1. The question in this case is whether the decree-holder's application for execution presented on the 30th of March 1920 is barred by limitation. The decree in the case was passed on the 20th of December 1916. On the 22nd of that month the first application for execution of the decree was made and the prayer was to attach three houses. The attachment was duly made on the 30th of January 1917. On the same date three objections were filed in regard to the attachment of the property, each objector claiming the attached property as his own and praying for the removal of the attachment on the property which was claimed by each objector. These applications were resisted by the decree-holder, and on the 23rd of April 1917 he presented an application praying that witnesses may be summoned on his behalf obviously for the purpose of resisting the objections preferred by the objectors. The objections prevailed and the property was released from attachment on the 30th of April 1917. The decree holder instituted a regular suit for the establishment of his judgment-debtor's title to the property, and that suit was decreed by the Court of first instance and the decree of that Court was ultimately affirmed by this Court in June 1921. After the passing of the decree of the Court of first instance, in the suit to which we have referred, the decree holder presented his application of the 30th of March 1920. If the application presented by the decree-holder on the 23rd of April 1917 for the purpose of summoning witnesses to resist the objections is a step-in-aid of execution, the present application is clearly within time. In our opinion the application of the 23rd of April 1917 was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Article 152 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. The object of the application was to summon witnesses for the purpose of resisting the objections preferred by the objectors and for furthering the execution of the decree. It is true that the application was made in proceedings relating to the objections preferred by the objectors, but the effect of the application was to further execution proceedings and was, therefore, obviously an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. The same view was held by this Court in the case of Ali Muhammad Khan v. Gur Prasad 5 A. 344 : A.W.N. (1883) 57 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 331 and also in the case of Shugan Chand v. Ramjas 5 Ind. Cas. 292, though the actual application in that case was one asking the Court to examine witnesses produced by the decree-holder and to reject the objection. We think that the Court below was right in holding that the present application for execution, which was presented within three years of the 23rd of April 1917, was not time-barred. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.