1. Musammat Muradan brought a suit, as amended, for a declaration that she has an ex-proprietary right in respect of the lands specified and that the plaintiff's registered deed of relinquishment, dated the 19th of January, 1918, is forged and is null and void and in effectual as against her. The facts are that the plaintiff was an ex-proprietary tenant together with certain relatives of 86 bighas odd of land. She and these other relatives executed a usufructuary mortgage. Subsequently some of the relatives entered into an arrangement with the zemindar by which he agreed to discharge the mortgage and in return therefor, these relatives executed in his favour on the 19th of January, 1918, a deed of relinquishment of 70 bighas of the land which purported to be executed by the plaintiff and all the relatives. To this extent the transaction would appear to have been to the benefit of the plaintiff in that she and her family recovered unencumbered possession of 16 bighas odd. The plaintiff alleges that she was no party to the deed of relinquishment at all and that so far as her name at any rate was concerned as it was a forgery. It has been found by both Courts that her allegation the forgery was well founded, and the trial Court gave her a decree for all the reliefs which she sought. On appeal the lower Appellate Court while agreeing with the trial Court that the document was a forgery in so far as the plaintiff's name was concerned and that the plaintiff would ordinarily be entitled to be declared an ex-proprietary tenant of the whole 86 bighas, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation under Article 92 of the Limitation Act.
2. The deed of relinquishment was dated the 19th of January, 1918, and the suit was filed on the 20th of June, 1923. Therefore if Article 92 was properly applicable and governed the whole of the reliefs asked for the suit was properly dismissed. The plaintiff, who was a pardanashin lady, does not appear to have wholly slept upon her rights, but she or her advisers did not know how to proceed and they wasted some considerable time in making applications to the District Judge and the Collector. It was urged below that she was entitled to the benefit of the time occupied in these proceedings. But that contention has not been repeated before us, and it is clear that if Article 92 governs the whole of the relief which she sought, the suit was barred. On behalf of the appellant we have been referred to the case of Jagardeo Singh v. Phuljhari 30 A. 375 : A.W.N. (1908) 156 : 5 A.L.J. 421 and the case of Mi San Ma Khaing v. Shwe Ba 74 Ind. Cas. 164; A.I.R. 1923 Rang. 82. Upon the view that we take we do not consider it necessary to consider these cases in detail. This was, so far as the relief concerning the document which we have set out above is concerned, in terms a suit for a declaration that the registered document was forged and as such that relief clearly comes within Article 92 of the Limitation Act, and the suit having been brought after the lapse of three years, that relief was barred by limitation.
3. The next question is whether the relief asking for a declaration that the document was forged was to such an extent the principal relief that any other relief was merely so subsidiary that the whole suit must be regarded as barred.
4. If we interpret appellant's argument in the most favourable way to her, it is that the relief asking for a declaration that the document was forged was wholly unnecessary; that the plaintiff was really entitled to ask merely for a declaration of her right in the property and that if this prayer was met by the defendants by the production of the deed alleged to be forged, it would be only necessary for the Court to determine whether that evidence, like any other evidence in the suit, was reliable or not, and that if it held that evidence was unreliable the plaintiff would be entitled to the declaration of the right which she sought.
5. Assuming that this is a tenable position, we may consider whether she could be given in the present suit the relief that she claims by a declaration of her right. That relief is that it may be declared that the plaintiff has an ex-proprietary right in respect of the specified lands. It is clear that the plaintiffs position is that she is and all along has been an ex-proprietary tenant of the lands in dispute, that the zemindar is now claiming that those rights have become vested in him; in ether words, that she, the plaintiff, is no longer an ex-proprietary tenant. This is clearly a matter which must be determined in the Revenue Court. Under Section 5 of the N.W.P. Tenancy (Local) Act No. II of 1901, which was in force at the time this suit was brought the plaintiff was entitled to bring a suit for a declaration of her tenancy. Such, a suit is specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Act and as such was, by virtue of a. 167 only triable in the Revenue Court; and, assuming that the relief asking for a declaration that the document was forged was not to such an extent the principal relief in the case that the period of limitation provided for that relief would govern the whole suit still, by virtue of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, to which we have referred, the first relief for which she asks would be barred to her in a Civil Court. The result is that the plaintiff's suit was properly dismissed by the lower Appellate Court, though not wholly for the reasons given by that Court. Whether the plaintiff has still a remedy by a suit in the Revenue Court is a matter for determination in that Court.
6. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.