1. This application was originally filed as one in revision against an order passed by the Session's Judge of Etawah refusing to interfere with the order of a gentleman holding the office of District Magistrate of the district of Etawah whereby he overruled an order passed by the Superintendent of Police of that district and contrary to the opinion of the said Superintendent, granted sanction for the prosecution of the applicant, Chhotey Lal, on the allegation that the said Chhotey Lal had committed a contempt of the lawful authority of the Police Officer in charge of a certain Police station in that district by giving the said Police Officer false information with such intent as to make the giving of the information an offence punishable under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge was perfectly right in refusing to interfere. If the District Magistrate had authority to grant the sanction in question he had that authority in virtue of the provisions of the Police Act V of 1861, Section (4). He was not acting as the presiding officer of the Court of a District Magistrate constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act V of 1898. The learned Sessions Judge rightly appreciated this fact and held that he had no jurisdiction to interfere. One of us was responsible for admitting this application and at the time of its admission, the suggestion was thrown out that the order of the Sessions Judge might be correct and yet the order of the District Magistrate a bad one. Upon his suggestion a further application in revision has been filed which assails the order of the District Magistrate direct. This was not the intention with which the suggestion above referred to was thrown out. The order of the District Magistrate, not being that of a Court of Justice, is not in itself subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. What was contemplated was that on proceedings being taken upon this order of sanction the person accused, or sought to be prosecuted, might have pleaded before the Court seeking to take cognizance of the matter that the said Court had no cognizance because of the invalidity of the alleged sanction. If proceedings had gone this length an issue of law would have been raised in a Court of subordinate jurisdiction to this Court and the opinion of this Court might have been sought by way of an application in revision. As the matter stands, however, we think it expedient to deal directly with the question sought to be raised. The real question in issue is whether the Superintendent of Police of the District of Etawah is or is not subordinate to the District Magistrate of Etawah within the meaning of Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is clear authority of this Court for answering this question in the affirmative; Emperor v. Shib Singh 27 A. 292 : 1 A.L.J. 597 : A.W.N. (1904) 231 : 1 Cr. L.J. 899. That authority has not, so far as we are aware, been challenged in this Court for some 18 years. Moreover, it seems to us that the words of the relevant section of the Police Act, referred to by the learned Judge who decided that case do have the force and meaning which he ascribes to them, that is to say, they do make the Superintendent of Police of a District sub-prdinate to the Magistrate of that District. There is one authority of the Calcutta High Court to the contrary. It was referred to by the learned Judge of this Court who decided Emperor v. Shib Singh 27 A. 292 : 1 A.L.J. 597 : A.W.N. (1904) 231 : 1 Cr. L.J. 899. We are by no means clear that the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court have not to a considerable extent changed their view of the matter, vide the subsequent decision in Emperor v. Sarada Prosad Chatterjee 32 C. 180 : 2 Cr. L.J. 171. At any rate, it is sufficient for us to say that we find ourselves in general agreement with the view taken by Sir George Knox in Emperor v. Shib Singh 27 A. 292 : 1 A.L.J. 597 : A.W.N. (1904) 231 : 1 Cr. L.J. 899. We reject both these applications. The stay-order passed at the time when they were admitted is discharged.