1. This is a civil revision brought by a plaintiff against a decree of the Small Cause Court in Jhansi. The plaintiff imported into Jhansi a number of articles on which lie was charged Rs. 237-7-9. The plaintiff contends that the articles which he imported do not come under the headings in the octroi schedule under which they have been assessed to octroi. The articles in question are shown in a number of invoices to consist of fuses, cables wire, fuse handles, britalux fittings, electric bulbs, etc. The series of schedules under which these articles have been assessed refer to articles made of brass, copper, bronze, rubber Nos. 80 to 83, and earthen ware No. 44. Some objection was taken that No. 44 comes under the heading of 'building materials and furniture' and learned Counsel argued that electric fittings would not come under either of those heads. He failed to explain under what head of house construction electric fittings would come. It appears to me that electric fittings in a house do come under the heading of building materials and furniture. Learned Counsel argued that an octroi schedule should be framed on the lines that every single article which might be imported into a Municipality on which duty was to be levied should be described by name. In other words that Britalux fitting should be so mentioned and also fuse handles. I do not consider that this is a possible method of framing an octroi schedule. The method which is adopted is to use general terms under which the innumerable different articles are included and they are classified as regards the metals of which they are composed.
2. It would not be possible to frame an octroi schedule which would have ten millon different kinds of articles mentioned. The finding therefore of the lower Court that these articles come under these headings appears to me to be correct. I am referred by learned Counsel to a ruling of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in Municipal Board, Benares v. Krishna & Co. 1934 All. 550. That ruling laid down that an electric fan motor would not come under the term 'hardware' in an octroi schedule because 'hardware' referred to articles such as pots and pansand domestic appliances and simple articles made of metal. The present case does not involve the term 'hardware' in the schedule and that therefore the ruling has no application to the present case. A further argument was made by learned Counsel that the lower Court was wrong in stating that Section 164, U.P. Municipalities Act, 2 of 1916, barred the present suit. That section states in sub-section (1):
No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.
3. In Section 160(1) it is provides as follows:
In the cave of a tax assessed upon the annual ?value of buildings or lands or both an appeal against an order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 143 under Sub-section (3) of Section 147, and in the case of any other tax, an appeal against an assessment, or any alteration of an assessment, may be made to the District Magistrate or to such other officer as may be empowered by the Local Government in this behalf.
4. In my opinion this allows an appeal to be made to the District Magistrate against an assessment under the octroi schedule. Learned Counsel argued that this sub-section referred only to taxes on lands and buildings, but the subsection clearly refers to the case of any other tax. 'Octroi' is referred to in Section 128 (1)(8) as one of the taxes which may be imposed by a Municipal Board. Accordingly it must be one of the other taxes under Section 160(1), which are subject to an appeal to the District Magistrate. Argument was made by learned counsel that there is no assessment in the case of octroi. I consider that the process by which an octroi muharrir examines goods and refers to his schedule and comes to the conclusion that certain goods come under certain heads of that schedule and should pay a certain tax is a process which is correctly described as 'assessment.' Therefore the correct remedy open to the applicant was to proceed by way of appeal to the District Magistrate under Section 160, Municipalities Act, and under Section 164, Municipalities Act, the applicant was precluded from making the claim in Court which he has made.
5. For these reasons I dismiss this application in revision with costs.