1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of a Bench of this Court striking off the name of the applicant who is a Pleader from the roll of the Pleaders on the ground of misconduct. Although the Calcutta and Patna High Courts have taken a different view, it his been the practice in this Court to treat such orders as falling under Section, 109(e), Civil Procedure Code. The case in Asharfi Lai v. Judges of Allahabad High Court (1930) A.L.J. 134 : 122 Ind. Cas. 4 : A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 60 : 31 Cr. L.J. 337 : 31 L.W. 298 : 34 C.W.N. 432 : 32 Bom. L.R. 556 : 7 O.W.n. 264 : 51 C.L.J. 417 : (1930) Cr. Cas. 205 : 58 M.L.J. 483 : Ind. Ral. (1930) P.C. 88 (P.C.) was a case of a Pleader who had been suspended from practice, for four years. Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was allowed and No. Objection was taken before their Lordships that the order allowing such leave was illegal. Indeed their Lordships actually accepted the appeal and set aside the order of (he High Court in that case. Again in T.G.A. Anandalawan v. Judges of the Madras High Court a Vakil had been struck off the roll of Vakils. Their Lordships accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The both these cases the: practitioners concerned were governed by the Legal Practitioners Act and not the Bar Councils Act. As regards Advocates, there have been two recent decisions of this Court that an appeal lies: see Bahadur lal v. Judges of Allahabad High Court : AIR1933All18 . and Shiva Narain v. Judges of Allahabad High Court : AIR1934All898 . In the latter case it was pointed out by this High Court that the Calcutta and the Patna High Courts had taken a contrary view, which was not followed by this Court. Their Lordships in their judgment did not make any; adverse comment on this. But leave under Section 109(c) cannot be granted as a matter of courts, and the applicant, has to satisfy us that the case is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. In Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Kri-ihen Narain 28 I.A. 11 : 23 All. 227. 7 Sar. 825 : 5 C.W.N. 193 : 11 M.L.J. 56 : 7 Sar. 825. (P.C.) their Lordships, after referring to Sections 595 and 600 of that old Code, providing for, the granting of an appeal where the High Court certified that the case, was fit for appeal otherwise, observed that it is
clearly intended to meet special cases such, for example, as those in which, the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private, importance. To certify that a case is of that kind, though it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court, is a judicial process which could not be performed without special exercise of that discretion, evinced by the fitting certificate.
The same point was again emphasized in Radha krisan v. Rai Krishn Chand 28 I.A. 182 : 23 A 415 : 5 C.W.N. 689 : 3 Bom. L.R. 469 : 8 Sar. 114 (P.C.) at p. 181 and it was pointed out that the prevailing impression in the Indian High Courts that the mere existence of a substantial question of law was sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to give leave to appeal was a mistake, if the amount of Rs. 10,000 or more is not in dispute, either directly or indirectly. The point was again explained by their Lordships in Radha Krishna Ayyar v. Swamirtatha Ayyav 48 I.A. 31 : 60 Ind. Cas. 85 : A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 25 : 19 A.L.j. 161 : 10 M.L.J. 229 : 13 L.W. 321 : (1921) M.W.N. 119 : 33 C.L.J. 277 : 25 C.W.N. 630 : 44 M. 293 : 23 Bom. L.R. 718 : 29 M.L.T 418 (p.C.) at p. 33. The requirement of Section 110
does not cover the whole grounds of appeal, because it is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute; there are questions, as for example, those relating to religious rites and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject matter in dispute cannot be reduced into actual terms of money.
2. The same principle appears to have been applied by their Lordships in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income tax Commissioner, Delhi , where the wrods in Sub-section 2, Section 66(A), of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, were textually the same as the concluding words of Section 109(c) Civil Procedure Code. It would, therefore, seem to follow that the certificate is not to be granted as a matter of course, but can be granted where the case is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. We think, that the conditions laid down by their Lordships in the first case in Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Kishen Narain 28 I.A. 11 : 23 All. 227, 7 Sar. 825 : 5 C.W.N. 193 : 11 M.L.J. 56 : 7 Sar. 825. (P.C.), are fulfilled in this case. This is an appeal from; an order striking off the name of a Pleader from the roll of Pleader, and the point in dispute is not measurable by money and it, is of great private importance to the applicant. There are some points of law also raised in this case. We, therefore, think that this can be treated as one of the special class mentioned by their Lordships in their judgment We accordingly certify under Section 109(c) that this, case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. We allow the applicant to furnish security by hypothecating sufficient immovable property.