Devi Prasad Singh, J.
1. Heard Shri PS. Baghel, Advocate, Shri Sandeep Dixit, Advocate, Shri R.R.Awasthi, Advocate and Shri Manish Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Shri I.B.Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 4 and 5 of the Standing Counsel.
2. These bunch of writ petitions involved common question of fact and law, hence, heard and decided by common judgment with the consent of parties.
3. The controversy relates to admission in the Post Graduate Medical Courses of the State of U. P though U.P. Post Graduate Medical Entrance Examination, 2004 (in short, herein after referred as UPPGMEE), which provided that only those candidates shall be eligible to appear in the examination and will be entitled for admission in pursuance to UPPGMEE, who have passed their MBBS or BDS courses from the recognized Medical Colleges situated in the State of U.P. Accordingly there is 100 per cent institutional reservation for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses held through UPPGMEE. All the petitioners belong to State of UP. and they have completed their academic career from the school or colleges situated in the State of U.P. They are permanent residence or domicile of the State of U.P. They have passed High School, Intermediate from the colleges situated in the State of U.P. Some of the petitioners were appeared in the UPPGMEE, 2004 in pursuance to interim order passed by this Court.
4. The case of the petitioner is that in pursuance to judgment of Apex Court, All-India Entrance Test is held for admission to Graduate Medical Courses. Fifteen per cent seats for Graduate Medical Courses are reserved in all the Government medical Colleges and Universities of the country for admission through All-India Entrance Test conducted by CBSE Board, Delhi. In pursuance to All-India Entrance Test held in the year 1996 the petitioners were admitted in the Medical Colleges for MBBS and BDS courses situated outside the State of U.P. The petitioner had completed their internship from the various Medical Colleges situated outside of the State of UP. and some of them completed their internship from the colleges situated within the State of U.P. also. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that petitioners were admitted outside the State of U.P. under compelling circumstance in order of merit in pursuance to All-India Entrance Test, conducted by CBSE Board. Accordance (sic) they have challenged the impugned provision contained in the information brochure.
5. The admission to Medical and Engineering Colleges of State of U.P. is regulated in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section (5) of Section 28 of U.P. States Universities Act, For convenience sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act is reproduced as under :-
'Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act :-
(a) reservation of seats for admission in any course of study in University, Institute, constituent college, affiliated college or associated college for the students belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes of citizens may be made and regulated by such orders as the State Government may, by notification, make in that behalf:
Provided that reservation under this clause shall not exceed fifty percent of the total number of seats in any course of study :
Provided further that reservation under this clause shall not apply in the case of an Institution established and administered by minorities referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution :
Provided also that the reservation under this clause shall not apply to the category of Other Backward Classes of citizens specified in Schedule II to the Uttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994;
(b) admission to medical and engineering colleges and to courses of instruction for degrees in education and Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine (including the number of students to be admitted), shall subject to clause (a), be regulated by such orders (which if necessary may be with retrospective effect, but not effective prior to January 1, 1979) as the State Government may be notification, make in that behalf:
Provided that no order regulating admission under this clause shall be inconsistent with the rights of minorities in the matter of establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice;(c) in making an order under clause (a); the State Government may direct that any person who willfully acts in a manner intended to contravene, or defeat the purposes of the order shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees, or with both, as may be specified in the order.'
6. The admission to Graduate and Post Graduate Medical courses are done in pursuance to order issued by the State Government. The examinations are conducted by Medical Colleges or Universities situated in the State of U.P. in accordance to guidelines provided by the Government of U.P. through its notification issued in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act.
7. The Apex Court in its landmark judgment reported in 1984(3) SCC 654, Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, had for the first time taken initiative with intention to strengthen the national integration and assimilation of peoples from one part of country to the other part and directed to hold the entrance test of Graduate and Post Graduate Medical Courses on All India basis. Initially fifty per cent seats were reserved for admission through All India test but later on it was reduced to 15 per cent for Graduate Medical courses and twenty five percent for Post Graduate Medical Courses. The Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi was authorised to conduct the examination in accordance to direction of the Apex Court issued from time to time and as per schemes framed thereunder.
8. Accordingly, every year twenty five per cent seats of Post Graduate Medical Courses are filled up through All-India Entrance Test conducted by CBSE and remaining seventy five per cent seats are filled up by various States of the country through their own entrance test. Some of the States of country had confined all the remaining seventy five per cent seats to be filled up by hundred percent institutional reservation and some by hundred per cent residential reservation. In the State of U.P., State Government while issuing a notification under Section 28(5) of the U.P. States Universities Act had provided 100 per cent institutional reservation for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses. Meaning thereby in case the candidate is admitted for MBBS and BDS courses outside the State of U.P. even through All-India Entrance Test or by any other test, he shall not be entitled for admission to Medical Colleges of the State of U.P. by appearing in U.P.P.G.M.E.E., even if, he is domicile or permanent residence of the State of U.P. Even if, he had pursued his entire studies up to class 12th from school or college of State of U.P. Even if, the parents and family members are residing in State of U.P. serving the State of U.P. and paying taxes to the Government of U.P. and its local bodies. Even if, for unavoidable reasons or compelling reasons or with intention to acquire the benefit of better facilities a candidate had joined a medical college outside the State of U.P. or in a foreign country to pursue his Graduate Medical Courses like 'MBBS/BDS.
9. After hearing the parties Counsel and after considering the claim and counter claim the following substantial question of law/issue of public importance are involved for adjudication under the present bunch of writ petitions :-
(I) Whether inspite of being qualified and eligible in accordance to provision contained in U.P. States Universities Act, 1973 (in short hereinafter referred as an Act), petitioners can be deprived from admission to pursue Post Graduate Medical Courses in Government Medical Colleges, University or in the Medical Colleges of Private Sector?
(II) Whether the State Government can issue an order in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act in contravention of the various provisions of the Act itself thereby infringing the petitioners' right of admission to Medical Colleges or Universities situated in the State of U.P.?
(III) Whether in view of Apex Court judgment right from Pradeep Jain's case (supra) till date by the impugned provisions Government of UP. has got right to make 100 percent institutional reservation against the 75 per cent seats earmarked to be filled up, on the discretion of Government of UP. through the State Entrance Test?
(IV) Whether a candidate who is permanent residence or domicile of State of U.P and pursued his academic career in a school/college of the State of U.P. and also having the source of livelihood in the State of U.P. can be deprived from admission to a Medical Colleges situated in the State of U.P. either in private sector or in Government Sector, more so when under the Directive Principle of State Policy, duty cast on the State Government to take measures to serve peoples residing in its own territory.
FIRST ISSUE :
1. The U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (in short hereinafter referred as an Act) was promulgated by the State Legislature with a view to tone up the academic and financial administration of higher education in the State of U.P. It was enacted by the President on 29th September, 1973. The aims and object of the Act was to provide equal opportunity in the field of higher studies to the peoples of State with better academic atmosphere. The aims and object of the Act is reproduced as under :-
'Reasons for the Enactment.-With a view to toning up the academic and financial administration of higher education in State of U.P., a comprehensive Bill applicable to all the State Universities (except the Roorkee University and Govind Ballabh Pant Agricultural University), was prepared in the light of the recommendations made by various Commissions and Committees appointed by the Government of India and the State Government and also the views of the Vice-Chancellors and other educationists.2. The Bill, inter alia, provides for the recognization of the Court, the Executive Council, the Academic Council, the Finance Committee and the Selection Committees for the appointment of teachers in the Universities with a view to making them more effective and compact bodies. It also provides for the constitution of Examination and Admission Committees. The Bill also provides for the appointment of Pro-Vice-Chancellors in certain Universities and a whole-time Finance Officer in place of honorary Treasurer in all Universities.'
Under the Act it has been made compulsory that all the colleges imparting higher education to fulfil the required norms provided under the Act which includes affiliation and recognition. There are various types of colleges and institutions define under the Act, some of them as defines under Section 2 and Section 3 are reproduced as under :--
'Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.
'affiliated college' means an institution affiliated to the University in accordance with the provisions of this Act and Statutes of that University;
'area of the University' means the area specified in respect of the University by or under Section 5 or Section 4, as the case may be;
'associated college' means any institution, recognised by the University and authorised under provisions of (this Act and the Statutes of the University) to provide for the teaching necessary for admission to a degree of the University;
5. 'autonomous college' means an affiliated or associated college declared as such in accordance with the provisions of Section 42;
[(5-A) the expression 'other backward classes of citizens' shall have the same meaning as in the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994;]
[(5-B) 'Central Board of Studies' means the Central Board of Studies referred to in Section 18-B;]
'constituent college' means an institution maintained by the University or by the State Government and named as such by the Statutes;
'existing University' means the University of Lucknow, Allahabad, Agra [which shall from September 24, 1995 be called Doctor Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Agra], Gorakhpur, [which shall with effect from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Second Amendment) Act, 1997 be called Deen Dayal Upadhaya Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur] Kanpur [which shall be called Shri Sahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur with effect from September 24, 1995 and Chhatrapati Sahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur with effect from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Amendment) Act, 1997], or Meerut (which shall from January 17, 1994 be called Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut] or the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwawidyalaya, as the case may be;
'institute' means an institute established by the University under Section 44;
'management' in relation to an affiliated or associated college, means the Managing Committee or other body charged with managing the affairs of that college and recognised as such by the University;
[Provided that in relation to any such college maintained by a Municipal Board or a Nagar Mahaplika, the expression 'Management' means the Education Committee of such Board or Mahapalika as the case may be and the expression 'Head of the Management1 means the Chairman of such Committee]
Recognition.-Where the Management Committee was recgonised under Statute 27-A of the Agra University statutes and the action taken by such Committee was approved by the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor that is sufficient recognition for the purposes of Section 2(13) of the Act. P.C. Sikand v. Chancellor, Agra University, 1979 ALJ (NOC)81.
'prescribed' means prescribed by the Statutes;
'registered graduate' means a graduate of the University registered under the provisions of this Act or under any enactment repealed by this Act;
'Statutes', 'Ordinances' and Regulation' means receptively the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulation of the University;
'University' means an existing University or a new University established after the commencement of this Act under this Act under Section 4;
'working men's college' means an affiliated or associated college recognized as such in accordance with the provisions of Section 43.
