1. In my opinion the decision of the lower Appellate Court in this case is correct.
2. The property in question belonged to one Kuber Singh who died and was succeeded by his widow, Musammat Anandi.
3. It appears that after Kuber's death the appellant here, Jagannath Singh, took possession of the property. A suit was brought by Musammat Anandi for the ejectment of Jagannath Singh and in that ease a compromise was arrived at between the parties. It was declared that Jagannath Singh had given possession to Musammat Anandi and that she was to pay Jagannath Singh in instalments a sum of Rs. 50 which Jagannath had paid on account of her husband's debts. In the terms of this compromise the suit of Musammat Anandi was dismissed.
4. It is said that this compromise never took effect and that Jagannath has remained in possession all along.
5. The present suit has been brought by the transferees of the daughter's son of Kuber Singh. They claimed to be entitled to the possession of this property and asserted that Musammat Anandi having died twelve years before the suit their suit was still within time.
6. In the Courts below Jagannath Singh resisted the claim on a plea of adverse possession. Both the Courts below have decided that plea against him ana there can be no question that this decision is correct. Adverse possession could not run against the present plaintiffs until after the death of the widow.
7. It is argued here, however, that, on the principle which was laid down by their Lordships in the case of Katama Natchicr v. Rajah of Shivagunga 9 M.I.A. 539 : 2 W.R.P.C. 31 : 1 Suth. P.C.J. 520 : 2 Sar. P.C.J. 305 : 19 E.R. 843, the plaintiffs' suit is incompetent for they are barred by the terms of a decree which was fairly obtained against Musammat Anandi who, it is said, was representing the estate.
8. Assuming, if it can be assumed, that in the suit which Musammat Anandi brought she was really representing the estate of her deceased husband and was not really suing on her own behalf to enforce the right she had as a widow to possession, it is for the defendant to show, if he appeals to the doctrine which is laid down in the Shivagunga case (1) referred to above, that he is in possession under and by force of a decree which is binding against the widow. Obviously, this cannot be done because the position of the defendant really is that he has been in possession of this property not under the decree but in spite of decree; and so we come back again to the old plea of adverse possession which cannot avail the defendant-appellant in the present case. The decision of the Court below must be affirmed. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs including fees in this Court on the higher scale.