1. The circumstances under which this appeal arises are briefly as follows:--One Mohammad Ali died about thirty years ago leaving as his heirs a son Zia-ul-Hasan, four daughters, one of whom was Nathia Begam, and a widow. He was a Shia by persuasion and Nathia Begam became entitled to 7 out of 48 sihams in his estate and her name was entered over that share. Musammat Nathia Begam died in November 1915 leaving the plaintiffs as her heirs. The plaintiffs applied for mutation of names over the share recorded in her name, but were met with an objection of Zia ul-Hasan, her brother and Lambardar of the Mahal. The plaintiffs also brought a suit for profits for the years 1321 and 1322 Faslis against the said Lambardar. The Revenue Court disallowed the application on the ground that the plaintiffs were not in possession. The suit for profits was also dismissed on the ground that the Lambardar had acquired title to the property by adverse possession, This decree dismissing the suit for profits was upheld on appeal by the Additional District Judge of Meerut, on the ground that the defendant had been in adverse proprietary possession for more than twelve years, The plaintiffs, treating this action of the Revenue Court as giving them a cause of notion for possession, have brought this suit for possession over 7 out of 48 sihams in the estate of Mohammad Ali. One of the pleas raised in defence was that the suit was barred because of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in any event by the general principle of res judicata. The Court below has dismissed the suit on the ground that it was so barred. The plaintiffs come here in appeal. We think that the Court below was right in its conclusion, The only circumstance under which a civil suit can be brought to question the correctness of a Revenue Court's decision on title in a suit for profits is one in which the Revenue Court proceeds upon an entry of a certain person's name in the revenue papers as conclusive on the question of title. See Section 201, Clause (3), and Section 99 of the Tenancy Act. In other oases, for instance in a case where the Revenue Court proceeds to decide the question of title itself, no such right is given. In the present case the Revenue Court did proceed to decide the question of title. An appeal was taken to the District Judge under Section 177 of the Tenancy Act and the question was decided adversely to the present plaintiffs. Prima facie having regard to the provisions of Section 201 of the Tenancy Act referred to above, no right of suit in the Civil Court could accrue in favour of the plaintiffs. We have been referred to a larger number of cases, but we do not enter into them in detail because we do not think it necessary to do so. It has been laid down in the Full Bench ruling in Mollo v. Ramlal 58 Ind. Cas. 772 : 18 A.L.J. 1030 : 43 A. 191 that a plaintiff cannot by framing a suit anew get round an order of a Revenue Court in a matter which it has jurisdiction to decide. In the present case the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of title. It has decided it, and we do not think that a Civil Court should interfere with that order. The result is that the appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs, including in this Court fees on the higher scale.