1. This was a suit before the Court of Small Causes at Allahabad. The claim was on a promissory note which, as brought into Court, purported to be dated November the 28th, 1911. The defendants alleged that the real date was the 28th of November 1910 and that the last figure of the year had been dishonestly altered in order to bring the suit within limitation. They also pleaded payment in full. The learned Judge of the Court below observed that from the appearance of the paper it did seem as if the last figure of the date at the foot of the pro-note in suit had been originally written as a cipher and changed to the figure 1. He came to no finding as to whether this had been done dishonestly, or indeed as to whether it had been done after the execution of the note or as to the date on which the note was actually executed. He held it proved that there had been a payment on account of interest made one year subsequant to the execution of the note, so that the suit was within time whether the pro-note in question was in fact executed on November the 28th, 1910, or 1911. He found against the defendants that no payment was proved over and above the one payment of Rs. 17 already referred to. Upon these findings he decreed the plaintiff's claim.
2. The defendants have brought the matter before this Court in revision. They contend that the pro-note in suit, having been materially alterad, is void as against them and no suit, is maintainable in respect of the same.
3. The real question is whether I ought to set aside the decree passed by the Court below and remand the case for enquiry as to whether there has or has not been any material alteration in the terms of the pro-note in suit since its execution. If the point was one clearly covered by Statute Law, I should feel it my duty to interfere; but the provisions of Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) are expressly limited to negotiable instruments' as defined in Section 13 of the fame Act. The pro-note in suit was not payable to the plaintiff or his order, and was, therefore, not a negotiable instrument.' It has been contended before me that the principle embodied in Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been applied, on the authority of English cases and on principles of justice, equity and good conscience, to mortgage-deeds, simple bonds and other documents which are not negotiable instruments. The authorities in this Court on the point seems to be Ganga Ram v. Chandan Singh 4 A. 62 and Mangal Sen v. Shankar Sahai 15 A. 580; A.W.N. (1903) 122. I do not think the point so clear as to justify my interference in revision in a case in which, on the findings of fact recorded by the Court below, justice has been done between the parties. I dismiss this application.