1. The two plots in suit situated in khata Nos. 1 and 2 of a joint mahal were originally the joint sir of the plaintiff Lagan Rai, and the defendant Raja Rai. The plaintiff sold his share to a third party and became ex-proprietary tenant in the plots in suit under an order passed under Section 36 of the Land Revenue Act. The defendant Raja Rai contested the order right up to the Court of appeal but the matter was finally decided in the plaintiff's favour in 1919 only one year before the present suit. It appears, however, that Raja Rai managed to retain possession of the plots and the plaintiff brought the present suit to eject him as a sub-tenant under Section 58 read with Section 34 of the Tenancy Act. I have always entertained doubts whether Section 34 was really intended to support a suit for ejectment but this appears to be the accepted view of the law since the decision of Balli v. Naubat Singh 16 Ind. Cas. 120 : 9 A.L.J. 771, and has not been contested before me. The defence raised in the Courts below was Shat as the defendant is a member of the proprietary body this is a ease of a tenant being wrongfully ejected by his landlord within the meaning of Section 79 of the Act and, therefore, the plaintiff's remedy is barred by reason of his not having sued within six months. This defence was rejected by the Assistant Collector but accepted by the learned District Judge and this is the sole issue argued in the appeal. It is now settled law since the Full Bench case of Debi Prasad v. Bhagwan Din 16 Ind. Case. 399 : 35 A. 27 : 10 A.L.J. 437, that a sir-holder who sells his share becomes an ex-proprietary tenant of the entire proprietary body and not merely of his vendee. The question therefore, resolves itself into this whether dispossession by one member of the proprietary body, not being the lambardar, is to be treated as ejectment by the landholder, within the meaning of Section 79. The point is covered by a very recent decision of Mr. Justice Mukerji, Rani v. Aidal Singh 78 Ind. Cas. 1041 : 22 A.L.J. 118. The matter is fully discussed in his judgment and it is sufficient to say that I am not prepared to dissent from the law laid down therein.
2. The result is that the present appeal must succeed. I set aside the decree of the Court below and restore that of the Trial Court with costs in all Courts.