1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant in a Court of ' Munsif for the ejectment of the respondent from two plots of land. The suit was resisted on the ground that the parties were landlord and tenant and, therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The respondent pleaded that he had been cultivating the plots. But the Courts below have found that he has not cultivated them but has held them only for grazing purposes and that he has been paying Rs. 3 a year for them to the appellant. The Munsif found that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court and decreed the claim. On appeal, the District Judge held that the suit was barred with reference to the provisions of Sections 4, 56 and 167 of the Tenancy Act. The suit as brought was not cognizable by a Revenue Court if, as I am informed, (the plaint is not before me), the appellant alleged that the respondent was a trespasser. That allegation has been negatived by the Courts below, and the question is whether on the facts found, a suit could have been maintained by the appellant for the ejectment of the respondent in a Revenue Court. According to the finding, the respondent was a tenant of the appellant and according to Section 4(3) of the Tenancy Act what the respondent paid to the appellant for the grazing was 'rent'. The definition of 'rent' specifically includes what is paid by a tenant on account of rights of pasturage. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be barred, if at all, by some express provision of the Tenancy Act, Section 167 provides that all suits specified in the fourth. Schedule of the Act shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts and ' except by way of appeal, no Court other than a Revenue Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which any such suit might be brought. If a suit for ejectment is maintainable by the appellant against the respondent at all, it must be either as a suit of the kind described at No. 29 in Group 0 of the fourth Schedule to the Act, or as a suit of the kind described at No. 39 in Group D of the fourth Schedule. The former is a suit for ejectment of a non-occupancy-tenant on the ground specified in Section 58 of the Act and the latter is a suit for ejectment of a tenant on the grounds specified in Clause (a) of secession 57 of the Act. The opening words of Section 57 are: - 'A tenant, not being a permanent tenure-holder, shall be liable to ejectment from his holding on one or more of the following grounds'. Then the grounds are stated. Section 58 provides as follows: Anon-occupancy-tenant shall be liable to ejectment on one or more of the following grounds in addition to the grounds specified in Section 57, namely, (a) on the ground that he holds only as a tenant from year to year; (b) on the ground that he holds under a lease the term of which has expired or will expire at or before the end of the current agricultural year; (c) on the ground that he has refused to accept a lease containing the particulars of his holding for the time being in accordance with the provisions of Section 96'. Both these sections relate to the ejectment of a tenant from his holding and holding' is defined in Section 4 (9) of the Act as a parcel or parcels of land held under one tenure or one lease or engagement The word 'land' is defined in Section 4(2) as land which is let or held for agricultural purposes. It appears, therefore, that Sections 57 and 58 apply only to suits for the ejectment of a tenant from land as defined in the Act. Thus the question whether the present suit is cognizable by a Civil Court or not, resolves itself into the question whether the land held for grazing purposes is land held for agricultural purposes within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Act. It seems to me that, in its widest possible sense, the expression 'agricultural purposes might include grazing. But it is impossible to hold that all land held for grazing purposes is land held for agricultural purposes. There are enormous areas in these Provinces to which cattle are sent to graze and which 'certainly have no connection whatever with agricultural purposes in the ordinary sense, and it would be impossible, I think, to hold that these areas are lands held for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Tenancy Act. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the respondent's occupation of the land in question is in any way connected with agricultural purposes in the ordinary sense, that is to say, with the tilling and cultivation of land, nor, in my opinion, can the question whether land held for grazing purposes is land held for agricultural purposes depend upon the trade or occupation of the person who actually holds the land in question in a suit. It seems to me that the words 'agricultural purposes 'in Section 4 (2) of the Act must be construed in their ordinary sense and that they refer to tilling and cultivation for purposes of raising crops. I was referred to a decision of the Board of Revenue in Chowdhury Muhammad Mahmood v. Ganga Ram Rev. L.J. Vol. III, p. 54. The question, which I have to decide, was raised in that case, but was not decided, the Board being of opinion that a person who has grazing rights over land is not a tenant of the land who can be ejected by a suit under the Tenancy Act. If that decision is correct, the present suit is cognizable by a Civil Court, even i| my interpretation of the definition of land is erroneous I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and remand the case to that Court in order that it may be restored to the pending file and disposed of according to law. Costs in this Court will be costs in the cause.
2. I am informed that the plaint was returned by the District Judge to the appellant for presentation to a Court of Revenue. The plaint should now be re-placed on the; record.