1. This application in revision must be allowed. The plaintiff Shyam Lal sued for recovery of possession over certain properties. The parties agreed that they would abide by a statement made by a certain gentleman, Khem Chand. Mr. Khem Chand made a statement to the effect that if defendant 1 paid the sum of Rs. 2,100 within two months of the date of his making the statement, which was 10th June 1927, the suit would stand dismissed, and if defendant 1 failed to pay, the suit would stand decreed. The learned Munsif before whom the case was, passed a decree in those terms. Defendant 1 on 10th August 1927, on which day, the two months' period expired, paid into Court the sum of Rs. 1,150. He, further, made an application to the Court for granting three months' further time to him, to pay up the balance. On 12th August 1927, the learned Munsiff, after hearing the parties, refused that application. On the same date, defendant 1 deposited the balance of the money. On the deposit being made, the learned Munsiff made a declaration that this payment would have a retrospective effect, as if the money had been paid on 10th August 1927. The effect of this declaration was that the decree which should have been in plaintiff's favour, went against him and the plaintiff's suit stood dismissed. The plaintiff has come up in revision and his contention is that the Court below had no jurisdiction to extend the time and his order dated 12th August 1927, should be set aside.
2. Mr. Panna Lal, the learned advocate for the respondents, has taken the objection that the order was appealable and no application in revision lay. His contention is that the order was virtually one under Section 47, Civil P.C., and, therefore, being a decree, was appealable. We do not accept this contention as correct. The decree that was passed on 10th June 1927 was an incomplete decree, which was to take its final shape on certain things happening or not happening, within two months. If a deposit was made within two months, the decree was to take this shape, namely, the suit of the plaintiff was to stand dismissed. If, on the other hand, no deposit was made, the decree was to be in favour of the plaintiff, allowing him to recover possession of property. The question, that arose before the learned Munsiff, was, what shape the decree should take in consequence of the deposit made by the defendant. The question that arose, was not, therefore, a question of the satisfaction or discharge of a decree. On the merits, we are of opinion, that the Court below had no jurisdiction to extend time We agree with the cases decided in this Court, namely, Sajjadi Begam v. Dilawar Husain  40 All. 579 and Kandhaiya Singh v. Mt. Kundan  42 All. 639. The power given to the Court under Section 148, Civil P.C., is a power to extend time where any period is fixed or granted by the Court to do an act prescribed or allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., where, in the progress of the suit, something has to be done by a party, the Court granting the time may extend the time. But where the decree settles the rights of the parties finally, the Court cannot extend time so as to interfere with the rights of the parties. The result is that we allow the application and set aside the order of 12th August 1927, passed by the learned Munsiff. The result is that the deposit of 12th August 1927 will not be treated as deposit made on 10th August 1927. The opposite parties will pay the costs of the application in this Court.