1. This is an appeal by the defendants arising out of a suit brought by some Managers of the Ram Lila Committee for a declaration of a right of easement and for the demolition of certain buildings erected by defendant No. 2 with the permission of defendant No. 1 on a plot of land No. 607. The plaintiffs also claimed an injunction.
2. The point raised by the plaintiffs was that the Hindus of Karhal used to hold Bharatmilap and, in order to get to plots Nos. 604 and 606, they used to pass over plot No. 607, and that, because of that user, they had acquired a right of easement of passage over plot No. 607.
3. The contention of the defendant was that Bharatmilap processions, after passing over the public road, passed over plot No. 608 and from that to the Chabutra in No. 604. The defendants did not contest the plaintiff's right to celebrate the Bharatmilap on plot No. 604 or 606; what they said was that the plaintiffs or their predecessors had not acquired any right of easement over plot No. 607, but that there was already a passage which they could use for the procession.
4. The suit has been decreed by both the Courts below. The defendants come here in second appeal. The dispute In this suit was a -very small one, i.e., about the passage of the Bharatmilap, and we thought that this was eminently a case which should be settled amicably and we gave the parties time for the purpose. Although several adjournments were obtained, nothing was done, and we have, therefore, to decide the appeal on the merits. As regards plot No. 607 over which the plaintiffs-respondents assert a right of way for the passage of the Bharatmilap, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is that the way of the Bharatmilap procession lay through plot No. 607. That was not the case of either of the parties and it is tantamount to a denial of the right of passage over plot No. 607 claimed by the plaintiffs. It has also been found that when the procession first passed over defendant's land, it was with the permission of the defendant. No question of any right of easement can, therefore, arise; the user, if any, was permissive. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim on the ground of easement customary or otherwise, fails and, on this ground, the claim should have been dismissed. The defendant No. 1, Shrimati Rameshari Debi, is the zemindar of the plots and the plaintiffs have, in our opinion, failed to prove any right in them to limit her user of plot No. 607. The suit ought to have been, strictly speaking, one on behalf of the Hindu community. The Courts below have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed as if the suit had been one of that nature. We do not think it necessary to enter into that question. Mr. Baleshwari Prasad, the learned Vakil for the defendants-appellants, has, however, stated to us that his client, the zemindar, is willing to give the plaintiffs a fifteen feet wide passage over plot No. 608 for going from plot No. 669, the public road, to Nos. 604 and 606. This, we think, is a very reasonable offer and the plaintiffs would have done well to have accepted it. However, as the defendant-zemindar is still willing to make that concession in favour of the plaintiffs, we allow this appeal in part and discharge the decrees of the lower Courts. We make the above reservation in plaintiff's favour. In other respects, we dismiss the plaintiff's suit and we make no order as to costs.