1. This appeal arises out of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in which a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The parties are both very young. The wife, i.e., the appellant left her husband and instituted proceedings for maintenance under Section 488, Criminal P.C. She obtained, an order from a Magistrate for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10 a month, on 14th July 1931. An application for revision in the Court of the Sessions Judge was dismissed on 22nd September 1931. In the meanwhile, on the 15th of September the husband had instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal.
2. The only defence to the suit was that the husband had been guilty of cruelty. The learned Judge of the trial Court came to the conclusion that he had been so guilty and dismissed the suit. On the other hand, in the appellate Court it was found that no real cruelty had been established. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the whole trouble was due to the fact that the husband had married a second wife. As he very rightly said, the husband was entitled to do this under the Hindu law, and the marriage would not be a ground for his previous wife's refusing to live with him. It appeared that she maintained that when she went to live with her husband, he being only about 13 or 14 years of age, she found that he was carrying on an intrigue with another woman who used to visit his Chouse. Considering the age of the boy and the fact that he was apparently living with his parents at that time I consider that the learned Judge was quite right in disbelieving the story. The defendant said that she was beaten, but, as I have already said, the learned Judge disbelieved her statement. As it has been found as a fact that there was no legal cruelty there is really no force in this appeal.
3. It has been argued that the husband accused his wife of unchastity, but the only evidence appears to be that of a person who declares that there was a panchayat in which the plaintiff and his father were fined because they could not establish an imputation of this kind which they had made. I do not think that a charge of this nature made as it were in defence would be a sufficient ground for refusing to pass a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In my opinion there is no force in this appeal and I dismiss it with coats. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.