1. The facts out of which this appeal arises are shortly as follows: Owing to the exertions of the plaintiff certain dacoits were convicted. It was alleged that two of the original defendants had harboured the dacoits, and the same two defendants were subsequently prosecuted by the Police for harbouring one of the dacoits. The plaintiff alleged that these defendants instigated the third defendant who is the appellant here to bring a false charge of forging a bond against the plaintiff. The prosecution was instituted against the plaintiff in respect of the alleged forging of the bond. His house was searched. Warrant was issued for his arrest. The matter was investigated by a Magistrate and the plaintiff was discharged. He then instituted the present suit against all three defendants for malicious prosecution. Two of the defendants pleaded that they had nothing to do with the prosecution. This issue was found in their favour and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed against them. The appellant here never pretended that he had not instituted the prxtiecutio to, On the contrary he pleaded that his complaint was quite true and that the bond had been really forged. It appears that the appellant did make a complaint in the Magistrate's Court. The Courts below have found that the bond was quite a genuine bond, and that the prosecution was malicious. The only point argued here on behalf of the appellant is that he was not responsible for the prosecution, and he relies on the case of Dudhnath Kandu v. Mathura Prasad 24 A. 317. In my opinion this case has no application whatever to the present. In the first place it was a first appeal in which the Court was Judge of both law and fact. The suit was, like the present, a suit for malicious prosecution. The appellate Court was entitled to go into the question of malice, and want of reasonable and probable cause. At page 31.9 of the report the learned. Judges say: 'The prosecution which was directed. was directed by the Magistrate suo moto and not on the complaint of the defendant or in any application made by him for the issue of -process. The words complained of were spoken by the defendant on a privileged occasion, namely, when he was being examined before a Magistrate in the course of a criminal proceeding.' The case of Balbhaddar Pande v. Basdeo Pande 29 A. 44 was also relied on that was a suit for damages for malicious imprisonment and not for malicious prosecution. The facts were quite different. The defendant in the suit for 'malicious imprisonment had been badly beaten. He named certain persons as being the persons who had attacked him. The Police arrested those persons. They were subsequently discharged, and then they sued for malicious imprisonment. The Court held that under these circumstances it was the police and not the defendant who had imprisoned the plaintiff. The learned Judges cited with approval the case of Narasinga Row v. Mutliaya Pillai 26 M. 362. The judgment in that case is very short. It seems to me that, if a man makes a false and malicious statement to the police with the intention of setting the criminal law in. motion against his enemy, and that as a consequence of his statement criminal proceedings follow, he ought to be held liable in damages in a suit for malicious prosecution. In a recent ruling of the Privy Council in Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Sardar Bhagat Singh 12 C.N.W. 1017 : 30 A. 525 their Lordships explain that the principle laid down in the case of Narasinga Row v. Muthaya Pillai 26 M. 362 although sound when properly understood, is not of universal application. At page 1021 of the report, their Lordships say 'The question in all cases of this kind (malicious prosecution) must be; who is the prosecutor, and the answer must depend upon the whole circumstances of the case. The mere setting, of the law in motion is not the criterion the conduct of the complainant before and after making the charge must also be taken into consideration. Nor is it enough to say that the prosecution was instituted and con-ducted by the police. That again is a question of fact. Theoretically all prosecutions are conducted in the name and on behalf of the Crown, bat in practice this duty is often left in the hands of the person immediately aggrieved by the offence, who pro hac vice represents the Crown.' In conclusion their Lordships say at page 1022: 'In the opinion of their Lordships it would be a scandal if the remedy provided by this form of action were not available to innocent persons aggrieved by such unfounded charges,' In the present case the appellant not only made a complaint which resulted in criminal proceedings, but he also took the case in revision to this Court, I dismiss the appeal with costs.