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Muhammad Mustafa Ali Khan Vs. Dist. Board and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1935All663; 155Ind.Cas.593
AppellantMuhammad Mustafa Ali Khan
RespondentDist. Board and anr.
Excerpt:
.....as issued made it perfectly clear that the draft resolution of the members together with the explanations and the report of the sub-committee would come up before the board on 8th march 1933, for final decision......upon it by section 173, has framed certain regulations which require that there should be ten days' notice of a meeting and a seven days' notice of the agenda. the first objection is that there was no notice given within the meaning of section 48 of the act. we are wholly unable to accept this contention. the agenda paper as issued made it perfectly clear that the draft resolution of the members together with the explanations and the report of the sub-committee would come up before the board on 8th march 1933, 'for final decision.' this undoubtedly notified that final orders would be passed on the matter. that necessarily included a resolution adopting the draft resolution as proposed by the members. we therefore think that there is no force in this objection.5. the second objection.....
Judgment:

Sulaiman, C.J.

1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for an injunction brought by the plaintiff who was the Secretary of the District Board, Bareilly, against the Board restraining the Board from enforcing their resolution of 8th March, 1933. A relief for a decimation that the plaintiff's dismissal was against law and unenforceable had been claimed, but was withdrawn.

2. The Courts below have dismissed the plaintiff's suit. In appeal it is contended that the decree is wrong. A question has been raised as to whether a suit for an injunction by a Secretary of Local Board, filed in a Civil Court is at all maintainable and whether any relief for injunction can be granted in the face of the provisions of Section 21(b), Specific Relief Act. Under that section a contract which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties or otherwise from its nature is such that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms cannot be specifically enforced. The question whether the contract of service of the plaintiff was dependent on his personal qualifications or the volition of the parties is of some difficulty and I would not express any final opinion on it at this stage of the case because the case can be disposed of without deciding this question.

3. Before considering the objections raised by the plaintiff it would be convenient to give briefly the previous history of the matter: Early in January 1933, a proposal signed by 18 members of the Board in the form of a resolution was received by the Board. It suggested that the Secretary and the Engineer had been negligent in the discharge of their duties and guilty of lack of supervision causing disorder in the affairs of the Board and making its finances suffer heavily and that they were incapable and unworthy of the posts they held. The proposal was that they should be called upon to submit replies to the charges against them within 15 days and in case of their not doing so or their replies being unsatisfactory the question of their dismissal should be considered by the Board. There was a further proposal that the post of the Secretary and the Engineer should be combined. On receipt of this resolution the Chairman called upon the persons complained against to furnish explanations. Copies of the charges as well as copies of the draft resolution were handed over to them. The draft resolution together with the explanations submitted were placed before a meeting of the District Board on 15th February 1933. The resolution was considered and it was resolved by the Board that a subcommittee of three member should be appointed to go into the charges and examine the explanations submitted on those charges and to submit a report to the Board before its next meeting on 8th March, and that the matter should come up for final decision on that date. Admittedly 10 (?) days before 8th March 1933, a notice was issued notifying that a meeting of the Board would be held on 8th March 1933. On 1st March 1933, an agenda paper was issued which contained, as the matter for consideration, the draft resolution of the 18 members about the dismissal of the Secretary and the Engineer along with the report of the Sub-Committee, the explanations of the Secretary and the Engineer as well as the report of the Special Officer and the resolution of the Board dated 15th February 1933. A complete copy of the draft resolution as well as a copy of the resolution of the Board dated 15th February 1933, were appended. On 8th March 1933, at a full quorum the Board passed a resolution dismissing the plaintiff.

4. The first objection taken is that there was no due notice given of the business that was transacted. Section 48, U.P. District Boards Act, requires that no business which is required to be transacted by a special resolution shall be transacted unless previous notice of the intention to transact such business has been given, and under Section 71 the dismissal of a Secretary is one of the matters for which a special resolution is necessary. It also appears that the Board acting under the power conferred upon it by Section 173, has framed certain regulations which require that there should be ten days' notice of a meeting and a seven days' notice of the agenda. The first objection is that there was no notice given within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act. We are wholly unable to accept this contention. The agenda paper as issued made it perfectly clear that the draft resolution of the members together with the explanations and the report of the Sub-Committee would come up before the Board on 8th March 1933, 'for final decision.' This undoubtedly notified that final orders would be passed on the matter. That necessarily included a resolution adopting the draft resolution as proposed by the members. We therefore think that there is no force in this objection.

5. The second objection is that under the regulations the agenda papers should have been issued ten days earlier. We are unable to accede to this, contention. The notice which is to be issued ten days before the meeting is a notice of the meeting itself, whereas the agenda is a notice of the matters which have to be considered at the meeting. There has in fact been no non-compliance with the regulation for notice of the meeting was, given ten days earlier and the agenda paper was issued seven days before the meeting. This objection also has therefore no force. I would therefore dismiss this appeal.

Bennet, J.

6. I concur.


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