1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by one Rikhdeo Tewari to have adjudged void a sale-deed dated 27th May 1912, executed by his grandmother Mt. Naulasi along with his elder brother Sukhdeo, who purported to execute it both on behalf of himself and of the plaintiff, a minor at the time. The suit was brought on the allegation that Mt. Naulasi's husband was Sita Ram, a son of Sheo Tewari and that the property came down to Mt. Naulasi from Sheo Tewari through Sita Ram. Both the Courts below found that, as a matter of fact, Sheo Tewari was not the father of Sita Ram but the uncle, and that Sita Ram predeceased Sheo Tewari. They consequently found that when Sheo Tewari died, Mt. Naulasi had no title to the property left by him and that her possession of the same must be held to be adverse to the reversioners of Sheo Tewari. There is no direct evidence to show how Sukhdeo came to be associated in the sale-deed impugned, but it is suggested that he was merely joined at the instance of the transferee in order 'to preclude any possible claim, such as the present one either by Sukhdeo himself or by Rikhdeo. Both the lower Courts found that at the date of execution of the sale-deed which is impugned, Mt. Naulasi had acquired absolute title in the property sold by twelve years' adverse possession. The first Court found that there was full legal necessity while the lower appellate Court found that there was legal necessity up to the extent Rs. 150.
2. In this second appeal we are asked to hold that the lower Courts were wrong in deciding in favour of accretion of title to Mt. Naulasi by reason of twelve years' adverse possession. We are referred to the Privy Council decision in Lajwanti v. Safa Chand A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 121 as authority for the view that a widow getting possession of property which could have come to her husband lawfully in his lifetime as reversioner or heir must be deemed to limit her claim to that of a Hindu widow. We would distinguish this decision, as it has previously been distinguished, on the ground that in the Privy Council case, at the time when the widow entered into possession, she was entitled to the property as widow and it was only subsequently that the birth of a posthumous son made her liable to dispossession. In the present case Mt. Naulasi was not entitled under any view to a Hindu widow's possession at the time when she obtained entry. The Privy Council decision has been distinguished in the same way in other cases. We would refer to Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 44 and Kali Charan v. Peare A.I.R. 1924 All. 740.
3. It has been urged that, as a matter of fact, there is evidence which will justify it being held that the widow limited her claim to a widow's estate. The evidence relied upon is an entry in the khewat showing that her name was associated with that of her daughter and her daughters's sons (exclusive of the present plaintiff). The lower appellate Court found that this evidence did not apply to the property in suit or property left by Sheo Tewari. It is quit conceivable that this entry was with reference to property left by her husband Sita Ram. We are told that he left some such property.
4. For the above reasons, we hold that the lower Courts were right in holding that Mt. Naulasi acquired an absolute title in the property by adverse possession and that this absolute title was acquired not only against the reversioners of Sheo Tewari's estate but as against any reversioner to her husband Sita Ram's estate.
5. We dismiss this appeal with costs.