1. This is a first appeal: from order brought, by an employer against an order, dated 8th April 1933, directing the employer to pay Rupees-393-12-0 only compensation to a widow of one Murli, who it was held died of accident on 26th June 1931 in the employment of the appellant. The facts, are that within six months from the death on 24th August 1931, an application was made to the Collector of Cawnpore by one Mahabir, son of Murli setting out the facts and stating:
3. That on his death Murli left as his heirs. Mahabir, applicant, Hanuman, one widow and, one daughter.
4. That according to Section 3, Clause A, Section 4, Workmen's Compensation Act, the applicant who is the son of the deceased and manager of his family is entitled to receive compensation to the extent of Rs. 510 from the defendant firm.
2. A written statement was taken in reply on 7th January 1933. The Collector passed an order on this application stating:
The most important issue is whether Mahabir is entitled to claim compensation. He has admitted that he is (now) in his 18th year. This settles the matter so far as Murli is concerned. He may not claim.
Now during the hearing an attempt has been made to bring up claims for a widow and two minor children of whom Mahabir has deposed but of whom he said nothing at all in his claim (or the preliminary notice to the employer) and who themselves have not claimed. The question present would be whether they could not be given compensation. No semblance of a sound reason has been shown for not introducing the alleged widow and minors to the Court at an earlier stage leave alone to the employer who may have been moved to pay some compensation if satisfied.
In these circumstances, I must and do hold that the claim is time barred, and it is so much so that I shall not extend the time. I reject the claim.
3. On the same date an application was filed by Mahabir purporting to be for review under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C., stating that Mahabir was claiming in paras. 3 and 4 of his plaint for other members of the family and asking that the order of that date be set aside and that:
the case be decided after taking into consideration paras. 3 and 4 of the plaint.
4. Next day the Commissioner held that the original application referred also to the widow and minors:
I shall therefore take up their questions tomorrow, framing further issues necessary.
5. Three issues were framed and the order in question awarding compensation to the widow as a dependant was passed. In first appeal it has been urged that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act has no power to review his order under Order 47, Rule 1 and therefore that he had no jurisdiction to pass the order under appeal. An objection was taken that no appeal lay, but as the order awards compensation, I hold that an appeal lies under Section 30(1)(a). It has not been urged for respondent that the Commissioner has powers of review and there is nothing in the Workmen's Compensation Act, to confer any power of review on a Commissioner under that Act. It has been held in In the matter of Karim Dad 1930 Lah. 657, that a Commissioner has no power to set aside a previous order for compensation made by him under a mistake and in the general rules made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Rule 29, Sub-rule (2), it is provided that no addition or alteration shall be made to the judgment other than the correction of a clerical or arithmetical mistake arising from an accidental slip or omission. I consider therefore that the Commissioner did not have powers to set aside his order of 7th January 1933, in review. It is true that the application made to him is headed 'review', but it is also true that his order of 8th March 1933, does not purport to be an order in review or setting aside the previous order of 7th January 1933. What be purports to do is to pass orders in regard to the original written application of 24th August 1931, in so far as it refers to the claim of the widow and minors, as he had not passed any order in regard to that claim in that application. Learned Counsel for appellant argued that he had passed an order, in the order of 7th January 1933. I do-not think that he passed any order in regard to the claims of the widow and minors in the petition in his order of 7th January 1933, because the language of that order is confined to a hypothetical claim made orally on that date only in regard to the widow and two minor children. No order was passed in regard to the written claim on behalf of the widow and two minor children on 24th August 1931. In my view the order of 7th January 1933, was final as regards the personal claim of Mahabir, but no order was passed on that date in regard to the claims of the widow and minors. The Commissioner therefore had failed to adjudicate on that matter and a supplementary order was necessary. It is laid down in Section 19(1). Workmen's Compensation Act, (8 of 1923), that:
If any question arises under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation...the question shall in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner.
6. The Commissioner was bound to settle the question of whether the compensation was due to the widow and minors on the application of 24th August 1931 and that claim which was brought within the period of six months from the death as prescribed by Section 10 was a claim which he had not decided. I consider therefore that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass order of 8th April 1933, now under appeal. Some further argument was made by learned Counsel that the application of 24th August 1931, could not have been made by Mahabir on behalf of the widow and minors because Section 24 of the Act requires that any appearance, application or act to be made or done by any person before or to a Commissioner may be made or done on behalf of such person by a legal practitioner or other person authorized in writing by 'such person.' As the words 'other person' are joined to legal practitioner, I understand that these words indicate formal appearance on behalf of the persons claiming. In the lease of a Hindu joint family acts on behalf of the members of the joint family such as the widows and minors are done by the managing member, lit has been stated in these proceedings that Mahabir is the managing member. I consider therefore that, the application was validly made by Mahabir on behalf of the widow and minors and that no authorization in writing by them was necessary. For these reasons I dismiss this first appeal from order with costs.