10. Under sub-section (4) of the Act, the State Government may establish an University and also specify its area. Under Section 5 of the Act, Universities shall exercise power in respect of the area being specified in the Scheduled provided in the Act. Section 6 of the Act provides that, Universities shall be open to all classes and creeds. Section 7 defines the powers and duties of the University. Section 7-A deals with additional powers duties and certain University. For convenience Sections 6, 7 and 7-A are reproduced as under :-
'6. University open to all classes and creed.-The University shall be open to all persons irrespective of class or creed, but nothing in this section shall be deemed to require the University to admit to any course of study a large number of students than may be determined by the Ordinances :
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the University from making special provisions for admission of students belonging to [the Scheduled Caste, the Schedule Tribes or Other Backward Classes of citizens].7. Power and duties of the University.-The University shall have the following powers and duties, namely-
(1) to provide for instruction in such branches of learning as the University may think fit, and to make provision for research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge;
(2) to admit any college to the privileges of affiliation or recognition or to enlarge the privileges of any college already affiliated or recognized, as the case may be, or to withdraw or curtail any such privilege and to guide and control:
(a) have pursued a course of study in the University, a constituent college or an affiliated college, or associated college; or
(b) have carried on research in the University or in an institution recognised in that behalf by the University or independently, under conditions laid down in the Statutes and the ordinances; or
(c) have pursued a course of study by correspondents whether residing within the area of the University or not, and have been registered by the University, subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the Statutes and Ordinances as external candidates; or
(d) are teachers or other employees in the University or in an institute or in a constituent or affiliated or associated colleges or in any other educational institutions under conditions laid down in the Statues land the ordinances or are inspecting officers permanently employed in the Department of Education of the State Government, and have carried on private studies under conditions laid down in the Statutes and the Ordinances; or
(e) are women residing within the area of the University and have carried on private studies under conditions laid down in the Statutes and Ordinances; or
(f) are blind and are residing within the area of the University and have carried on private studies under conditions laid down in the Statutes and the Ordinances;
(5) to hold examinations for and to grant the degree of Bachelor of Arts or Commerce or Master of Arts or Commerce to persons residing within the area of the University who have carried on private studies under conditions laid down in the Statutes and the Ordinances;
(6) to confer honorary degree or other academic distinction in the manner and under conditions laid down in the Statutes;
(7) to grant such diplomas to, and to provide such lectures and instructions for persons, not being students of the University, as the University may determine;
(8) to co-operate or collaborate with other Universities and authorities in such manner and for such purposes and the University may determine;
(9) to institute teaching posts required by the University and to appoint persons to such posts;
(10) to recognize teachers for giving instruction in halls;
(11) to lay down the conditions of affiliation or recognition of colleges and to satisfy itself by periodical inspection and otherwise that those conditions are satisfied;
(12) to institute and award scholarships, fellowships (including travelling fellowship), studentships and prices in accordance with the Statues and the Ordinances;
(13) to institute and maintain halls and hostels and to recognize places of residence for students of the University, the Institutes or the constituent or associated colleges affiliated; or
(14) to demand and receive such fees and other charges as may be fixed by the ordinances;
(15) to supervise and control the residence and to regulate the discipline of students of the University, the Institute and the constituent or affiliated or associated colleges and to make arrangements for promoting their health;
(16) to create administrative, ministerial and other necessary posts and to make appointments thereto; and
(17) to do all such acts and things; whether incidental to the powers aforesaid or not, as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the University.
[7-A. Additional powers and duties of certain University.-Upon being authorized by the State Government by notification under the Uttar Pradesh Homeopathic Medicine Act, 1951 [Doctor Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Agra or (Chhtrapati) Shahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur], as the case may be, shall-
(a) hold examinations for and grant diplomas in Homeopathy;
(b) take over the functions of holding of examinations for courses prescribed by the Board of Homeopathic Medicine constituted under the said Act and granting diplomas and shall exercise an perform all the powers and functions of such Board under the said Act with respect to holding of such examinations and granting of diplomas.]'
11. Under Section 10 of the Act, Governor of the State is a Chancellor of the University. For convenience Section 10 is reproduced as under :
'The Chancellor.-(1) The Governor shall be the Chancellor of the University. He shall by virtue of his office, be the Head of the University and the President of the Court and shall, when present, preside at meeting of the Court and at any convocation of the University.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to furnish such information or records relating to the administration of the affairs of the University as the Chancellor may call for.
(4) The Chancellor shall have such other powers as may be conferred on him by or under this Act or the Statutes.'
12. The admission in the Universities are regulated under the provision contained in Section 28 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 28 deals exclusively with the admission to Medical and Engineering colleges which has been reproduced hereinabove.
Chapter VII of the Act deals with affiliation and recognition of colleges. Section 37 empowers the Universities of Agra, Gorakhpur, Kanpur and Meerut to recognise and affiliate colleges for higher education subject to fulfillment of necessary condition. Section 38 deals with the recognition of associate colleges by Lucknow University, Allahabad University. These Universities through recognition also impact education through associates colleges subject to fulfillment of necessary conditions. The provision relating to constituent and autonomous colleges have been provided under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act.
Chapter 8 of the Act deals with the matter relating to admission and examination. Section 45 provides the conditions in compliance of which a student should be eligible for admission to the course of study for a degree. For convenience Section 45 is reproduced as under :-
'45. Admission of students.--(1) No student shall be eligible for admission to the course of study for a degree unless-
(a) he has passed-
(i) the Intermediate Examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, or of any University or Board incorporated by any law for the time being in force; or
(ii) any examination, or any degree conferred by any other University, being an examination or degree recognized by the University as equivalent to the Intermediate Examination or to a degree of the University; and
(b) he possesses such further qualification, if any, as may be specified in the Ordinances :
Provided that the University may prescribe by Ordinance any lower qualifications for admission to a degree in Fine Arts.
(2) The conditions under which students may be admitted to the diploma courses of the University shall be prescribed by the Ordinances.
(3) The University shall have the power to recognize (for the purposes of admission to a course of study for a degree), as equivalent to its own degree, any degree conferred by any other University or, as equivalent to the Intermediate Examination of any Indian University, any examination conducted by any other authority.
(4) Any student whose work or conduct is unsatisfactory may be removed from the University or an institute or a constituent college or any affiliated or associated college in accordance with the provision of the ordinances.'
13. The provision contained in Section 45 of the Act is needless to say that it is mandatory and extends statutory right to a candidates who is otherwise eligible for admission to a degree course. The letter and spirit of Section 45 of the Act at the face of record shows that in case a person possessed prescribed qualification and passed examination from the Board of High School or Intermediate or possessed degree conferred by any University recognised by the University, he shall be entitled for admission to graduate courses. However, it shall be open for University to specify the qualification which shall be necessary for the candidates seeking admission in the University for its constituents colleges.
14. All the Medical Colleges whether running under private sector or under the State Government have been affiliated to the Universities in one or other form with due recognition to impact medical education upto Graduate or Post Graduate level. The certificates and degrees are issued by the Universities to whom these Medical Colleges are affiliated. They have to fulfil all necessary conditions, provided by rules and regulations framed by the Government or Universities by which they have been recognized. However, the King Gorge Medical University is the only University which impacts education upto Post Graduate level including the courses of super speciality constituted in pursuance to the Act of legislature.
Accordingly, students or candidates have got right of statutory protection and benefit provided under the Act, in case they fulfil necessary conditions provided under the Act. Such persons shall be entitled for admission to respective degree courses which includes the Post: Graduate Medical Courses.
15. A combined reading of Section 6 read with Section 25 shows that every persons will have got statutory right of admission in the degree courses or Post Graduate Degree Courses in case he fulfils the necessary qualification provided under the Act, rules and regulation.
Section 6 of the Act provided that the University shall be open to all persons irrespective all caste, creed or religion. However, under Section 6 of the Act the number of seats can be restricted for admission to various courses by the Government or respective Universities.
16. Under Section 45 of the Act, the only condition necessary for a candidate to seek admission in a degree courses is that he/she should have a degree certificate from a recognised institution. The University shall have power to recognize a degree or de-recognized the same. It shall be open for the Universities of the State of UP. not to recognize any decree conferred by any University of the country on reasonable grounds.
All the Medical Colleges from which the petitioners have passed their examination of MBBS Course and obtained the degree are duly recognized colleges by the respective Universities and the State Governments. There is no material on record which may indicate that the Medical Colleges from which the petitioners have obtained the degree of MBBS or BDS course have been de-recognized by the Government of U.P. or the respective Universities of the State.
17. The Statement of Object and Reason coupled with the fact that the Act is a regulatory statute, atleast reflects that the peoples residing in the State of U.P. shall be entitled to get benefit of higher education through the Medical College or Universities situated in the State. The statement of object and reason reproduced hereinabove in the Act shows that the Act was enacted to tone up the higher education in the State of U.P. which includes imparting education on moderate fees keeping a view the financial and social background of the people residing in the State of U.P. The Apex Court in a case reported in 2003 (5) SCC 298, Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan, held that the Statement of Object and Reasons in an Act may be considered as one of the ground while considering the impact and utility of a statute. The relevant portion from Bakhtawar's case (supra) is reproduced as under :-Para 31
'............The Statement of Objects and Reasons may, therefore, be employed for the purposes of comprehending the factual background, the prior State of legal affairs, the surrounding circumstances in respect of the statute and the evil which the statute has sought to remedy. It is manifest that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot, therefore, be the exclusive footing upon which a statute is made a nullity through the decision of a Court of Law.'
18. Moreover, the intention of the legislature while enacting the Act is to impart higher education to all the persons residing in the State of U.P. However, it does not mean that others will have no right. The intention of the legislature should be gathered by reading the entire provisions contained in the Act as whole. While interpreting the provision contained in Section 6 read with Section 45 of the Act coupled with other provisions relating to the recognition of the Universities and Medical Colleges, it should be kept in mind that what was the purpose to legislate the Acts. The purpose and intention of legislation of the Act should be gathered as a whole. The Apex Court in a case reported in 2003 (6) SCC 186, D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, while placing reliance on a renowned book 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P.Singh held as under :-16-17-18 Paras.
