1. This is an application in revision by a plaintiff whose suit for the recovery of certain money has been dismissed by the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Bareilly. The suit was on the face of it one for the balance of money advanced in payment of goods to be delivered, falling under Article 57 of the first Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act IX of 1908. The learned Judge of the Court below rightly appreciated this point, but wont on to hold that, inasmuch as there was nothing in the plaint to show that any date was fixed for delivery of the goods, the date of payment must be taken to be the date for delivery of goods. The learned Judge was, in my opinion, palpably wrong. The circumstances of the transaction were such, according to the allegation in the plaint, that the date of the payment of the money could not possibly he the date for the delivery of the goods. The principles which should govern the decision of the Court when a question of this sort arises appear to have been correctly laid clown in a very old ruling, that of Boiddonath Shah v. Lal-un-nissa Bibi 7 W. R. 164 The learned Judge oil the Court below ought either to have considered whether, by reason of trade custom or some established usage, well-understood by both parties, any particular period could be laid down as the time when the goods required in this particular case ought to have been delivered, or failing this, he should have fixed some reasonable time after the advance of the money, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. I note that, according to the findings of the Court below, an allowance of only thirty days for the delivery of the goods would be sufficient to bring this claim within limitation. In my opinion the suit has been thrown out in the Court below without adequate inquiry and on a misapprehension of the law applicable to the case. It has been contended on behalf of the defendants-opposite party that a wrong decision upon a question of limitation would not of itself justify interference of this Court under Section 25 of Act IX of 1887 (the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act). It is not easy to lay down precise principles to govern the exercise of the very wide discretion which has, for obvious and necessary reasons, been conferred upon the High Court by the Section above referred to. In the present case, however, I think it is apparent on the face of the judgment of the Court below that that Court would have done better to inquire into the facts of the case and to determine the case as a whole, including the question of limitation, when fully satisfied as to the facts. The application before me has been admitted by a learned Judge of this Court and I am not prepared to say that the case is one in which in the exercise of its discretion it would be unreasonable for this Court to interfere in the interests of justice. I set aside the order and decree of the Court below and remand the case to that Court with orders to re-admit the same to its file of pending suits and to dispose of it with due regard to the remarks made above on the question of law involved. Costs of this application will be costs in the suit.