1. This is an appeal by the defendant against ah order of the lower Appellate Court remanding a suit for disposal by the Court of first instance on the question of mesne profits. The plaintiff a landlord, sued for possession and damages against the defendant-appellant on the ground that the defendant-appellant was a tenant who had been ejected and who was in possession as trespasser. The defendant pleaded that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and a reference was made by the Civil Court of first instance to the Revenue Court under Section 273, Act III of 1926. The finding of the Revenue Court was that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and the Civil Court of first instance being bound by that decision dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an appeal and the lower Appellate Court came to a decision on the question of fact that the defendant was a trespasser and not a tenant of the plaintiff. Accordingly the lower Appellate Court set aside the decree of the Court of first instance dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. The argument which has been addressed to us is that Section 44, Act III of 1926, would enable the plaintiff to bring a suit against the defendant as a trespasser in a Revenue Court and accordingly that under Section 230, Act III of 1926, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. That question has already been settled by the Full Bench case of Manohar Singh v. Sheo Saran Mohammad Muslim v. Maharamia : AIR1927All369 , where it was held that a suit by a landlord against a trespasser lies in the Civil Court and although Section 44, Act III of 1926, would also give a remedy with a limited amount of damages in the Revenue Court, still Section 230 of that Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
3. On one other point we were addressed and that was that the appellant had become a statutory tenant and, therefore, was not liable to ejectment. The expression 'Statutory tenant' is defined ins, 19, Act III of 1926, and that definition requires that a statutory tenant should be a person in possession as a tenant at the commencement of the Act or a person who is, after the commencement of the Act, admitted as a tenant. The defendant has been held, as a matter of fact, by the lower Appellate Court to be a trespasser and, therefore, the defendant does not come within the definition of a statutory tenant.
4. These were the only points raised before this Court. Accordingly this first appeal from order is dismissed with costs.