'16. Placing such a construction, as we propose to, on the provision of Section 48-Appellate authority is permitted by well-settled principles of interpretation. Justice G.P. Singh, States in Principal of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn., 2001):
'It may look somewhat Paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not plain and requires some explanation. The rule, that plain words require no construction, starts with the premise that the words are plain, which is itself a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their context and construed.'The rule of literal interpretation is also not to be read literally, such flexibility to the rule has to be attributed as it attributable to the English language itself.'
17. The learned author States again :
'In selecting out of different interpretations 'the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things', as it may be presumed 'that the legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense of justice'.'
'The Courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statue to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative 'on the principle expressed in the maxim : ut res magis valeat quam pereat'.'
'If the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the true meaning regard must be had to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results.'
18. Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section 48 Appellate Authority would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequence as Parliament could have never intended. The provision has an ambiguity and is capable of being read in more ways that one. We must, therefore, assign the provision a meaning and so read it-as would given life to an otherwise lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby being meaningfully availed and effectively exercised.'
19. In one other case reported in 2003 (2) SCC 111, Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Ltd., the Apex Court laid down the principle as to how the intention of legislatures may be gathered from an Act. For convenience Paras 23 and 26 are reproduced as under :-
'It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant.' .
26. It is also well settled that a beneficent provision of legislation must be liberally construed so as to fulfil the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it.'
20. A plain reading of entire statutory provisions contained in the Act and Rules framed thereunder, prima-facie establish that a person residing in the State of UP. has got right to seek admission in the Graduate and Post Graduate Courses in the Universities or in the Medical Colleges of the State of U.P. There can not be 100 percent institutional reservation which may indirectly prevent the candidates of the State of U.P. from getting admission in the Medical Colleges having permanent residence in the State of U.P. to get admission on account of the fact that they were admitted in the Medical Colleges through All India Test and studied outside the State. There may not be 'absolute bar' for the candidates haying permanent residence or domicile of the State of U.P. under the provision contained in the Act. They are entitled for admission in pursuance to statutory provision contained in the Act itself. The intention of the legislature is to provide higher education to the peoples of the State on the basis of residence or domicile as well as otherwise and not on the basis of 100 percent institutional reservation as done by the opposite parties.
21. The applicability of statutory provision contained in the Act has been not considered by the Apex Court in any of the judgment. Learned Counsel for the parties has also not brought into notice of this Court any judgment delivered by the Apex Court in which the applicability and rights accured in pursuance to the Act has been considered.
22. The information brochure of UPPGMEE-04, has been annexed as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition contains the provision by which 100 per cent institutional reservation has been done by the State Government. The information brochure is the extract of Government notification issued in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Act reproduced hereinabove. The information brochure is the extract of Government notification dated 19th November, 2003 as modified by order dated December 15, 2003.
23. Now the question arises as to whether in pursuance to impugned notification while exercising power, under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Act, the State Government can create 100 per cent institutional reservation against the 75 per cent seats, earmarked to be filled up by UPPGMEE. There is no doubt that the State Government is the regulatory authority for admission to Medical and Engineering Colleges. The Apex Court reported in (1992) 2 UPLBEC 1288, State of U.P. and Ors. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, etc., held as under :-
'Section 28(5) of the U.P. Universities Act 10 of 1973, as amended by the Act 15 of 1980, the later came into force from January 1, 1979, for short 'the Act' provides that;
'Notwithstanding contained in any other provisions of this Act, admission to Medical and Engineering Colleges and to course of instruction for degrees in Education or Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of medicine (including the number of students to be admitted), shall be regulated by such orders (which if necessary may be with retrospective effect, but not effective prior to January 1, 1979) as the State Government may, by notification, make in that behalf:
Provided that no other regulating admissions under this sub-section shall be inconsistent with the rights of minorities in the matter of establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice.4. The non-obstante clause diffuses the effect of any inconsistent law in the Act and empowers the State Government, if necessary with retrospective effect, to regulate by a notification, the admission to Medical and Engineering Colleges as well as to courses of instructions and the number of students therein.'
24. Now the question arises as to whether in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Government can create blanket bar for admission to graduate and Post Graduate Medical course by depriving permanent residence of the State from admission and pursuing their Medical courses in the Medical Colleges and Universities of the State of U.P. The U.P. Universities Act is a regulatory Act and its first purpose is to serve the people of the State. Any prohibitory order by which the candidates of State are deprived from admission shall be highly arbitrary, illegal unjust and improper keeping in view the scheme of the Act itself. The Apex Court in a case reported in 2003 (5) SCC 622, DL1 Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust, held as under :-
'A regulatory Act must be construed having regards to the purpose it seeks to achieve. The State as a statutory authority cannot ask for something, which is not contemplated under the Act. A statute relating to regulator of user of land must not be construed to be limitation prohibiting transfer of land which does not affect its user.'
25. Any order passed by the State Government in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Act shall be an incident of subordinate legislation. The order passed by the Government under the delegated legislation should not be in contravention of statutory provisions contained in the Act. The Apex Court in a case reported in 2003 (3) SCC 1, State of U.P. v. Bhola, held as under :-
'A delegated legislation can be declared invalid by the Court mainly on two grounds; firstly, that if violates any provision of the Constitution and secondly, it is violative of the enabling Act. If the delegate which has been given a rule-making authority exceeds its authority and makes any provision inconsistent with the Act and thus overrides it, it can be held to be a case of violating the provisions of the enabling Act but where the enabling Act itself permits ancillary and subsidiary functions of the legislature to be performed by the executive as its delegate, the delegated legislation cannot be held to be in violation of the enabling Act.'
26. In one another case reported in 2003 (3) SCC 321, St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE, the Apex Court held that rules or order are all the part of delegated legislation and it is the settled principle that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. Rules or orders can not be passed to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. Para 10 of St. John's case (supra) for convenience is reproduced as under :-
'A regulation is a rule or order prescribed by a superior for the Management of some business and implies a rule for general course of action. Rules and regulations are all comprised in delegated legislation. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to Act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative functions or, what is fictionally called, a power to fill up details. The legislature may after laying down the legislative policy confer discretion on any administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the framework of policy. The need for delegated legislation is that they are framed with care and minuteness when the statutory authority making the rule, after coming into force to the Act, is in a better position to adopt the Act to special circumstances. Delegated legislation permits utilization of experience and consultation with interests affected by the practical operation of statutes. Rules and regulations made by reason of the specific power conferred by the statutes to make rules and regulations establish the pattern of conduct to be followed. Regulations are in aid of enforcement of the provisions of the statute. The process of legislation by departmental regulations saves time and is intended to deal with local variations and the power to legislate by statutory instrument in the form of rules and regulations is conferred by Parliament. The main justification for delegated legislation is that the legislature being over burdened and the needs of the modern day society being complex, it can not possibly foresee every' administrative difficulty that may arise after the statute has begun to operate. Delegated legislation fills those needs. The regulations made under power conferred by the statute are supporting legislation and have the force and effect, if validly made, as an Act passed by the competent legislature.'
27. There is one another reason for which the impugned order can be assailed. Since under the statutory provisions there is no bar for admission in the Universities and Colleges on account of the fact that a person had studied outside the State of UP., the opposite parties have got no right to create bar indirectly by providing institutional reservation. It is not uncommon when in pursuance to All India Test several persons are studying in the Medical Colleges and Universities outside the State of UP. in one or other way. Now by 100 percent institutional reservation the State Government wants to do a thing by subordinate legislation which can not be done directly on account of provision contained in Section 6 read with Section 45 of the Act. What can not be achieved directly can not be done indirectly. Nothing can be read by implication. The Apex Court in a case reported in 2003 (2) SCC 593, Dayal Singh v. Union of India, held as under :-
'33. The person whose lands were acquired, thus, having entered into an agreement cannot be said to have any legal right which can be enforced in a Court of Law so as to enable him to obtain an order from the Court directing the Union of India to reopen the agreement, only because by reason of a subsequent award an enhanced amount of compensation has been paid for similar class of lands. If a right to get the amount of compensation redetermined is held to be implicit in the Act, the same for all intent and purport would amount to invoking the provisions of Section 2 8-A of the Land Acquisition Act indirectly which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
35. The right to get the amount of compensation redetermined must expressly be provided by the statute. Such a right being a substantive one cannot be sought to be found out by implication nor can the same be read therewith.
37. It is well-settled principle of law that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The Court has to find out legislative intent only from the language employed in the statutes.'
28. In view of above, in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Act though the State Government has got right to regulate the admission to Medical and Engineering Colleges, but lacks power to deny admission by providing 100 per cent institutional reservation, while making admission in the Medical Colleges and Universities of the State of U.P. A subordinate legislation must be issued by keeping in view the statutory provision of the Act. While passing the impugned orders and making provision the State Government had failed to take notice of the statutory provisions of the Act.
29. Accordingly the impugned provisions contained in the information brochure are violative of the statutory provisions contained in the Act itself hence are illegal and not tenable under law and is the act of non-application of mind by the State Government.
30. The Apex Court from time to time laid down the law relating to the admission by All India Test also decided issuance in the Medical Colleges for Post Graduate Medical Courses. Some of the judgments which may relates to present controversy are as under :
(i) (1984) 3 SCC 654, Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(ii) (1985) 3 SCC 22, Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Motilal Nehru Medical College and Ors.
(iii) (1986) 3 SCC 727, Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (II) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College and Ors.
(iv) (1987) 4 SCC 122, Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Motilal Nehru Medical College and Ors.
(v) (1987) 4 SCC 459, Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Motilal Nehru Medical College and Ors.'
(vi) (2000) 7 SCC 262, State of U.P. and Ors. v. Vineet Singh and Ors.
(vii) (2000) 5 SCC 684, Dr. Parag Gupta v. University of Delhi and Ors.
(viii) (2003) 11 SCC 186, Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India.
