1. These appeals arise out of cross suits for pre-emption. In each case, the plaintiffs were given a decree for preemption of half of the property and the decree went on to provide that if they did not, pay the price within a month, their claim would stand dismissed and, in that event, the plaintiffs in the other case were allowed a farther period of fifteen days within which to pay in the price, so that if either set of plaintiffs failed to Ray in the price, the other set would be entitled to take the whole of (he property on complying with the terms of the decrees. The decrees in both cases were made on June 17th, 1911, and the period of one month expired on July 17th--no money was paid into Court in either case by that date.
2. On July 19, Kirat Singh and others, the plaintiffs in one case, petitioned the Court to grant an extension of the time limited by the decree, and by an order of July 25th, time was extended to August 4th. Each set of plaintiffs paid into Court the price specified in their decree before August 4th. The purchaser objected but his objection was overruled. He, then, appealed to the District Judge in both cases and it was held that the first Court had no power to extend the time limited by the decrees. The plaintiffs have appealed to this Court contending that there was no right of appeal to the District Judge against the orders of the first Court and that if the appeals were in order, the District Judge should, have upheld the orders of the first Court on the merits.
3. The purchaser has applied in each case for revision of the orders of the first Court in case it is held that those orders were not appealable.
4. The plaintiffs rely upon Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure as authorising the Munsif to extend the time fixed in the decrees. In Jug Ram v. Jew K-im 6 A.L.J.R. 647 : 3 Ind. Cas. 497 Banerji and Tudball, JJ. expressed grave doubts whether this section applied to suits for pre-emption, and in Hukam Chand v. Hayat 121 P.W.R. 1912 : 99 P.R. 1912 : 15 Ind. Cas. 941 Reid, C.J. held that this section did not apply to periods fixed by a decree. To the same effect is the decision of Messrs. Evans and Piggott in Narendra Bahadur v. Ajudhia Prasad 13 O.C. 28 : 5 Ind. Cas. 443. I agree with the views expressed in these cases. It appears to me that the payment of money into Court within a fixed time in pursuance of a decree is not so act prescribed or allowed by the Code within the meaning of Section 148. According to the decision in Rahima v. Nepal Rai 14 A. 520 : A.W.N. (1892) 99 which is binding upon me, I must hold that the orders of the Munsif were appealable. In my opinion, the District Judge was right in setting those orders aside. The two appeals to this Court are dismissed with costs.