1. This is a civil revision by plaintiffs against a decree of the Small Cause Court of Farrukhabad dismissing a suit of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are two minors who sued through the Collector of Farrukhabad as manager of Court of Wards for a sum of money alleged to be due from the defendant on the basis of a bahi-khata account. The lower Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The Court found that on November 17, 1928, the defendant purchased a hundi from the plaintiff for Rs. 2,502-5-6 and, therefore, became in debt to the plaintiff for payment of that amount A few days later, on November 20, 1928, the father of the plaintiffs died. By November 25, 1929, the defendant firm had paid almost all the principal but apparently the interest was not paid. On November 16, 1929, the defendant firm made a payment to the plaintiff by a cheque (Ex. 1). This was the last transaction and the suit was brought more than three years after this date in 1934. There is no doubt that the payment by cheque gave a fresh start to limitation on November 16, 1929, but the Court below has held that this only ex' tended limitation for three years from that date, and as the suit was brought after that period, the right to sue was barred. For the plaintiffs the learned Government Advocate contends that under Sections 19 and 20:
A fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed, or when the payment was made.
2. His argument is that under Section 6, Limitation Act, the plaintiffs are under a legal disability and that the date of November 16, 4929, should be taken under Section 6 as the date 'at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned.' That is he argues that the payment by cheque does not merely extend limitation for a period of three years but it operates under Section 6, Limitation Act, to produce the result that at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned the plaintiffs were under the legal disability of being minors and, therefore, the plaintiffs have all the period for their suit given to them by Section 6. This is a subject on which the rulings of this High Court have differed. In an earlier ruling of 1909 under the former Limitation Act of 1877, there was a ruling reported in Ram Charan v. Ram Dass 6 A L J 378 : 1 Ind. Cas. 759. That ruling was contrary to the view advanced by the learned Government Advocate. On the other hand in a recent ruling of the year 1912 reported in Chandrabhan v. Raj Kumar : AIR1933All100 , a Bench of this Court has adopted that view and has held that in a case similar to the present, Section 6 will apply. I consider that I ought to follow the later ruling which appears to be more logical, and in my opinion, the plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to sue. A further question was raised that on the wording of Section 6, the suit could only be brought by the plaintiffs personally after they had attained majority and within a period of three years from so attaining majority. It is not quite clear on this theory what would happen if there was a difference of more than three years between the ages of the plaintiffs and I was not shown any ruling in which this point of view had been adopted. On the other hand, in Musi Imran v. Collector of Bijnor. : AIR1931All434 a Bench of this Court has held that a suit could be brought on behalf of the minors in which the minors obtained the benefit of Section 6, Limitation Act.
3. This appears to me to be the meaning of the section. It would cause great inconvenience if it were held that under Section 6, time must always run for the full period until minors have come of age because in such a case interest would accumulate largely to the detriment of the defendant. Accordingly, therefore, I consider that in the present case the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for the amount due to them. In this view I allow this application in revision and I remand the suit for disposal by the Small Cause Court Judge. Costs hitherto incurred will be costs in the case.