(ix) (2001) 3 SCC 425, Abhinav Agrawal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(x) 2003 AIR SCW 6392, Saurabh Chaudhary and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
31. The Apex Court by the land mark judgments in Pradeep Jain's are reported in 1984(3) SCC 654, held that a national level examination should be held for admission to Graduate and Post Graduate Medical Courses. Accordingly 50 percent vacancies were reserved for All India Test. By subsequent judgments the Apex Court in Dinesh Kumar's case (supra) had reduced the All India quota to 25 percent and left and remaining 75 per cent seats for admission through entrance test conducted by various States of the country. States were given liberty to fill up 57 per cent seats of Post Graduate Medical Courses through their own resources and in accordance to their rules and regulations frame by them from time to time. The controversy had arisen through multiplicity of litigation in the various High Courts of the country including the Allahabad High Court on the basis of petitions filed by the candidates residing permanently in their respective States and who have done their Graduate Medical Courses from the medical college outside the State either from Government Medical Colleges or Medical Colleges falling under the private sector. Each and every judgment of the Apex Court had upheld the dictum of Pradeep Jain's case (supra).
32. The Apex Court Judgment in Pradeep Jain's (supra) case, is a step which fulfil the ambitions of framers of our Constitutions before the Drafting Committee of the Constitution Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad has sent a letter dated 28th April, 1948, who was the then Education Minister a relevant extract from the letter of Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad is reproduced as under :
'in the present State of development of Education in India, it is imperative that them should be Central guidance if not Central control, on Provincial progress.........If it can be secured that Education throughout India follows the some general pattern, we can be sure that the intelligentia of the country will be thinking on similar lines. This would be a better check against the dangers of fragmentation than and centralization of Government or concentration of power in the hands of the Central Authority.'
Mahatma Gandhi was also of the view that atleast basic national education should be uniform throughout the whole of India. Accordingly atleast for higher education the Central Government has been given wide power to legislate law.
33. In Pradeep Jain's case (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with residential requirement and institutional preference hold that there can not be 100 percent reservation on the basis of residence or studies in an institution. Relevant portion from Pradeep Jain's case for convenience is reproduced as under :-
'9. We may note proceed to consider whether residential requirement or institutional preference in admissions to technical and medical colleges can be regarded as constitutionally permissible. Can it stand the test of Article 14 or does it fall foul of it and must be struck down as constitutionally invalid. It is not possible to answer this question by a sample 'yes' or 'no'. It raises a delicate but complex problem involving consideration of diverse factors in the light of varying social and economic facts and calls for a balanced and harmonious adjustment of competing interests...........'
'20. The only question which remains to be considered is as to what should be the extent of reservation based on residence requirement and institutional preference. There can be no doubt that such reservation can not completely exclude admission of students from other Universities and States on the basis of merit judged in open competition...................we agree wholly with these observation made by the learned Judge and we unreservedly condemn wholesale reservation made by some of the State Governments on the basis of 'domicile' or residence requirement within the State or on the basis of institutional preference for students who have passed the qualifying examination held by the University or the State excluding all students not satisfying this requirement regardless of merit. We declare such wholesale reservation to be unconstitutional and void as being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
21. But, then to what extent can reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference for students passing the qualifying examination held by the University or the State be regarded as constitutionally permissible? It is not possible to provide a categorical answer to this question for, as pointed out by the policy statement of the Government of India, the extent of such reservation 'would depend on several factors including opportunities for professional education in that particular area, the extent of competition, level of educational development of the area and other relevant factors'. It may be that in a State where the level of educational development is woefully low, there are comparatively inadequate opportunities for training in the medical specialty and there is large scale social and economic backwardness, there may be justification for reservation of a higher percentage of seats in the medical colleges in the State and such higher percentage may not militate against 'the equality mandate viewed in the perspective of social justice'. So many variables depending on and economic facts in the context of educational opportunities would enter into the determination of the question as to what in the case of any particular State, should be the limit of reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference. But, in our opinion, such reservation should in no even exceed the outer limit of 70 percent of the total number of open scale after taking into account other kinds of reservation validly made...........................The result is that in any event at least 30 per cent of the open seats shall be available for admission of students on All-India basis irrespective of the State or University from which they come and such admissions shall be granted purely on merit on the basis of either All- India entrance examination or entrance examination to be held by the State. Of course, we need not add that even where reservation on the basis of residence requirement or institutional preference is made in accordance with the directions given in this judgment, admissions from the source or sources indicated by such reservation shall be based only on merit, because the object must be to select the best and most meritorious students from within such source or sources.
22. So much for admission to the MBBS course, but different considerations must prevail when we come to consider the question of reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference for admission to the post graduate course such as, MD, MS, and the like. There we cannot allow excellence to be compromised, by any other considerations because that would be detrimental to the interest of the nation..........If equality of opportunity for every person in the country is the constitutional guarantee, a candidate who gets more marks than another is entitled to preference for admission. Merit must be the test when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This proposition has greater importance when we reach the higher levels of education like post-graduate courses. After all, top technological expertise in any vital field like medicine is a nation's human asset without which its advance and development will be stunted. The role of high grade skill or special talent may be less at the lesser levels of education, jobs and disciplines of social inconsequence, but more at the higher levels of sophisticated skills and strategic employment. To devalue merit at the summit is to temporize with the country's development in the vital areas of professional expertise. In science and technology and other specialized fields of developmental significance, to relax lazily or easily in regard to exacting standards of performance may be running a grave national risk because in advanced medicine and other critical departments of higher knowledge, crucial to material progress, the people of India should not be denied the best to nation's talent lying latent can produce. If the best potential in these fields is cold-shouldered for populist considerations garbed as reservations, the victims, in the long run, may be the people themselves. Of course, this unrelenting strictness in selecting the best may not be so imperative at other levels where a broad measure of efficiency may be good enough and what is needed is merely to weed out the worthless........................................We are, therefore, of the view that so far as admissions to post graduate courses, such as MS, MD and the like are concerned, it would be eminently desirable not to provide for any reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference. But, having regard to broader considerations of equality of opportunity and institutional continuity in education which has its own importance and value, we would direct that though residence requirement within the State shall not be a ground for reservation in admissions to post graduate courses, a certain percentage of seats may in the present circumstances, be reserved on the basis of institutional preference in the sence that a student who had passed MBBS course from a medical college or University, may be given preference for admission to the post-graduate course in the same medical college or University but such reservation on the basis of institutional preference should not in any event exceed 50 percent of the total number of open seats available for admission to the post-graduate course. This outer limit which we are fixing will also be subject to revision on the lower side by the Indian Medical Council in the same manner as directed by us in the case of admissions to the MBBS course. But, even in regard to admissions to the post-graduate course, we would direct that so far as super specialties such as neuro-surgery and cardiology are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even on the basis of institutional preference and admissions should be granted purely on merit on All- India basis.'
34. In the subsequent judgment of Dinesh Kumar (supra), Dr. Parag Gupta (supra) and followed by Magan Mehrotra's case, the Pradeep Jain's case have been affirmed However, the controversy had again cropped up relating to 100 percent institutional or residential reservation arisen from various petitions filed by the candidates of various States the matter was referred to Constitution Bench of Supreme Court decided in Saurab Choudhary's case.
35. It shall be relevant to point out that the notification relating to UPPGMEE, 2004 was issued by the State Government in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the UP. Universities Act on 19.11.2003. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court had delivered judgment in Saurab Choudhary's case on 4.11.2003. The examination of UPPGMEE was held on 1.2.2004, Apex Court in Saurab Choudhary's case (supra) had reaffirmed the judgment of Pradeep Jain's case and deprecated the 100 per cent institutional or residential reservation done by various States of the country while admitting the candidates for graduate or post Graduate Medical Courses. It shall be relevant to point out, so far as the graduation medical and post Graduate Medical Courses in the recognised or Government Medical Colleges are concerned, they are done in pursuance to All-India Entrance Test against 25 per cent or 15 per cent vacancies only. Every State has got right to fill up the rest of the 75 percent seats or 85% seats (for graduate medical course) by own State examination and as per own rules and regulations and statutory provisions.
36. In Para 25 of the Apex Court judgment in Saurab Choudhary's case (supra) a description has been given relating to all the States of the Country, where there is 100 per cent institutional reservation or reservation on the basis of permanent residence. In some State there is 100 per cent institutional and in some State there is 100 per cent reservation on the basis of permanent residence or domicile After considering entire facts and circumstances, the Apex Court had held that the 100 per cent reservation on the basis of domicile or institution is not justified and is illegal under the scheme of our Constitution. However, it has been held by Saurab Choudhary's case that reservation by institutional preference is valid. The conclusion which emerges from Saurab Choudhary's case is that a reservation may be done only up to the limit of 50 per cent of the total seat keeping in view of the dictum of Pradeep Jain's case. For convenience Paras 67,. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75 and 76 of the Apex Court judgment in Saurab Choudhary's case is reproduced as under :-
'67. This Court may, therefore, notice the following :
(i) The State runs the Universities.
(ii) It has to spend a lot of money in imparting medical education to the student of the State.
(iii) Those who get admission in Post-Graduate Courses are also required to be paid stipends. Reservation of some seats to a reasonable extent, thus, would not violate the equality clause.
(iv) The criteria for institutional preference has now come to stay. It has worked out satisfactorily in most of the States for last about two decades.
(v) Even those States which defined the decision of this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) had realized the need for institutional preference.
(vi) No sufficient material has been brought on record for departing from this well established admission criteria.
(vii) It goes beyond any cavil of doubt that institutional preference is based on a reasonable and identifiable classification. It may be that while working out the percentage of reservation invariably some local students will have preference having regard to the fact that domicile/residence was one of the criteria for admission in MBBS Course. But together with the local students 15% students, who had competed in All-India Entrance Examination would also be getting the same benefit. The percentage of students who were to get the benefit of reservation by way of institutional preference would further go down if the decision of this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) is scrupulously followed.
(viii) Giving of such a preference is a matter of State Policy which can be invalidated only in the event of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(ix) The students who would get the benefit of institutional preference being on identifiable ground, there is hardly any scope.
(x) For manipulation.
