P.N. Bakshi, J.
1. This revision application arises out of the proceedings under S 145 Cr. P.C. An application under Section 145 Cr. P.C. was filed by Ram Lubhaya and others on 12th June 1978. The Station Officer Kotwali was directed to make a spot inspection and to submit his report. The Station Officer reported vide Annexure 'C' dated 12-6-1978 that there was an apprehension of breach of peace and prayed for attachment of the disputed property. Another detailed report was called for by the Magistrate on 13-6-1978 which was submitted the same day vide Annexure 'D' in which while recommending action under Section 145 Cr. P.C. it was also reported that civil litigation had been decided with respect to the same property by the Munsif as well as by the Civil and Sessions Judge in favour of Smt. Prem Lata. It appears that the Magistrate asked for the opinion of the District Government Council (Criminal). He was of the opinion that it was not desirable to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. in view of the Civil litigation between the parties, and if there was apprehension of the breach of peace, then the party concerned should be proceeded with under Section 107/117 Cr. P.C. Thereafter on 15th June 1978 Ram Lobhaya and three others again filed an application under Sections 145/147 Cr. P.C. on which the Station Officer Kotwali was again directed to submit his report. The Station Officer Kotwali reported on 15-6-1978 that there was an apprehension of the breach of peace and that the property in dispute may be attached under Section 146 Cr P. C. On 16th June 1978 the City Magistrate, Mathura being of the opinion that there was an apprehension of the breach of peace and considering the case one of emergency, passed impugned order attaching the property in dispute. Hence this revision.
2. I have heard counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the documents on the record. A preliminary objection has been taken that the impugned order being an interlocutory order the revision in question is not maintainable. Learned Counsel for the applicants has argued that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order. His submission is that if this Court comes to the conclusion that since the civil dispute with respect to the land in question has been decided in favour of the applicants, the court below should not have proceeded under Section 145 Cr. P.C. but should have taken action under Section 107/117 Cr. P.C. against the opposite parties, the entire proceedings were liable to be quashed. In the alternative the learned Counsel has also urged that the order of attachment is a final order passed under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. (new) and will enure till the rights to the properties, with regard to the person entitled to possession to the disputed land are determined by a competent court.
3. The first argument of the learned Counsel is not acceptable to me for a number of reasons. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit that in the civil suit the Munsif had issued a temporary injunction, which was dismissed subsequently. The opposite parties preferred an appeal which was allowed. The matter however, is being agitated in the High Court by the opposite parties. In this view the order of the civil court cannot be said to be final. Secondly, I find from a perusal of the prayer contained in the memorandum of revision that it seeks the setting aside of the order of attachment of the property in dispute under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. There is no prayer contained in this revision for quashing of the proceedings pending under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. For the reasons given above, the first contention of the applicants' counsel is repelled.
4. With regard to the second contention, two cases have been brought to my notice by the counsel for the parties. In the decision of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : 1978CriLJ165 the scope of interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr. P.C. (new) was under consideration. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the view that 'An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr. P.C.' Applying that principle it cannot be said that a decision on the question whether the emergency attachment of the property in dispute is justifiable Or not is a matter which will conclude the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. From a perusal of Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. it is clear that an order of attachment can be passed by the Magistrate on the existence of either of the following three conditions:
1. When after passing a preliminary order under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. he considers the case one of emergency.
2. When he decides (obviously after taking the entire evidence) that none of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order, and
3. When in spite of the evidence being recorded he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties wag in possession of the disputed land on the date of the preliminary order.
5. The first order of attachment would obviously be passed during the continuance of the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate. However, if he considers during the course of the proceedings that an emergency has arisen, he is entitled to pass an order directing attachment. In that case in spite of the order of attachment the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. shall continue and the entire procedure prescribed under Section 145 Cr. P.C. shall continue to be followed. The parties will file their written statements, documents, affidavits and produce evidence as they may desire and thereafter under Sub-section (4) of Section 145 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate will decide which of the party was in possession of the disputed property on the date he passed the preliminary order under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 Cr. P.C. Thus an order of emergency attachment in the first instance cited above will not conclude the proceedings. As a matter of fact, when a decision has been arrived at under Section 145(4) Cr. P.C. by the Magistrate and he gives his verdict holding one party to be in possession of the property in dispute and forbidding interference with his possession by the other party, he will in those circumstances lift the emergency attachment imposed by him. In other words the emergency attachment is just a protective measure to prevent breaking of heads till such time as the Magistrate gives his final decision under Section 145(4) Cr. P.C. As such an order passed under the first clause of Section 146 Cr. P.C. will be an interlocutory order.
6. The other two types of attachment, however, fall in a different category. The jurisdiction to pass such an order arises only in two contingencies mentioned above. After the case is concluded, he decides that no party is in possession, he is empowered to attach the property, till the rights of the parties are decided by a competent court. If, on the conclusion of evidence he is unable to decide which party is in possession, he is still empowered to attach the property till the decision of their rights by a competent court. In other words the attachment contemplated under the second and the third clauses of Section 146 is a final order so far as the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. is conferred. After attaching the property, subject however, to the requirements of Section 146(2) Cr. P.C. the Magistrate becomes functus officio and the whole dispute thereafter inter partes with regard to their rights can only be decided by a competent court, civil or revenue, whatever it might be. Therefore, the attachment order passed under the second and the third clause of Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. would be a final order and it will continue to be operative so long as the parties do not approach the proper forum for vindication of their rights. Such an order will conclude the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C, and as such it would be a final order. Support to my aforesaid opinion is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik : 1978CriLJ356 , wherein their Lordships have given expression to a similar view in para 7 of their judgment, which need not be repeated. Lastly, it is urged by the applicant's counsel that the impugned order dated 16th June 1978 was passed behind the back of the par-ties and the Magistrate has incorrectly mentioned in the impugned order that he had heard the counsel for both the parties. I have carefully perused the application filed by the applicants before the Magistrate on 16th June, 1978. There is no mention in this application that the counsel for the parties were not heard by the Magistrate before he passed the impugned order. No such grievance has been made therein. On this application the Magistrate ordered as follows : 'Orders have already been passed. K. O. F. (Keep on file) seen'. It is true that in the High Court a grievance has been made to the effect that the parties' counsel were not heard, but the City Magistrate concerned, has not been impleaded specifically as one of the opposite parties to give a reply to those allegations. For these reasons it is not possible to hold that the order dated 16-6-1978 was passed without hearing the counsel for the parties.
7. Having thus considered the submissions made on behalf of the applicants, I am of the opinion that the revision filed in this Court is not legally maintainable and it is hereby dismissed.