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Rahmat Vs. Ganeshi Lal - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1928All264; 108Ind.Cas.733
AppellantRahmat
RespondentGaneshi Lal
Cases ReferredSundar Singh v. Collector of Shahjahanpur
Excerpt:
- .....of proprietary title has been in issue in the court of first instance and is a matter in issue in appeal the appeal lies to the district judge. there can, i think, be no question that the terms of section 177 (e) have been fulfilled in this case.5. the defendants set up the plea that they were proprietors under section 158, tenancy act, and that plea was decided by the first court in their favour. the plaintiff went in appeal and raised the question of proprietary right in his memorandum of appeal. it is quite clear, therefore, that the question of proprietary title was in issue in both courts; consequently it is not possible to argue now that the district judge had no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. i may refer in this connexion to the case reported in sundar singh v. collector.....
Judgment:

Lindsay, J.

1. The proceedings which have given rise to this appeal were taken under Section 154, Agra Tenancy Act, by one Ganeshi Lal who claimed to be the zamindar of these plots of land specified in the plaint. The defendants to the suit were Ramzan Shah and others. The case of the plaintiff, as disclosed in the plaint, was that these defendants were holding the lands in suit rent free in lieu of their services for the maintenance of a takia. In para. 2 of the plaint a statement was given of the specific services which the defendants were liable to render and it was alleged that the defendants had ceased to render these services. In paragraph 3 of the plaint it was said that the plaintiff no longer desired to have these services rendered.

2. By way of reply the defendants put forward the case that the land was not resumable as it was not muafi in lieu of services but was a charitable muafi. And in paragraph 4 of the written statement it was pleaded that the defendants having been in possession for more than fifty years and for more than two generations they were not liable to be ejected. The Court of first instance decided in favour of the defendant; the lower appellate Court has decreed the plaintiff's suit.

3. It has been argued in the first place that the learned additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the decision of the Assistant Collector, and this argument is based on the provisions of the Schedules to the Tenancy Act, Schedule 4, group C, Serial No. 36. Group C certainly relates to suits which are triable by Assistant Collectors of the 1st Class and from which an appeal lies to the revenue Court. So prima facie an appeal in a case brought under Section 154, Tenancy Act, would be to the revenue Court.

4. Dr. Agarwala, however, has that this objection by referring to the provisions of Section 177 (e), Agra Tenancy Act, U.P., Act 2 of 1901. From this it is clear that in all suits in which a question of proprietary title has been in issue in the Court of first instance and is a matter in issue in appeal the appeal lies to the District Judge. There can, I think, be no question that the terms of Section 177 (e) have been fulfilled in this case.

5. The defendants set up the plea that they were proprietors under Section 158, Tenancy Act, and that plea was decided by the first Court in their favour. The plaintiff went in appeal and raised the question of proprietary right in his memorandum of appeal. It is quite clear, therefore, that the question of proprietary title was in issue in both Courts; consequently it is not possible to argue now that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. I may refer in this connexion to the case reported in Sundar Singh v. Collector of Shahjahanpur [1911] 33 All. 553. I refer in particular to the statement of the law set out in the order of Mr. Justice Banerji. So much for the question of jurisdiction. As regards the other matters in dispute between the parties: the case for the defendants was that the grant was a charitable grant and as such not resumable. On the evidence before me the Judge of the Court below has held that the grant was not a charitable grant, but was a service grant and he based his decision principally upon the ground that in the settlement papers of the year 1886 the lands in question were recorded as service muafi. He points out again that when partition was made in the year 1912 the lands were again described in the same terms, and finally he points out that in the settlement of 1917 the lands are still recorded as a service grant. In these circumstances the Judge was entitled to come to the finding that this was a service grant, and as the plaintiff had stated that he no longer required the services it follows that the grant was resumable. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.


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