70 We, therefore, do not find any reason to depart from the ratio laid down by this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra). The logical corollary of Our finding is that reservation by way of institutional preference must be held to be not offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
71. However, the test to uphold the validity of a statute on equality must be judged on the touchstone of reasonableness. It was noticed in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) that reservation to the extent of 50 per cent was held to be reasonable. Although subsequently in Dr. Dinesh Kumar's case (supra), it was reduced to 25 per cent of the total seats. The said percentage of reservation was fixed keeping in view the situation as then existing. The situation has now changed to a great extent. Twenty years have passed. The country has during this time have produced a large number of post graduate doctors. Our Constitution is organic in nature Being a living organ. It is ongoing and with the passage of time. Law must change. Horizons of constitutional law are expanding.
72 Haying regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the original scheme as framed in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) should be reiterated in preference to Dr. Dinesh Kumar's case (supra). Reservation by way of institutional preference, therefore, should be confined to 50 per cent of the seats since it is in public interest.
73. For the purpose of selecting the candidates, it is necessary to hold an All-India Entrance Examination by an impartial and reputed body. We must, therefore, lay down the criteria therefor. AIIMS in terms of an order passed by this Court has been conducting the said examination. It may continue to do so unless a competent body is created by the Central Government in terms of a Parliamentary Act or otherwise. All expanses for conducting such examination shall be borne by the Central Government which would also provide the requisite infrastructure therefor. One test shall be held for all the students taking admission throughout the country. This order is passed keeping in view the fact that now one common entrance test is held for admission against 25 per cent of All-India quota and others tests are being held by the respective Universities. Disparities in such tests should be done away with and merit of the students should be judged on the basis of one test held therefor.
74. AIIMS is an institution of excellence. It is a class by itself and pride. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the AIIMS and the medical colleges of the Central University, merit should have primacy subject of course to institutional preference to the extent of 50 per cent of the total seats in the MBBS course. In all other respects the decision of this Court in All-India Institute of Medical Sciences Students' Union's case (supra) shall operate.
75. Our directions aforementioned, however, are interim in nature. The Parliament having regard to Entry 66, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India has the legislative competence which would take care of the country as a whole. While making such a legislation, the Parliament undoubtedly would take into consideration the special needs of some small States, having regard to their backwardness economic, social and educational as also geographical conditions.
76. The Parliament has also the legislative competence in forms of Entry 25, List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is for education and particularly higher education where excellence is required, while enacting law must also foresee that in the era of liberalization and globalization, Indian citizens must compete with their counterparts of the developed countries. Merit, thus, must be allowed to explore to the fullest extent. Genius hidden in the citizens must be allowed to blossom. Despite 55 years of India's existence as an independent nation, a National Policy on higher education has not come into being. Its significance and importance was highlighted in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) but the Parliament did not pay any heed thereto.'
37. The judgment of Apex Court right from Dinesh Kumar (supra) to Magan Mehrotra's (supra) case have considered by the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in Saurabh Chaudhary's case hence their outcome need not to be discussed while deciding the present controversy.
38. The hundred per cent reservation done by the State of U.P. against 75 per cent left over seats is unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust and improper as it absolutely deprived the persons residing permanently in the State of U.P. Hundred per cent institutional reservation means to fill up all the post graduate seats from the students who had studied in the same medical colleges or any medical college of the State of U.P. as evident from the impugned provisions. The Apex Court while deprecating the 100 per cent institutional reservation, in the case reported in 2002 (1) SCC 428, AIIMS Students' Union v. AIMS and Ors., held as under :
'Krishna Iyer, J. opined that even in the areas where reservation is constitutionally permissible, it should be as an exception and not a rule and subject to a few rules of caution : (i) that reservation must be kept in check by the demands of competence. You cannot extend the shelter of reservation where minimum qualifications are absent; (ii) all the best talent cannot be completely excluded by wholesale reservation; (iii) need for protecting and giving a preferential push in the interests of basic medical needs of a region or a handicapped group cannot prevail at the highest scales of specialty where the best skill or talent must be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph. D, MD or levels of higher proficiency, where international measure of talent is made, losing one great scientist or technologist in-the-making is a national loss, the considerations prevailing at the lower levels of education justifying protective discrimination for 'locals' and the handicapped group lose their potency and importance. Here equality measured by matching excellence has more meaning and cannot be diluted much without grave risk for pampering local feeling will boomerang; (iv) backward regions and Universities situated miles away from forward cities with sophisticated institutions cannot be equated. The former, for equalization, need crutches and extra-facilities to overcome injustice while the latter already enjoy all the advantages of the elite and deserve no fresh props. Else there will be double injury to claims of equality of the capable candidates coming from less propitiously circumstance Universities and societies. In conclusion the majority opinion held that University wise preferential, treatment may be consistent with the rule of equality of opportunity where it is calculated to correct an imbalance or handicap and permit equality in the larger sense.
44. When protective discrimination for promotion of equalization is pleaded, the burden is on the party who seeks to justify the ex-facie deviation from equality. The basic rule is equality of opportunity for every person in the country, which is a constitutional guarantee. A candidate who gets more marks that another is entitled to preference for admission. Merit must be the test when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This proposition has greater importance when we reach the higher levels and education like post-graduate courses. Reservation, as an exception, may be justified subject to discharging the burden of proving justification in favour of the class which must be educationally handicapped-the reservation geared up to getting over the handicap. The rationale of reservation in the case of medical students must be removal of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage. Even there the quantum of reservation should not be excessive or societaly injurious. The higher the level of the specialty the lesser the role of reservation.
58. The preamble to the Constitution of India secures, as one of its objects, fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation to 'we the people of India'. Reservation unless protected by the Constitution itself, as given to us by the founding fathers and as adopted by the people of India, is subversion of fraternity, unity and integrity and dignity of the individual. While dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 46 is taken not of often by overlooking Articles 41 and 47. Article 41 obliges the State inter alia to make effective provision for securing the right to work and right to education. Any reservation in favour of one, to the extent of reservation is an inroad on the right of others to work and to learn. Article 47 recognises the improvement of public health as one of the primary duties of the State. Public health can be improved by having the best of doctors, specialists and superspecialists. Undergraduate level is a primary or basic level of education in medical sciences wherein reservation can be understood as the fulfillment of societal obligation of the State towards the weaker segments of the society. Beyond this, a reservation is a reversion or diversion from the performance of primary duty of the State Permissible reservation at the lowest or primary rung is a step in the direction of assimilating the lesser fortunate in the mainstream of society by bringing them to the level of others which they cannot achieve unless protectively pushed. Once that is done the protection needs to be withdrawn in the own interest of protectees so that they develop strength and feel confident of stepping on higher rungs on their own legs shedding the crutches. Pushing the protection of reservation beyond the primary level betrays the bigwigs' desire to keep the crippled for ever. Rabindra Nath Tagore's vision of a free India cannot be complete unless 'knowledge is free' and 'tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection'.
59. The upshot of the above discussion is that institutional reservation is not supported by the Constitution or constitutional principles. A certain degree of preference for students of the same institution intending to prosecute further studies therein is permissible on grounds of convenience, suitability and familiarity with an educational environment. Such preference has to be reasonable and not excessive. The preference has to be prescribed without making an excessive or substantial departure from the rule of merit and equality. It has to be kept within limits. Minimum standards cannot be so diluted as to become practically non-existent. Such marginal institutional preference is tolerable at post graduation level but is rendered intolerable at still higher levels such as that of superspeciality.'
39. In view of law laid down by Apex Court in the case referred hereinabove to wholesale institutional reservation of the entire seats earmarked to the filled up by UPPGMEE is highly arbitrary, unjust and improper. Keeping in view the Pradeep Jain's case (supra) followed by AIMS Students' Union' case and then Saurabh Chaudhary's case (supra) the State Government may provide reservation only up to 50 per cent seats by institutional preference and the remaining 50 per cent seats should be filled up by students who are domicile of the State of U.P. and having permanent residence or from other persons. By providing 50 per cent admission by institutional preference, the State Government may have a defence that the provision contained in U.P. States Universities Act has been reasonably complied with.
40. The classification done by the State Government by creating 100 per cent institutional preference and depriving the others who are residing in the State of U.P. seems to be unreasonable classification and it has got no nexus with the object sought to achieve. It is not necessary that against 25% seats earmarked to be filled up by All-India competitions all the candidates may belong to State of U.P. Accordingly there may be situation when inspite of willingness a candidate could not be get admission in the Medical College of State for lack of seat and otherwise even in pursuance to All-India Test. Accordingly the impugned institutional reservation seems to be arbitrary.
Option is always open to the State Government to issue, appropriate notification for admission of the candidates of the State of U.P., and studied outside the State and who are highly meritorious with brilliant academic record for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses in the State of U.P. by making appropriate provisions in the notification issued under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act. Moreover admission in Post Graduate Medical Courses are done through competitive test, hence admission of outsiders shall not affect the professional excellency.
41. The State Government may issue a notification providing fifty per cent institutional reservation leaving rest of the seats to fill up by candidates who have got domicile of the State of U.P. or otherwise whose parents are residing in U.P. but studied in a recognised Medical Colleges of other State through All-India Test or other wise. Keeping in view above facts and circumstances Paras 9, 20, 21, 22 of Pradeep Jain's case (supra) coupled with Para 72 of Saurabh Chaudhari's case (supra) it shall be obligatory on the part of the State Government to provide institutional reservation only up to 50 per cent of seats while holding UPPGMEE. The law declared by the Apex Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. I failed to understand once the Apex Court judgment in Saurabh Chaudhari's case was delivered on 4-11-2003 why the Government of U.P. has not made appropriate amendment while issuing the notification under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act on 19-11-2003 keeping in view a Apex Court judgment in Saurabh Chaudhary case.
Accordingly the impugned provisions seems to be arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, Apex Court judgment and not tenable under law.
