Rachhpal Singh, J.
1. These are two connected appeals. Mt. Miran was the owner of a stone quarry. On 26th March 1927, she gave a lease of it to Kundan Lal and Moti Lal. The lease was given for a period of two years. The lessees agreed to pay Rs. 70 yearly as rent. During the continuance of the lease, Moti Lal assigned his rights in it to Kundan Lal. Mt. Miran died. Before the expiry of the period of two years, Deep Chand, the heir of Mt. Miran gave a notice to Kundan Lal plaintiff to quit. Kundan Lal did not comply with this demand. The result of the dispute was that two suits were instituted, one by Kundan Lal and other by Deep Chand. Kundan Lal in his suit contended that the lease given to him by Mt. Miran was for an indefinite period and that under its terms, he was entitled to keep the quarry in his possession for as long as he liked on payment of Rs. 70 per annum. He complained that Deep Chand was wrongfully interfering with his (Kundan Lal's) enjoyment of the lease. He therefore asked that a decree be granted to him declaring that he (Kundan Lal) was in possession of the land in suit and that Deep Chand had no right to interfere in any manner. Deep Chand instituted a suit against Kundan Lal. He alleged that the lease in favour of Kundan Lal was for a period of two years, that before the expiry of the lease notice to quit had been given to him, that he did not give up possession over the property leased and was therefore in wrongful possession of the same. Deep Chand asked for possession and damages.
2. Two suits were tried together. The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried them, came to the conclusion, that the plea of Kundan Lal that he, under the terms of the lease, was entitled to hold possession of the leased property for as long as he liked was not made out. He found it established that the lease which Mt. Miran had given to Kundan Lal was for a period of two years only. Kundan Lal had taken a plea that having regard to the provisions of Section 106, T.P. Act, he was entitled to six months' notice and so, the notice given to him by Deep Chand was bad and that therefore he was entitled to remain in possession of the leased property even after the expiry of the term of the lease. The Court below found that only 15 days' notice was necessary. The suit of Kundan Lal was dismissed, while the suit which Deep Chand had instituted against Kundan Lal for possession and damages was decreed. Kundan Lal has preferred these two appeals in both the cases.
3. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the lease in favour of Kundan Lal was for a period of two years only has not been challenged before us by the learned Counsel who appeared for Kundan Lal appellant. The only question which he has raised in this Court is that the notice which Deep Chand gave to Kundan Lal asking him to quit the leased property on the expiry of the period of two years was not a valid notice because of the iprovisions of Section 106, T.P. Act, and therefore a decree for ejectment should hot have been passed. We proceed to consider this question. The lease in favour of Kundan Lal was for a period of two years. The date of the lease is 26th March 1927. It terminated on 25th March 1929. On 31st January 1929, Deep Chand gave a notice to Kundan Lal asking him to give up possession by 26th March 1929. The contention of the learned Counsel for Kundan Lal is that in view of the provisions of Section 106, T.P. Act, Kundan Lal was entitled to a notice of six months. Section 106, T.P. Act runs as follows:
In the absence of a contract or local law or visage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy ; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by 15 days' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy....
4. The learned Subordinate Judge held that second part of the aforesaid section was applicable to the case and therefore only 15 days' notice was necessary. In our view, this opinion of the learned Subordinate Judge is not correct. We are clearly of opinion that Section 106, T.P. Act, has no application to the case before us. That section lays down that in cases where there is no contract or local law or usage, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable on six months' notice, and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable by 15 days' notice The language of the section shows in an unmistakeable manner that it will not apply to cases in which there is a contract that the lease is not one from year to year. The section prescribes rules by which, in the absence of contract or local law or usage to the contrary, the duration of leases and length of notice for terminating them are regulated. Section 106, T.P. Act, does not apply to cases in which the parties, under their agreement, fix a period for the lease. In the case before us, the Court below has found that the parties to the lease agreed that the lease was for a period of two years. Under the law, no notice was necessary. Under Section 111, T.P. Act, a lease of immovable property, where time is fixed by the parties to it, determines by the efflux of time' limited thereby. On the expiration of the term for which a lease has been granted the lessee may be ejected without notice to quit.
5. Section 116, T.P. Act, lays down that if a lessee of the property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to him, and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of contract to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Section 106, T.P. Act. In the case before us, the facts are different. Here, the lease was according to the contract between the parties for a period of two years certain. As soon as the period expired, the lease determined and the lessee was bound to give up possession. On the termination of the lease, the position of the lessee was that of a tenantat-sufferance as being one who came in by right and held over without rightt. Such a person can be ejected without notice. In the present case, it has been found that the lessor, before the expiry of the term of the lease, gave notice to the lessee that he did not desire the lessee to remain in possession after the termination of the period of lease. A tenant-at-sufferance has bare possession without right and without privity between himself and the owner; he has no right to any notice to quit. Where there is a contract between the parties that a lease would terminate on a particular day, that contract by itself is a notice to the lessee to quit on the expiry of the terms of the lease. According to English law
a lease for a term requires no notice to quit at the end of the term when the term expires by effuxion of time...':see Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 458, Vol. 18 (1911 Edn.).
6. The same rule has been laid down in Section 111, T.P. Act. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that where the period of a lease is fixed by a contract between the parties, the lease determines on the expiration of the term for which it has been granted and the lessee is liable to be ejected without notice to quit. Section 106, T.P. Act, has no application to a case in which the parties to the contract have fixed a period of the lease. Therefore in our judgment, the decree of the Court below is correct. Both the appeals of Kundan Lal stand dismissed with costs of the respondent.