1. This second appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit. The question before us is whether the lower Appellate Court had a right to extend the time for payment into Court of the preemption-money.
2. It appears that the appellants were given a decree for pre-emption by which they were required to pay a sum of Rs. 800 into Court within a period of thirty days from the gate of the first Court's decree. That decree was passed three days before the Courts closed for the long vacation, so that we have it that the plaintiffs had really only a period of three days to deposit the money.
3. An application was made after the vacation for the reception of the money by the Court. The application was declined on the ground that the Court had no authority to extend the time.
4. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge. In the Memorandum of Appeal, as presented, the only ground, taken was that the price which had been fixed by the Court below was excessive. It seems, however, that at a later stage the plaintiffs were allowed to add another ground of appeal taking exception to the short time which the first Courts had allowed for payment into Court of the pre-emption-money.
5. The lower Appellate Court agreed with the first Court regarding the sum which the plaintiffs preemptors were bound to pay, i.e., Rs. 800. The learned Judge in his judgment found that the time which had been allowed to the plaintiffs for paying the money into Court was too short. Consequently, although he upheld the first Court regarding the amount of pre-emption-money, he thought that he was entitled to extend the time and he extended it accordingly.
6. In view of the rulings which have been cited to us, namely Kodai Singh v. Jaisri Singh 13 A. 189 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 118(F.B.) and Khurshed-un-nissa v. Alim-un-nissa 17 Ind. Cas. 868 : 10 A.L.J. 421, it appears to us that this appeal cannot succeed. According to these judgments the Court below had a discretion to extend the time. If that discretion has been judicially exercised this Court does not interfere in second appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.