IVTH ISSUE :
42. The Constitution of India had inherited its federal characteristic from the Government of India Act, 1935. It was because of federal characteristic the merger of the several Indian States into the Dominion of India completed easily. The most important feature of our Constitution is the distribution of legislative power between Centre and the States. The scheme of three Lists as provided under the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution was provided under the principle emerging from Government of India Act, 1935. Under the List I, the Federal Legislative had exclusive legislative power on the subjects contained therein. In the List II the Provincial Legislature has got exclusive legislative power over the subjects contained therein. However, the matters contained in List III the Centre and Provincial legislatures has got concurrent power. The residuary power has been conferred on Parliament. It was possible for our Constituent Assembly to adopt a unitary Constitution but with intention to provide certain autonomy to the States, the Federal character was incorporated in the Constitution and to provide certain exclusive duties and autonomy to the States. Accordingly the mode of distribution of legislative power was to give effect and securing to the States certain exclusive legislative power. Since the Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws with respect to matters in List I, the State Legislature has exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws with respect to matters in List II. In respect of matter in List III Centre and State both have got power to legislative law. However in the event of conflict the law legislated by Parliament prevails. But Article 254(2) provides that if a law passed by State Legislature in respect of matter in the concurrent Legislative List receives the President's assent, then, such a law, if inconsistent with the law passed by Parliament would prevail in that State, subject to the power or Parliament to repeat such a law either directly, or by-passing a law inconsistent with it. Admittedly, U.P. State University Act had received Presidential assent in pursuance to Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
43. The legislative competence of Parliament and the legislatures of the States to make laws under Article 246 is regulated by the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution. In the VIIth Schedule as originally was in force, Entry 11 of List II gave to the State an exclusive power to legislate on :
'education including Universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry of List III.'
Entry 11 of List II was deleted and Entry 25 of List III was amended with effect from 3-1-1976 as a result of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act of 1976. The present Entry 25 in the Concurrent List is as follows :
'25. Education, including technical education, medical education and Universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List II; vocational and technical training of labour.' Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows :
However, Entry 66 of List I gives exclusive power in the Central Government to maintain the standard of higher education, For convenience Entry 66 of List I is reproduced as under :
'66. Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.'
Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also co-ordination of such standards. A State has, therefore, the right to control education including medical education so long as the field is not occupied by any Union legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education. Because this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. Secondly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and University education, is now in the Concurrent Lists that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254.
44. In view of aforesaid constitutional provision the legislature of the State is competent to regulate the admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses, which should be subject to regulations framed by Medical Council of India in pursuance to power conferred by Medical Council of India Act and the related law legislated by Parliament.
45. Now the question arises whether while doing so the State can debar the peoples of the State directly or indirectly from pursuing the Post Graduate Medical Courses in the Universities as well as Government Medical Colleges. Statutory right accrue to the candidates in pursuance to U.P. States Universities Act and law laid down by Apex Court has been already discussed hereinabove. Now coming to fourth issue what is the extent of duty of State to provide higher education to the citizens. While discussing the federal nature of our Constitution, Shri H.M. Seervai in a great treatise 'Constitutional Law of India' Fourth Edition at Pages 301 and 303, while summoning up the right and duties of the State and Federal character of our Constitution proceeded to diseases as under :
'(c) External sovereignty is not relevant to the federal nature of a Constitution, for such sovereignty must belong to the country as a whole. But the division of internal sovereignty by a distribution of legislative powers is: an essential feature of federalism, and our Constitution possesses that feature. With limited exceptions, the Australian Constitution confers overlapping legislative powers on the States and the Commonwealth, whereas List II, Schedule VII of our Constitution confers exclusive powers of legislation on the States, thus emphasising the federal nature of our Constitution.
(d) The view that unimportant matters were assigned to the States cannot be sustained in face of the very important subjects assignment to the States in List II, and the same applies to taxing powers of the- States, which are made mutually exclusive of the taxing powers of the Union so that ordinarily the States have independent source of revenue of their sources of revenue available to the States are substantial and would increasingly become more substantial. In addition to the exclusive, taxing powers of the States, the States become entitled either to appropriate taxes collected by the Union or to a share in the taxes collected by the Union.'
46. To question arises, the State Legislature while discharging their constitutional duties and promulgating laws in pursuance to List II or List III of the VIIth Schedule, will work for whom? Naturally the answer will be, the primary duty of the State Governments will be to legislate law provide facilities to serve people who were residing within their own territorial jurisdiction subject to constitutional limitations. There is nothing in our Constitution like domicile of State, the citizenship and domicile both are different things/Article 5 of the Constitution deals with citizenship and comicile. For convenience Article 5 of the Constitution of India is reproduced as under :-
'Article 5. Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution.-At commencement of this Constitution every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and
(a) who was born in the territory of India; or
(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or
(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of Indian for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India'
47. In AIR 1955 SC 334, D.P. Joshi v. Madhya Bharat, the Apex Court for the first time proceeded to decide the rights accruing through domicile or permanent residence of a State. Relevant portion from D.P, Joshi's case (supra) is reproduced as under :-
'Now the contention of Mr. N.C: Chatterjee for the petitioner is that this rule is in contravention of Articles 14 and 15(1), and must, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional and void. Article 15(1) enacts :
'The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.'
The argument of the petitioner is that the rule under challenge in so far as it imposes a capitation fee on students who do not belong to Madhya Bharat while providing an exemption , therefrom, to students of Madhya Bharat, makes a discrimination bases on the place of birth, and that it offends Article 15(1).
Whatever force there might have been in this contention if the question had arisen with reference to the rule as it stood when the State took over the administration, the rule was modified in 1952, and that .is what we are concerned with in this petition. The rule as modified is clearly not open to attack as infringing Article 15(1). The ground for exemption from payment of capitation fee as laid down therein is 'bona fide' residence in the State of Madhya Bharat. Residence and place of birth are two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact, and when Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination based on the place of birth, it cannot be read as prohibiting discrimination based on residence. This is not seriously disputed.
The argument that is pressed on us is that though the rule purports to grant exemption based on residence within the State, the definition of bona fide' residence under the rule shows that the exemption is really based on the place of birth. Considerable emphasis was laid on clauses (a) and (b) of the rule wherein 'residence' is defined in terms of domicile, and it was argued that the original domicile, as it is termed in the rules, could in substance mean only place of birth, and that, therefore, the exemption based on domicile was, in effect, an exemption based on place of birth under an 'alias'. That, however, is not the true legal position.
Domicile of a person means his permanent home. 'Domicile meant permanent home, and if that was not understood by itself no illustration could help, to make it intelligible' observed Lord Cranworth in 'Whicker v. Hume', (1859) 28 LJ Ch 396 at p. 400(B) Domicile of origin of a person means 'the domicile received by him at his birth' (vide Divey on Conflict of Laws, 6th Edition, page 87). The learned author then proceeds to observed at page 88 :
'The domicile of origin, though received at birth, need not be either the country in which the infant is born, or the country in which his parents are residing, or the country to which his father belongs by race or allegiance, or the country of the infant's nationality.'
In 'Somerville v. Somerville, (1801) 5 Ves 750 at p. 786 (C), Arden, Master of the Rolls observed :
'I speak of the domicile of origin rather that of birth. I find, no authority which gives for the purpose of succession any effect to the place of birth. If the son of an Englishman is born upon a journey, his domicile will follow that of his father.'
(7) It was argued that under the Constitution there can be only a single citizenship for the whole of India, and that it would run counter to that notion to hold that the State could make laws based on domicile within their territory. But citizenship and domicile represent two different conceptions. Citizenship has reference to the political status of a person, and domicile to his civil rights. A classic statement of the law on this subject is that of Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny, (1869) LR 1 SC & Div. 441 at 457 (E).
He observes :
'The law of England, and of almost all civilised countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal status or conditions : one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country binding him by the tie of national allegiance, and which may be called his political status, another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.
The political status may depend on different laws in different countries; whereas the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage succession, testacy or intestacy, must depend.'
Dealing with this question Dicey says at page 94 :
'It was, indeed, at one time held by a confusion of the ideas of domicile and nationality that a man could not change his domicile, for example, from England to California, without doing at any rate as much as he could to become an American citizen. He must, as it was said, 'intend quatenus in illo exuere patriam'. But this doctrine has now been pronounced erroneous by the highest authority.'
Vide also the observations of Lord Lindley in 1904 AC 287 at p. 299 (D):
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. VI the law is thus stated at page 198, Para 242 :
'English law determines all questions in which it admits the operation of a personal law by the test of domicile., For this purpose it regards the organisation of the civilized world in civil societies each of which consists of all those persons who live in any territorial area which is subject to one system of law, and not its organization in political societies or States, each of which may either be co-extensive with a single legal system or may unite several systems under its own sovereignty.'
'Under the Constitution Article 5, which defines citizenship, itself proceeds on the basis that it is different from domicile, because under that Article, domicile is not by itself sufficient to confer on a person the status of a citizen of this Country.
(8) A more serious question is that as the law knows only of domicile of a country as a whole and not of any particular place therein, whether there can be such a thing as in, whether there can be such a thing as Madhya Bharat domicile apart from Indian domicile. To answer this question we must examine what the word 'domicile' in law imports. When we speak of a person as having a domicile of a particular/country, we mean that in certain matters such as succession, minority and marriage he is governed by the law of that country.
Domicile has reference to the system of law by which a person is governed, and when we speak of the domicile of a country, we assume that the same system of law prevails all over that country. But it might well happen that laws relating to succession and marriage might not be the same all over the country, and that different areas in the State might have different laws in respect of those matters. In that case, each area having a distinct set of laws would itself be regarded as a country for the purpose of domicile.'
The position is thus stated by Dicey at page 83 :
''The area contemplated throughout the Rules relating to domicile is a 'country' or 'territory subject to one system of law'. The reason for this is that the object of this treatise, in so far as it is concerned with domicile, is to show how for a person's rights are affected by his having his legal home or domicile within a territory governed by one system of law, i.e., within a given country, rather than within another.
If, indeed, it happened that one part of a country, governed generally by one system of law, was in many respects subject to special rules of law, then it would be essential to determine whether D was domiciled within such particular part, e.g., California in the United States; but in this case, such part would be 'pro tanto' a separate country, in the sense in which that term is employed in these Rules.'
