1. The question for determination in this Second Appeal is whether a certain petition filed in the Revenue Court on 22nd December 1914 in a mutation proceeding is admissible in evidence, and, if so, whether it gives the appellant the property which he claims.
2. The question has to be decided with reference to the peculiar facts of this case, having regard, of course, to the principles laid down in various cases by this High Court.
3. It appears that on the death of Musammat Udha, the widow of one Monohar Ojha, certain persons, including the appellant, claimed title. Applications were made in the Revenue Court. It does not appear clearly on what ground the present appellant claimed. The compromise in question was filed. This compromise will be examined later on. It will be sufficient here to mention that by this compromise the parties to it aeked the Revenue Court to record the names of themselves in certain shares. An order was made in accordance with the compromise. But it appears from the statement of facts made in the plaint that this order was set aside by a Court of appeal on the ground that the persons actually in possession were the Maharaja of Dumraon and another. Some of the defendants in this suit instituted a suit in the Civil Court for the ejectment of the Maharaja of Dumraon and others with respect to the property which belonged to Musammat Udha. That suit succeeded and on foot of the decree mutation orders were passed in favour of the contesting defendants. This fact constituted the cause of action of the plaintiff-appellant and he brought the suit for mainten ance of possession.
4. It has been found by the Court of first instance that the plaintiff never got possession. The plaintiff based his claim on two grounds. He contended that he was an adopted son of one Dhanai Ojha and as such was reversioner to the property. On this point the decision of the Courts below is against him. It has been found that Dhanai Ojha never adopted him. The second point that was taken by him was that as the result of the compromise arrived at in the mutuation proceedings he was entitled to the share now claimed by him. The Courts below negatived this ground of the claim, They held that the document by itself did not create any title for want of registration.
5. The Courts below have relied on the Full Bench case of Jagrani v. Bisheshar Dube 36 Iad. Cas. 701 : 14 A.L.J. 449 : 38 A. 866 (F.B.). The learned Counsel for the appellant has sought to distinguish this case and has referred me to two cases decided subsequently, namely, the case of Baldeo Singh v. Udal Singh 58 Ind. Cas. 732 : 18 A.L.J. 877 : 2 U.P.L.R. (A) 202 and Salamatul-Zamina v. Masha Alia Khan, 43 Ind. Cas. 645 : 16 A.L.J. 98 : 40 A. 187.
6. In my opinion this case must be decided on the peculiar facts involved in it. The principles of law are perfectly clear. Where an agreement is not required by law to be in writing or to be registered it is not necessary to prove the agreement by the production of a written document. Now the question in this case is whether the petition of compromise filed in the Revenue Court is admissible to prove the plaintiff's title. I have already said that, it has been found that the appellant has no title to the property independently of the compromise. This claim based on adoption by Dhanai Ojha has been negatived. But that fact alone does not show that there was not a bona fide contest in the mutation proceedings. But the question is, 'the plaintiff having no initial title at all, what is that which gives him the title'. It is said that it is the agreement among the parties in the mutation proceedings by which they settled their dispute that the appellant's claim was recognised. Reading the petition of compromise I find the following sentence in it:
Haq o hissa har sulah kunindagam hasb-i-zail qarar paya.
7. Assuming that there was a bona fide dispute as to the property the terms of the settlement were reduced into writing and the petition of compromise purported to declare the rights of the several executants. As the terms of the compromise were reduced into writing, the writing alone is the evidence and no oral evience can be adduced to prove the agreement. The writing being there and the property involved being worth more than Rs. 100 the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act would apply and the document cannot be of any value to the appellant without registration. In fact, the petition of compromise is the title-deed of the appellant. He has no title independently of this document. In this view I think the decision of the Courts below was perfectly right. I dismiss the appeal with costs including fees in this Court on the higher scale.