1. The question in; this case is whether the appeal in an ejectment suit, lies, to the Civil Court, or to the Revenue Court. This question depends in the present suit on whether a question of jurisdiction has been decided within the, meaning of Section 177(f) of the Tenancy Act. In construing the provisions of that section, we are bound by the ruling of the Full Bench in Gokaran Singh v. Ganga Singh 52 Ind. Cas. 779 : 42 A. 79 A.L.J. 1072 : 1 U.P.L.R. (A.) 136 which approved a previous Letters Patent decision in Umrai Singh v. Ewaz Singh 49 Ind. Cas. 732 : 41 A. 270 : 17 A.L.J. 189. The rule laid down by the Full Bench is that a plea of jurisdiction, to come within the provisions of Section 177(f), must be a plea to the effect that, assuming the allegations made in the plaint to be true, the Revenue Court has no jurisdiction. If the defendant alleges that the true facts are different from those stated in the plaint, and that on the facts alleged by himself, the case is not cognizable by the Revenue Court, this is not a plea to which Section 177(f applies. Applying this rule to the facts of the present case, we find that the plaint sets out' that a certain Ranjit Singh was the original occupancy tenant of the village. He relinquished his occupancy rights, which thereupon became extinct. The defendants were at the time of the relinquishment sub-tenants, and on the relinquishment became non-occupancy tenants, who were liable to ejectment. On this statement of facts, it was not alleged and could not be alleged that the suit was not one cognizable by the Revenue Court. What the defendant did allege is that, instead of being a sub-tenant, he was a mortgagee from the occupancy tenant, and, therefore, a suit against him lay in the Civil Court. In our opinion, therefore, the case comes under the rule laid down by the Full Bench, and the plea of jurisdiction raised by the defendant is not one to which Section 177(f) applies. It would be improper for us to express any opinion as to the correctness of the Full Bench ruling. As a Division Bench, we are bound by it, and we follow it. The appeal accordingly fails, and it is hereby dismissed with costs.