The following statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume VI, page 246, Para 249 may also be quoted :
'..................where that State comprises more than one system of law, a domicile is acquired in that part of the State where the individual resides.'
48. However, the DP. Joshi's (supra) case at subsequent stage to some extent modified by Apex Court by other judgments. It has been settled and held that as per our constitutional frame, there is nothing like 'domicile' of a State, there is only one 'domicile' i.e. Domicile of India. In Pradeep Jain's (supra) case, the Apex Court proceeded held as under :
'Now, it is clear on a reading of the Constitution that it recognizes only one domicile, namely, domicile in India. Article 5 of the Constitution is clear as explicit on this point and it refers only to one domicile, namely, 'domicile in the territory of India'. Moreover, it must be remembered that India is not a federal State in the traditional sense of that term. It is not a compact of sovereign States which have come together to form a federation by ceding a part of their sovereignty to the federal State. It has undoubtedly only one citizenship, namely, the citizenship of India. It has also one single unified legal system which extends throughout the country. It is not possible to say that a distinct and separate system of law prevails in each State forming part of the Union of India the legal system which prevails throughout the territory of India is one signal indivisible system with a single unified justicing system having the Supreme Court of India at the apex of the hierarchy, which lays down the law for the entire country. It is true that with respect to subjects set out in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the States have the power to make laws and subject to the overriding power of Parliament, the States can also make laws with respect to subjects enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but the legal system under the rubric of which such laws are made by the States is a single legal system which may truly be described as the Indian legal system............. It would not, therefore, in our opinion be right to say that a Citizen of India is domiciled in one State or another forming part of the Union of India. The domicile which he has is only one domicile, namely, domicile in the territory of India. When a person who is permanently resident in one State goes to another State with intention to reside there permanently or indefinitely, his domicile does not undergo any change he does not acquire a new domicile of choice. His domicile remains the same, of unity and integrity of India to think in terms of State domicile. It is true and there we agree with the argument advanced on behalf of the State Governments; that the word domicile in the rules of some of the State Governments prescribing domiciliary requirement for admission to medical colleges situate within their territories, is used not in its technical legal sense but in a popular sense as meaning; residence and is intended to convey the idea of intention to reside permanently or indefinitely.........'
49. The dictum of the D.P. Joshi's (supra) case has been reiterated by Constitutional Bench of Apex Court in Saurabh Chaudhary's (supra) case. Thus there is only one domicile i.e. Domicile of India and a person having a permanent resident in a particular State may not be termed as a person of domicile of State. In view of the Article 5 of the Constitution of India coupled with Apex Court judgment referred hereinabove whether the persons residing permanently in a State may have certain rights or not and to be benefited by funds of Public Exchequer. Under Directive Principles of the State Policy (Part-IV of the Constitution of India), the Constitution commands the State to discharge certain duties of course for the people of their own territorial jurisdiction. Article 38(2) of the Constitution of India commands the State strikes to minimize the inequalities in status facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people. Article 39(a) of the Constitution of India commands the State, frame policies for securing equal rights to adequate means of livelihood. Article 41 of the Constitution of India further provides that the State shall make effective provisions for securing the right to work, right to educational so what. Article 46 of the Constitution of India further provides that the State shall take special care of educational and economical interest of the weaker section of the societies. For convenience Articles 38, 39(a) and Article 41 of the Constitution of India are reproduced as under :-
'State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.-(1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations.
39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.-The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.
39-A. Equal justice and free legal aid.-The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases.-The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.'
50. Once the State has got constitutional duty to provide equal opportunity of education, opportunity of livelihood, opportunity to employment and special care to poor class then question arises as to whether State can deprive directly or indirectly a person residing permanently or otherwise within its own territorial jurisdiction to be benefited from the educational facilities running at the cost of Public Exchequer. Of course, State has got power to laid down guidelines, limits of seats and to recognize the college and Universities either situated in the State of UP. or outside the State of UP. for the purpose of admission to Graduate and Post-Graduated Medical Courses but State may not create blanket bar or prohibition, denying the enjoyment of its facilities to the peoples atleast who are residing in the State itself. In case it is permitted then it may amount to negate the Constitutional mandate and peoples residing in same State may be denied to avail facilities available through beneficial legislation.
51. The State has got legislative competence to legislate law within its territory. Accordingly while enforcing the Directive Principles the State Government legislates law to serve the people. The State may not have right to pass order which may amount to 'giving by one hand and taking out by another hand'. The doctrine of territorial nexus is an established law. The Apex Court in case reported in AIR 1957 SC 699, State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwaia, held as under :
'The next point urged by the petitioners to that under Articles 245 and 246 the Legislature of a State can only make a law for the State or any part thereof and consequently the Legislature overstepped the limits of its legislative field when by the impugned Act it purported to affect men residing and carrying on business outside the State. It is submitted that there is no sufficient territorial nexus between the State and the activities of the petitioner who are not in the State.
The doctrine of territorial nexus is well established and there is no dispute as to the principles. As enunciated by learned Counsel for the petitioners, if there is a territorial nexus between the person sought to be charged and the State seeking to tax him the taxing statute may be upheld. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves a consideration of two elements, namely, (a) the connection must be pertinent to that connection.'
52. The Apex Court in a case reported in AIR 1958 SC 731, M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, while considering the Directive Principle of State Policy held as under:
'Before we actually take up and deal with the alleged infraction of the petitioners' fundamental rights, it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary question raised by Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava. It will be recalled that the impugned Acts were made by the States in discharge of the obligations laid on them by Article 48 to endeavour to organize agriculture and animal husbandry and in particular to take steps for preserving and improving the breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of certain specified animals. These directive principles, it is true, are not enforceable by any Court of law but nevertheless they are fundamental in the governance of the country and it is the duty of the State to give effect to them. These laws having thus been made in discharge of that fundamental obligations imposed on the State, the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens and others by Chapter III of the Constitution must be regarded us subordinate to these laws. The directive principles, says learned Counsel, are equally, if not more, fundamental and must prevail. We are unable to accept this argument as sound. Article 13(2) expressly says that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Chapter III of our Constitution which enshrines the fundamental rights. The directive principles cannot over-ride this categorical restriction imposed on the legislative power of the State. A harmonious interpretation has to be placed upon the Constitution and so interpreted it means that the State should certainly implement the directive principles but it must do so in such away that its laws do not take away or abridge the fundamental rights, for otherwise the protecting provisions of Chapter III will be 'a mere rope of sand'. As this Court has said in the State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525 at p. 631 : AIR 1951 SC 226 at p. 228(A): 'The Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.'
53. In one another case reported in 1995(5) SCC 730, State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi, matter relating to grant-in-aid for colleges by the Government, the Apex Court proceeded to held as under :
'A plea was taken in the High Court that the petitioner has no right to seek a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution basing his relief on a directive principle contained in the Constitution. The High Court, rightly in our opinion, repelled this plea relying on the decision of this Court in State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma. The High Court referred to the dictum laid down in the aforesaid decision to the effect (a) the Court can in a fit case direct the executive to carry out the directive principles of the Constitution, and (b) when there is inaction or slow action by the executive the judiciary must intervene. We have no doubt that the above conclusion of the Court below is also justified.
18. Before closing we may observe that the content of Article 21 read with Article 39A did not (in terms) arise for consideration in this Court on any previous occasion. Even in the recent Constitution Bench decision reported in Unni Krishnan case Article 21 read with Articles 41, 45 and 46 alone came up for consideration. The scope of Article 21 in the right of Article 39A never arose for consideration nor was it considered in the said decision.'
54. In the State of Punjab v. Dayanand Medical College and Hospital, 2001(8) SCC 664, the Apex Court held that it shall be duty of State to secure reservation for socially and educationally (backward). For convenience Para 12 of the said judgment reproduced as under :
'Insofar as the provision for reservation added by the State of Punjab in respect of socially and educationally backward classes, no exception can be taken because, as we have explained earlier, it is a prerogative and duty of the State to indulge in such an exercise in carrying out and implementing the constitutional policy declared in Article 46 of the Constitution armed with the enabling power under Article 15(4) of the Constitution and there has been no decision on the point including the decision in Dr. Preeti Srivastava case to the effect that the Medical Council of India can alone or shall do so. If in a given case, the prescription of reservation for weaker sections by the State is to such an enormous extent as to produce the candidates to be selected on the basis of merit performance in an examination from the general category to a very small number, then perhaps the Medical Council of India may have to take appropriate steps by stipulating specific standards for such reserved category candidates also and not otherwise. The observation of enabling the Medical Council of India in setting the standards in medical education includes the extent of reservation for socially and educationally backward classes in Dr. Preeti Srivastava case should be understood in this background. Thus, proper balance will have to be struck both by the Medical Council of India and by the Government, Central and State, in exercise of their respective powers. The Medical Council of India, a creature of a statute, cannot be ascribed with such powers to reduce the State Governments to nothing on and in respect of areas over which the States have constitutional mandate and goal assigned to them to be performed. The Medical Council of India cannot also purport to arm itself with powers to prescribe a standard, which is impossible of attainment by a candidate belonging to a reserved category or for that matter even general candidates and whatever is fixed, must be realistic and within attainable limits. In conclusion, the finding of the High Court that the notification issued by the appellant State is invalid to the extent of making reservation in terms of Article 15(4) of the Constitution is set aside.'
55. Right to education as settled by Constitution Bench of Apex Court reported in 1993(1) SCC 645, Unni Krishnan J.P. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., is implied in Article 21 of the Institution of India flows from the right to life and personal liberty. Though by amendment right to education up to 14 years have been made fundamental right but broadly speaking in view of Unni Krishnan's (supra) case right to education including the higher education is fundamental right covered by Article 21 of the Constitution of India subject to financial capability of the State and the statutory provisions, rules and regulations framed thereunder. The relevant portion of Unni Krishnan case (supra) is reproduced as under:
'Right to free education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years (Article 45).-It is noteworthy that among the several Articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? Can the State Flout the said direction even after 44 years on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to endeavour to provide' the same and on the further ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage of 44 years-more than four times the period stipulated in Article 45 convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right? In this context, the feel constrained to say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of education in India discloses on inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 45. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the 'limits of its economic capacity and developments' as does Article 41. which inter alia speaks of right to education. What has actually happened is more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than to and at the cost of primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education, which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age). Neglected more so are the rural sector, and the weaker sections of the Society referred to in Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the Government we are only emphasizing the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question. This inversion of priorities has been commented upon adversely by both the educationists and economists.'
