1. This appeal arises out of an application made by the judgment-debtors appellants under Section 258 of Act XIV of 1882, asking the Court to record an alleged adjustment of a decree as certified. The decree-holder respondent had taken out execution of his decree and some property of the judgment-debtor was advertised for sale. On the date fixed for the sale the parties, it is alleged, entered into an agreement, whereby the judgment-debtors undertook to pay down Rs. 25 in cash, pay a further sum of Rs. 25 in November 1906, and execute a sale-deed of certain immovable property in favour of the decree-holder for the remainder of the amount of the decree. This agreement was made on the 20th of August 1906. Rs. 25 was paid to the decree-holder but no sale-deed was executed nor was the further sum of Rs. 25 paid. On the 17th of November 1906 the judgment-debtors filed an application which purported to be an application under Section 258 and stated therein that it had been mutually agreed between the decree-holder and judgment-debtors that the judgment-debtors should sell their property in mouzah Dawli to the decree-holder in lieu of the entire amount of the decree. The petition then sets forth 'Hence this agreement is filed and it is prayed that the adjustment may be sanctioned and certified and the execution case may be struck off, the decree having been satisfied in full.' This application was opposed by the decree-holder who alleged that he had been deceived by the judgment-debtors and that they had perpetrated a fraud on him as regards the property agreed to be sold.
2. The Court of first instance held that the agreement was one to grant time within the purview of Section 257A of the Code and not having been sanctioned by the Court was void. It accordingly refused to grant the application of the judgment-debtors. On appeal the lower appellate Court set aside the order of the Court of first instance and granted the judgment-debtors' application. This order has on appeal to this Court been set aside by a learned Judge of this Court and the order of the Court of first instance has been restored. Hence this appeal under the Letters Patent.
3. We agree with our learned brother that the agreement of the 20th of August 1906 was an agreement to grant time within the meaning of Section 257A of the Code. As it was not sanctioned by the Court it was void and, therefore, on the strength of this agreement the judgment-debtors were not entitled to ask the Court to record the decree as satisfied in fall.
4. We are, however, asked to regard the application as one for sanctioning the agreement, and it is contended that the Court of first instance was also asked to sanction the agreement and it had improperly refused to do so. As we have said above, the application made to the Court by the judgment-debtors was one not for the sanctioning of an agreement under Section 257A but to have the decree recorded as having been satisfied as full. The application was in substance and in form one under Section 258 of the Code. It appears from the judgment of the learned Munsif that in the course of the argument it was contended that the Court could sanction the agreement even at that late stage of the proceedings. The learned Munsif was, in our opinion, justified in refusing to accede to that request. The application which the Court had to determine was as we have said above not an application under Section 257A but under Section 258. At that late stage of the proceedings the Court of first instance was right in refusing to treat the application before it as an application under Section 257A, specially in view of the fact that the application contained an untrue allegation. We see no reason to interfere with the decree appealed against and, accordingly, dismiss this appeal with costs.