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Rajul and anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1982CriLJ635
AppellantRajul and anr.
RespondentState of Uttar Pradesh
Cases ReferredSmt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal
Excerpt:
- - on a careful consideration of the question i am clearly of the view that the order and judgment dated 6-11-1981 cannot be recalled on account of the prohibition contained in section 362 of the cr. such an approach will not be well founded. in neither of them the counsel for the appellant had failed to appear on account of want of notice or some other cause. 16. for the above reasons the judgment and order dated 6-11-1981 cannot be recalled or set aside by this court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as well......appeal and for listing the said criminal appeal again for hearing in presence of their counsel shri kundan singh.2. criminal appeal no. 2770 of 1977 rajul and anr. v. state under sections 392/397 ipc was listed for hearing on 6-11-1981. names of shri v. g. katiyar and shri kundan singh. advocates were shown in the list as counsel for the appellants. shri v. c. katiyar did not appear to argue the appeal. an illness slip was filed on behalf of shri kundan singh, but it was not accepted under the impression that the memo of appearance did not bear the signatures of shri kundan singh, advocate and he was not the counsel for the appellants. this impression was caused on account of the order dated 10-8-1981 passed by hon'ble mohd. hamid husain j. on the order sheet. on 10-8-1981, the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

R.B. Lal, J.

1. This is an application by Rajul and Saukhi Lai appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 2770 of 1977 for recalling the judgment and order dated 6-11-1981 passed by me in that appeal and for listing the said criminal appeal again for hearing in presence of their counsel Shri Kundan Singh.

2. Criminal appeal No. 2770 of 1977 Rajul and Anr. v. State Under Sections 392/397 IPC was listed for hearing on 6-11-1981. Names of Shri V. G. Katiyar and Shri Kundan Singh. Advocates were shown in the list as counsel for the appellants. Shri V. C. Katiyar did not appear to argue the appeal. An illness slip was filed on behalf of Shri Kundan Singh, but it was not accepted under the impression that the memo of appearance did not bear the signatures of Shri Kundan Singh, Advocate and he was not the counsel for the appellants. This impression was caused on account of the order dated 10-8-1981 passed by Hon'ble Mohd. Hamid Husain J. on the order sheet. On 10-8-1981, the appeal had come up before him for hearing and no one had appeared on behalf of the appellants to argue the appeal. Then he noticed that the memo of appearance did not bear the signature of Shri Kundan Singh. Since the appellants were awarded a sentence of R. I. for seven years by the trial Court, he considered it desirable, in the interest of justice, that a fresh notice be issued to the appellants to engage a counsel. On 6-11-1981 it was found that the appellants had been personally served with the notices issued in pursuance of the order dated 10-8-1981, but there was no fresh memo of appearance on behalf of the appellants after this service of notices on them. In these circumstances I perused the record of the lower court myself and decided the appeal by judgment and order dated 6-11-1981.

3. In the present application, Shri Kundan Singh, learned Counsel for the applicants-appellants has pointed out that he had filed a properly signed memo of appearance in the office on 14-12-1977, but it was not placed on the record, and therefore, it did not come to the notice of Hon. Mohd. Hamid Hussain J., and his Lordship passed the order dated 10-8-1981. He has further pointed out that after service of notices on the appellants, he had filed another memo of appearance in the office on 2-9-1981, but that memo was also not placed on the record by the office. His name was, therefore, rightly shown as counsel for the appellants in the cause list dated 6-11-1981. Shri V. C. Katiyar, Advocate had no instructions and had conveyed this to the Bench Secretary on 10-8-81 and it was for this reason that order was passed for issue of fresh notices to the appellants. The learned Counsel has further urged that if the filing of fresh memo of appearance had come to my notice, I would not have declined to accept his illness slip on 6-11-1981 and surely adjourned the hearing of the appeal for the day. His absence on 6-11-1981 was not deliberate and in the interest of justice, the order and judgment dated 6-11-81 should be recalled and he should be afforded an opportunity to argue the appeal.

4. The learned A. G. A. has not filed a reply and has not opposed the application.

5. The facts pointed out by Shri Kundan Singh are now borne out. The office has now placed on record a memo of appearance dated 14-12-1977 bearing the signatures of Shri Kundan Singh, It has also reported that Shri Kundan Singh Advocate had filed his retainer on 2-9-1981 but the same is misplaced somewhere and is being searched. Had these memos come to my notice on fi-11-1981, in all probability, I would have accepted the illness-slip of Shri Kundan Singh. Advocate and adjourned the appeal for the day. It is also clear that the absence of Shri Kundan Singh on 6-11-1981 was not deliberate.