56. Accordingly, the petitioners' right for admission in the Post-Graduate Medical Courses not only flow from the fact that they are permanent residence of the State of U.P. and they are residing in the State of UP. but also from their own fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India coupled with Directive Principle of the State Policy. One of States owe duty to provide equal opportunity of education then how a State can deprive directly or indirectly the candidates like petitioners who are permanent residence of the State by making 100% institutional reservation. A constitutional mandate under Directive Principle of the State Policy, caste a duty on the State to provide amenites and facilities without overriding the fundamental rights available to citizen under Chapter III of the Constitution.
57. In a recent Judgment reported in JT 2004(3) SC 415, State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. S.V. Bratheep and Ors., after considering the Constitution Bench judgment of Preeti Srivastava's case (supra) and other judgment held that the State has gone right to regulate admission in the colleges in pursuance to power conferred by Entry 25, List III of the Constitution of India unless the process adopted by the State does not adversely effect the standard laid down of the Union of India or any other authority functioning under it. For convenience relevant portion from the Judgment State of Tamil Nadu (supra) is reproduced as under :
'As regards the scope of the Entries in the Constitutional arising under Entry 66 of List 1 and the Entry 25 of the List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was examined in great detail by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors.. After adverting to these two entries in the Seventh Schedule, this Court stated as follows :
'Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of the List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also co-ordination of such standards. A State has, therefore, the right to control legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education. Because this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. Secondly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 2/1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and University education, is now in the Concurrent List so that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Articles 264.
It would not be correct to say that the norms for admission have no connection with the standard of education, or that the rules for admission are covered only by Entry 25 of List III. Norms of admission can have a direct impact on the standards of education. Of course, there can be rules for admission which arc consistent with or do not affect adversely the standards of education prescribed by the Union in exercise of powers under Entry 66 of List I. For example a State may, for admission to the post-Graduate Medical Courses, lay down qualifications in addition to those prescribed under Entry 66 of List I. This would be consistent with promoting higher standards for admission to the higher educational courses. But any lowering of the norms laid down can and does have an adverse effect on the standards of education in the institutes of higher education........'
9. Entry 25 of List III and Entry 66 of List I have to be read together and it cannot be read in such a manner as to form an exclusivity in the matter of admission but if certain prescription of standards have been made pursuant to Entry 66 of List I, then those standards will prevail over the standards fixed by the State in exercise of powers under Entry 25 of List III insofar as they adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India or any other authority functioning under it....................
It is no doubt true as noticed by this Court in Adhiyaman's case that there may be situations when a large number of seat may fall vacant on account of the higher standards fixed. The standards fixed should always be realistic which are attainable and are within the reach of the candidates. It cannot be said that the prescriptions by the State Government in addition to those of AICTE in the present case are such which are not attainable or which are not within the reach of the candidates who seek admission for engineering colleges. It is not very high percentage of marks that has been prescribed as minimum of 60% downwards, but definitely higher that the mere pass marks. Excellence in higher education is always insisted upon by series of decisions of this Court including Dr. Preeti Srivastava's case. If higher minimum marks have been prescribed, it would certainly add to the excellence in the matter of admission of the students in higher education.'
58. One more factum should be taken into consideration while deciding the present controversy. In pursuance to provision contained in the The Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994, it has been provided by the State Government to provide reservation to candidates of OBC Category, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and other classes. List has been prepared by the State Government containing various castes and communities. It is not necessary that the candidates belonging to reserve category studied outside the State of U.P. may get reservation in the respective States accordingly in case they are prevented by the State Government by institutional reservation such candidates belonging to reserve category and done their MBBS or BDS from outside the State may be deprived to get benefit of reservation which is their statutory right in their own State i.e. State of U.P.
59. Apart from above facts and circumstances there is one other reason which comes in the favour of petitioners' against the 100% institutional reservation. In the case of Saurabh Chaudhary's (supra) the Apex Court had considered in detail (in Para 25 of the judgment) the reservation provided by various States of the country on the basis of institutions or residences. In some of the States like Assam, Tamil Nadu, Goa, Karnataka there is 100% reservation on the basis of residence. Accordingly in case a candidate has done their Graduation Medical Courses from these States they may not be entitled to pursue their Post Graduate Medical Courses. This is an anomaly which has been removed by Constitution Bench of Apex Court by providing maximum 50% of the reservation either of institutional or in the basis of residence in Sanrabh Chaudhary's case.
60. Any law or regulations framed by the State which directly and indirectly prohibit a person from pursuing education in the State's own Medical College or University or in a college which includes Medical Colleges financed by the State Government will be arbitrary, unjust and improper and shall be violative of Article 14 as well as Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly the impugned provisions suffers from non-application of mind by which the petitioner has been deprived to their Post Graduate Medical Courses from the Medical Colleges or Universities which are being financed by the Government of UP.
61. A duty is cast upon the State Government to provide facilities of education atleast through the Government owned Medical Colleges or the Colleges and Universities financed by the State uniformly and equally to all persons residing in the State without discrimination. Creating 100% institutional reservation indirectly prohibit the petitioner to pursue their courses from the State own medical colleges or the college or Universities financed by the State.
62. In view of discussion as discussed hereinabove relating to four issues, the present controversy is summarised as under :
(i) All medical colleges and Universities imparting medical education including the post graduate medical education may not deprive a person from pursuing their courses by blanket bar to the admission, in violation of Statutory provisions contained in the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. All persons who are otherwise eligible or qualified under the Act and rules framed thereunder shall be entitled for admission to medical as well as Post Graduate Medical Courses in the medical colleges or Universities of the State of U.P. However, State Government can restrict the number of seats by laying down the criteria or recognize or de-recognize the college or Universities situated in the State of U.P. or outside the State of U.P. while providing criteria for admission to Graduate or Post Graduate Medical Courses after considering the standard of education and other related facts of the respective medical colleges or the Universities, in the light of rules, regulations and recommendations framed by Medical Council of India.
(ii) The State Government while issuing notification under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act can not create complete bar or prohibit the candidates directly or indirectly from seeking admission to Post Graduated Medical Courses, in contravention of provision contained in U.P. States Universities Act.
The regulations, rules or orders issued in pursuance to power conferred under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. States Universities Act is a subordinate legislation hence it can not be issued in contravention of the provisions contained in the Act itself. However, in pursuance to subsection (5) of Section 28 of the Act, Government may lay down the procedure, eligibility criteria providing reservation on the basis of residential as well as institution preference, but can not create absolute bar from admitting a candidate in pursuance to said provision except on merit.
(iii) Peoples can not be deprived from the rights accrued to them by the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. States Universities Act, 1973. Admittedly Act has been legislated with the assent of President of India under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. Accordingly the rights of petitioners will survive till Government of India or Parliament legislate law, repugnant to it.
(iv) In view of Apex Court judgment right from Pradeep Jain's case (supra) to Saurabh Chaudhary's case (supra) while holding the examination for Post Graduate Medical Courses or Graduate Medical Courses State Government can not provide 100% institutional reservation while filling up 75% of seats. The State Government may reserve maximum 50% of the seats by institutional preference in the various medical colleges and the Universities of the State of U.P. for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses. In the rest 50% of seats the State Government should admit candidates who are residence of the State of U.P. and others. For this the State Government may frame appropriate guidelines.
(v) In view of provision contained in U.P States University Act, the State Government directly or indirectly can not deprive the candidates who are permanently or otherwise residing in the State of U.P. from admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses even if they have studied outside the State of U.P. except on merit as well as on the ground that they have pursued their Graduate Medical Courses from a college which has been either de-recognised in accordance to law or it is a college of which the standard of education is not up to mark.
(vi) The Articles 38, 39, 41 and 46 of the Constitution of India has got element of positivism and command the State Government to discharge duties for the welfare of peoples presiding within its territory. The peoples residing in a State has got right to be benefited by State action done in pursuance to the Directive Principle of the State Policy. Any action of the State Government which negate or deprive the peoples of the State from getting such benefit shall be highly arbitrary, unjust and improper and will be violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The State Government can not deprive in a absolute sense by any Legislative Act, enactment, notification or order from the benefit available to peoples residing in the State. However, the State Government may impose reasonable restrictions provide reservation on institutional or residential basis in the medical colleges or Universities but should not be made more than 50% of the seats in view of the law settled by Apex Court in Saurabh Chaudhary's case (supra).
63. Under the above facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove the impugned provision which contains 100% institutional reservations for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses is highly arbitrary unjust and improper and is an act of non-application of mend as well as violation of Apex Court judgment (supra) hence violative of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, deserves to be struck down.
64. In view of above the writ petition is allowed and decided in the following manner:
(1) The impugned provision which is the extract of Government Notification, dated 19th November, 2003 as modified by order dated December 15, 2003 as contained in Para 3.1.1 of the information brochure which create 100% institutional reservation is declared unconstitutional, illegal, void and inoperative and quashed. A writ of certiorari is issued accordingly.
(2) Only those petitioners who have filed writ petition in this Court and appeared in the UPPGMEE-2004, in pursuance to interim order passed by this Court, shall be entitled to get benefit of present judgment. It may create complex problem in case the benefit of this judgment may be made available to others also who had not filed writ petition in the High Court, including the delay in admission of candidates and loss of session, etc.
(3) State Government is directed to frame guidelines and issue order in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the UP. State Universities Act while holding the next Post Graduate Medical Entrance Examination in the light of present judgment.
(4) Since the examination has already been held and result has been declared, I am not inclined to accept the prayer of petitioners' Counsel that fresh examination should be held for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses and the result of UPPGMEE, 2004 be cancelled.
(5) Subject to above, the present judgment will have got prospective effect.
65. Accordingly, the writ petition disposed of finally. No order as to costs.