.