1. This is a second appeal by a minor plaintiff who brought a suit under the guardianship of his father for a declaration that a certain usufructuary mortgage of a house dated 12th October 1923, executed by his father in favour of Rup Lal was invalid, and asking for the alternative relief of redemption on payment of that portion of the mortgaged consideration which was found to be valid. The Court of first instance held that the mortgage-deed was valid to the extent of Rs. 713 only, but the lower appellate Court has held that the mortgage-deed was valid to the extent of the wole consideration, which amounts to Rs. 2,400. The question has been argued before us that the mortgage-deed is altogether invalid. The executant, Ghure Lal, came of age on 1st February 1917, having been a minor with a guardian appointed by the District Judge. The mortgage in question was executed on 12th October 1923. The six items of consideration in the mortgage are as follows:
(1) Rs. 100 cash paid previous to the mortgage. This has been found to have been advanced for payment of the expenses of registration and execution. These charges would be legal necessity if the main consideration is for legal necessity. (2) Rs. 150 cash paid before the sub-registrar. There is no finding that this amount is for legal necessity, and the lower appellate Court stated that as the item was small it might be overlooked and the question of its legal necessity might be left over. This portion of the finding has not been specifically challenged in the memorandum of appeal. (3). Rs. 1,127-8-0: this was left with the mortgagee to pay off the mortgage debt incurred by Ghure Lal on 22nd February 1917, after he attained majority, the mortgage debt being for Rs. 1,000 and the deed being in favour of Rup Lal, the brother of the present mortgagee. Argument has centred largely round this item of consideration. The argument which was advanced in the memorandum of appeal was that a minor cannot legally ratify the debts contracted by him during the minority after he attains majority, and and there is no distinction whether the debt is renewed in favour of the same creditor or of a third person.
2. The first part of this proposition is supported by the rulings in Bindeshari Bux Singh v. Chandika Prasad : AIR1927All242 and in Suraj Narain Dube v. Sukh Aheer : AIR1928All440 . In each of these, cases however there was a minor who had incurred a debt during his minority, and on attaining majority he executed a mortgage to his creditor in which he undertook to pay off his debt. The point taken by the Court was that there was no consideration for the promise made by the minor on attaining majority, because the debt which he had incurred during minority was not enforceable and therefore was not a consideration, and the case did not come under the exceptions to Section 25, Contract Act, and the contract was void tinder that section. In the present case however there is the essential difference' that the promisee or mortgagee has given consideration for the item in question by paying the amount to the mortgagee of 22nd February 1917. Therefore the payment by the present mortgagee amounts to a consideration within the meaning of Section 2(d), Contract Act. The present case therefore is clearly distinguishable from the two cases in the reported rulings. learned Counsel has failed to show that the payment by the mortgagee to a creditor who advanced money to the minor during his infancy is in any way rendered invalid by any provision of the Contract Act. We consider therefore that in this case there was a perfectly good consideration for the item of Rupees 1,127-8-0.
3. The next item No. 4 is Rs. 255-8-0 which was left with the mortgagee to pay a prior mortgage of 22nd February 1917, Rs. 200 by Ghure Lal to Rup Lal. The fifth item was for Rs. 151 set off on a prior mortgage of 30th April 1923. These items were for antecedent debts and the father was entitled to mortgage joint family property to pay these antecedent debts which are not alleged to have been tainted with immorality.
4. The sixth item was of Rs. 136 due on two simple bonds of 26th September 1920, and 22nd August 1920. These have been rejected by the Court of first instance on the ground that the documents were not produced. The lower appellate Court found that the documents were sufficiently proved by the admission of their existence in para. 6 of the plaint and by the admission of liability made by a father in the mortgage-deed in question.
5. We do not consider that in any way the findings of the lower appellate Court are illegal or contrary to law. Accordingly, we uphold the decree and dismiss this appeal with costs.