6. Now. the question is whether, in the abovementioned circumstances, the order and judgment dated 6-11-1981 can be legally recalled. On a careful consideration of the question I am clearly of the view that the order and judgment dated 6-11-1981 cannot be recalled on account of the prohibition contained in Section 362 of the Cr. P. C. (briefly the Code), notwithstanding the fact that one may feel the justice of the case of the appellants-applicants.

Section 362 of the Code reads thus:-

Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.

7. The language of this section is quite clear and unambiguous. It is wide enough to include High, Court in its sweep. It prohibits a court, when it has signed a judgment or final order, from altering or reviewing the same, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is subject to the non obstante clause save as otherwise provided by. this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.' In the decision State of Orissa v. Ram Chander : 1979CriLJ33 the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 369 old Cr. P. C, which corresponds to Section 362 of the Code .and also referred to Section 362 of the Code and held: (Para 11).

Hence an alteration or review by a High Court would be permissible as in this case of other courts, where provision thprefor. is made in this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.

Their Lordships further held 'Giving the plain meaning to Section 369, it is clear that no court, subject to exceptions made in this section, shall alter or review its judgment.'

8. The Code contains provisions relating to some specific orders which may be set aside by the Court passing them, if certain grounds are made out. Section 126(2) of the Code is such an instance. It empowers the magistrate to set aside an ex parte order granting maintenance allowance if certain grounds are made out. However, the Code does not contain a general provision empowering a court to recall or set aside its own judgment or final order which would cover a case of the present kind. There is no other law in force which confers such power on a court or High Court exercising criminal jurisdiction. The learned Counsel too, has not been able to point out any provision either in the Code or in any other law which empowers the High Court to recall or set aside a judgment rendered in appeal.

9. The provisions of Section 362 cannot be got over by saying that recall of a judgment or final order is not an alteration or review of the same within the meaning of the section. Such an approach will not be well founded. What a Court is prohibited from doing directly, cannot be done by it indirectly. To say that Sec, 362 does not apply to the case of recall of a judgment or final order, would be engrafting a proviso in the section and thus restricting its scope. This is not permissible. The effect of recall of judgment or final order is that it is effaced for all practical purposes so far as the particular case is concerned and thereafter a new judgment or final order, as the case may be. follows. The new judgment or final order is, in substance, nothing but an altered or reviewed judgment or final order by the same court. The prohibition contained in Section 362, therefore, logically extends to recall of a judgment of final order by the same Court.

10. Section 482 of the Code which preserves the inherent powers of High Court, too cannot be invoked for altering or reviewing a judgment when the prohibition contained in Section 362 of the Code is applicable. This aspect was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander 1979 Cri LJ 33 (supra) and their Lordships observed. {Paras 16, 17) :-

Thus, inherent power cannot relate to any of the matters specificallv dealt with by the Code. It would follow that inherent powers cannot be invoked to exercise powers which would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. The saving of inherent power is only for giving effect to orders passed under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of j.ustice.

If Section 369 of the CrIPC is understood as applying to judgments on appeal by the High Court, Sec, 561-A cannot be invoked for enabling the Court to review its own order which is specifically prohibited by Sec, 369 by providing that, no court when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error.

11. The provisions of Sees, 389 and 561A of the CrIPC 1898 correspond to the provisions of Sees. 362 and 482 of the Code respectively. The above observations of the Supreme Court, therefore, fully apply to the instant case.

12. In the decision Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal : 1981CriLJ296 , the Supreme Court repelled the contention that inherent powers of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code can be invoked, notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 of the Code, and observed thus ;- (Para 5)

It is true that the prohibition in Sec, 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is 'otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.' Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of t-he Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Sec, 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.

13. Their Lordships also clarified that 'A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the Court, it represents that which the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.'

14. No doubt the facts in the aforementioned two Supreme Court decisions were different. In neither of them the counsel for the appellant had failed to appear on account of want of notice or some other cause. However, the interpretation put by the Supreme Court on Sec, 362 and 482 of the Code in the aforesaid decisions, cannot be distinguished or ignored on this ground because the language of Section 362 is quite wide and does not contain any exception which would cover the facts as exist in the instant case.

15. The present is not a case for correction of a mere clerical or arithmetical error which may be covered Under Section 362 of the Code.

16. For the above reasons the judgment and order dated 6-11-1981 cannot be recalled or set aside by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as well.

17. In the result the application for recall of the judgment and order dated 6-11-1981 cannot be allowed and is accordingly dismissed.


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