1. This is an application by one who was the decree-holder in the Court below for setting aside an order dated 8th December 1927, passed by the Second Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur, in the exercise of our revisional power. The facts are these: The decree-holder brought about the sale of the judgment-debtors' property. The judgment-debtors applied for setting aside the sale. The application came up for hearing on 30th June 1927. On that date there was a default in the appearance of the judgment-debtors, and their application was dismissed for default, the sale being confirmed, automatically. Within a month of this date, namely, on 26th July 1927, the judgment-debtors applied for the restoration of their application and for a re-hearing of it. The learned Subordinate Judge has granted this application by the order under revision.
2. The point that has been taken is that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass an order of restoration, although he professed to act under Section 151, Civil P.C. We have given the argument our best consideration and we are of opinion that whether Section 141, Civil P.C., applies or not, Section 151 may safely be applied. In this case the learned Subordinate Judge was satisfied that there was a very good ground for the default committed by the judgment-debtors. If that was so, it was necessary that the applicants should have their application for setting aside the sale re-heard. Justice was done in their favour and we shall be loath to hold that the Code did not provide any remedy, when Section 151, Civil P.C., gives wide powers to the Court to be exercised where there was no specific provision in it.
3. On the merits the learned Counsel for the applicant argued that the learned Judge did not consider the case fully and that he quoted the affidavit of only one of the applicants and did not consider whether there was any good ground for the other judgment-debtor to be absent. This is a matter relating to the facts of the case and if the learned Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application for restoration of the previous application we do not think we should interfere on the merits. The application is dismissed with costs.