Sunder Lal, J.
1. One Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh died, leaving two widows Musammats Balraj Kuar and Bilas Kuar, He also left, daughter by Bilas Kuar named Janki Kuar and Janki Kuar had a son named Chiranji Kuar. The plaintiff-respondent lent a sum of money to Musammat Balraj Kuar as representing the estate of her husband Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh. He, therefore, brought a suit for recovery of that amount against the estate of Bisheshar Bakbsh Singh and against the defendant. That is the prayer in the plaint. The Court below gave a decree against Janki Kuar alone and dismissed the suit as against the other defendant. That was on September 20th, 1911. Against that decree an appeal was filed to the District Judge on behalf of Janki Kuar. That Court dismissed; he appeal. The Court of Wards preferred an appeal against the said decree to this Court. In appeal, it was urged on behalf of Janki Kuar that the decree should have been, so far as she was concerned, against She estate of Bisheshar Bakesh Singh in her hands. This Court, therefore, allowed the appeal to this extent, but it was held that the defendant appellant was liable for the amount of the decree to the extent of the assets of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh in the defendant's hands. The decree made in that case is against the appellant as assets-holder of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh's estate. On, the date when the decree was made Bilas Kuar was the real representative of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh and Janki Kuar did not represent the estate. Bilas Kuar died in July, 1913, and it was then that Janki Kuar became entitled to the estate. Airways, on behalf of the appellant, has argued that the suit as against Bilas Kuar having been dismissed, any estate which passed from Bilas Kuar to Janki Kuar' as the estate of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh was not liable. Whether a decree against Janki Kuar in the terms in which this Court on the motion of Janki Kuar passed the decree, should have passed or not is not for me to decide. That decree was made by this Court and is binding upon the parties and upon me. It is a decree against the estate of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh that may be in Janki Knar's hands and although she got such estate subsequent to the decree, I think that the term may be' in this particular decree is wide enough to cover any property that now may be in her hands. There is now a decree against Janki Kuar as representative of the estate of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh and any property in her hands now is equally liable. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. The decree in this case, I take it, is a decree in terms of Section 52 of the Code. It is not a decree against any specific property, nor was it intended to be limited to the assets then in hand. It is not drawn up with precision but was, I think, intended to be a decree under the said section.
2. I have come to the same conclusion with considerable hesitation. I think we are really stretching the language of the decree and giving to it an effect which a strict interpretation does not bear in the interest of what we believe to be the justice of the case. And I, therefore, think it important to make quite clear, at any rate so far as I am concerned, the ground upon which I do it. Otherwise I think there is danger of laying down a principle of interpretation which is unsound and may be misleading. I do not think that the language of the decree, whore specific property is indicated as being liable to discharge the decree, can be interpreted as speaking from the date of execution. Not do I think that in the ordinary case when a plaintiff has obtained a decree against the personal representative of the estate of a deceased person, if he confines himself to obtaining a decree against the assets which are in the hands of the person, he can afterwards come in execution and actual property which has come thereafter. To hold that would be to my mind to render superfluous and unnecessary the common form of addition which is invariably made for the protection of the decree-holder it such case, namely, assets which are or may come into the hands of the personal re preventative. In dismissing the appeal ] adopt the reasoning given in the judgment of the Court below: 'There cannot be the slightest doubt that the appellant Rani posed in the High Court as one of the representatives of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh otherwise Champa Lal's suit would have been dismissed by that Court. Looking at the frame of the plaintiff's original suit and the appellant's conduct in the High Court I feel certain that the decree was really passed against the estate of Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh and as at present that property is in the possession of the appellant and she is the personal representative, she cannot now be heard to object to the attachment.' On that ground and on that ground alone I am prepared to give in this particular case what I think as an elastic interpretation to the two words may be and to hold that they must be taken to mean may at any time be.'
3. The order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.