1. This is an application in civil revision by a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by a Small Cause Court on the ground that it was time-barred. The plaintiff sued on a simple money bond execution 1st April 1931. The suit was brought on 6th July 1934, that is more than three years after the execution of the bond. The bond set out firstly that the money was payable on demand and further on it set out that interest should be payable six monthly and that the whole sum with interest should be paid within one year. The suit was brought within three years from the date for payment of 1st April 1932. Article 66. Limitation Act. applies to the case and the question is whether the period of limitation should run from the date of execution on the ground that the bond was payable on demand or whether it should run from the period of one year j specified in the bond as payable. The principle which applies in such cases appears be me to examine whether it was open to the debtor to make a payment before the end of the period of one year fixed. Clearly in the case of this bond, it was not open to the debtor to make a payment because the bond states that it was payable on demand, that is on demand of the creditor. Until the creditor made a demand the bond was not payable. This clause therefore gave the creditor an option, but it did not give any option to the debtor. There was a somewhat similar case in Jwala Prasad v. Shama Charan 1920 All. 353. In that case there was a promissory note payable on demand, and on the date of execution the defendant wrote to the Bank promising to pay within a year and apparently the Bank accepted that promise as part of the agreement between the parties. It was held that limitation would run from the expiry of the period of one year. I consider that the general principle governing these cases is to be deduced from a ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Lasa Din v. Gulab Kunwar 1932 P.C. 207. In that case there was a mortgage deed with a period of twelve years for payment and provision that payment might be demanded in case of default of payment of interest. It was held that this was an option to the creditor and that limitation did not run until the period of twelve yeans should expire. This principle in that ruling was laid down in regard to mortgage bonds, but it has been extended to simple bonds in a ruling in Lalta Prasad v. Gajadhar Shukul 1933 All. 235.
2. For these reasons I allow this application in revision and set aside the decree of the lower Court and remand the suit for disposal on the remaining issue. The court-fee of this Court will be returned to the plaintiff. Costs hitherto incurred will be costs in the case.