1. This is a second appeal by defendant 1 in a suit in which the lower appellate Court has granted to the plaintiff a decree declaring that his sale-deed of 11th December 1922, is a genuine document and that the house which he has purchased by that document from defendant 2 is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree of defendant 1 against defendant 2. The facts, as found by the lower appellate Court, are that on 8th August 1921, defendant 1 obtained this decree against defendant 2. In execution of that decree he attached the house in question. Subsequent to that attachment the judgment-debtor, defendant 2, executed a sale-deed in question in favour of the plaintiff. It is further found by the lower appellate Court that the sale consideration was only Rs. 100, and the value of the house at the date of the transfer was Rs. 200. It is also found that the judgment-debtor had left himself without any other property whatever. The Munsif dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that the transaction in question was fraudulent within the meaning of Section 53, T.P. Act, being for an inadequate sum and with the intention of defeating the creditors of the transferrer. The lower appellate Court reversed that finding chiefly on the following grounds:
I do not think that Rs. 100 ware grossly inadequate consideration for it.... I have shown above that the sale took place in pursuance of an agreement made on the 19th November 1920. Therefore I hold that the disputed sale-deed is not a transaction flotations and collusive and entered into with intent to defeat any creditor. The plaintiff was a bona fide transferee for consideration.
2. It is objected that on the finding that there was no fraudulent transfer, no appeal lay to this Court, and reference was made to: Durga Chaudhrani v. Jawahir Singh  18 Cal. 23. But in Dhannamal v. Moti Sagar , their Lordships of the Privy Council had laid it down in 1927:
It is clear, however, that the proper effect of a proved fact is a question of law.
3. Accordingly we consider that the question of whether Rs. 100 is or is not a grossly inadequate consideration for a house which is found to be by the lower appellate Court worth Rs. 200 is a question of law, as it is an inference from proved facts. Similarly there is no doubt that the construction of the sale-deed in question and of the agreement of 19th November 1920, are questions for the consideration of this Court, The agreement of 19th December 1920, provided that defendant 2 would sell to the plaintiff all his property within one month. That agreement was not carried out within one month, and therefore it appears to us that the agreement came to an end.
4. On 11th December 1922, the sale-deed in this suit was executed by defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff, and it contained no reference whatever to any previous agreement. On the contrary, it states that the plaintiff is in want of money to release certain ornaments which he had pledged and mentions that he had tried to sell the house in question to other persons and finally was selling it to his uncle for Rs. 100. We consider that on a true construction of these two documents the finding of the lower appellate Court is incorrect that the sale-deed of 1922 was made in pursuance of an agreement of 1920. The importance of this matter is that the sale-deed is undoubtedly of a date subsequent to the decree of defendant 1 against defendant 2. As we have held that it was not executed in pursuance of the agreement of 1920, the fact that agreement was of a date prior to the decree of defendant 1 is of no importance. We note that it has been found as a fact by the lower appellate Court that tenants are in possession of the house on behalf of the plaintiff.
5. But the lower appellate Court also found that the daughter of defendant 2 is living with the plaintiff, and the Munsif has found as a fact, and that finding is not reversed by the lower appellate Court, that defendant 2 is beyond any dispute the nephew of the plaintiff. Accordingly the mere fact that the tenants, who are in actual possession of the house, are tenants of the plaintiff is not in our opinion of sufficient weight in view of the inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence in the present case. We have firstly a transfer made by a judgment-debtor subsequent to the decree passed against him and a transfer made of the only remaining property which he possessed, and that transfer made to his uncle for a sum which is found to be half the actual value of the house at the time of the transfer. We consider that these circumstances lead to the inevitable inference that this transaction was fraudulent within the meaning of Section 53, T.P. Act, and that the transfer was intended to defeat the creditors of the transferrer, and the transferee was a party to that fraud. Accordingly we allow this appeal, and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff with costs in all Courts.
6. The plaint in this case has been drawn to our attention, and in particular paras.. 3 and 5. These two paragraphs are both scandalous and irrelevant. They offend against the rules of pleading and are merely personal abuse. They are drafted by a pleader called B. Durga Prasad, and in para. 5 he accuses in a manner totally irrelevant to the suit a brother pleader and calls him an expert in telling lies apparently on the ground that he is a pleader. It is difficult to say anything too severe about conduct of this sort. We direct that copy of these remarks of ours be sent to the pleader in question.