Knox, Actg. C.J. and Blair, J.
1. The sole point with which we have to deal in this appeal is, whether the application for execution which was passed on the 19th November 1889, is or is not barred by limitation. The Court below taking in aid an application by the judgment-creditor, dated the 8th January 1896, has decided that it was not so barred. The contention before us on behalf of the appellant is that the application just named is not an application which saves the running of time against the decree-holder. The application was one made by the decree-holder asking for permission under Section 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bid for or purchase the property put up for sale. This Court has already held in the case of Bansi v. Sikree Mal (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 211, that the making of such an application is a step in aid of execution within the meaning of Clause 4, No. 179, Schedule ii of Limitation Act No. XV of 1877. The Lower Appellate Court acted therefore perfectly rightly, and was bound to follow that precedent. The learned vakil for the appellant asks us to lay down the opposite of this ruling on the ground, firstly, that this decision is the decision of a single Judge which he alleges has not been followed; secondly, on the ground that the Calcutta High Court in the case of Raghunundun Misser v. Kally Dut Misser (1896) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 690, have ruled otherwise. There is no authority for the allegation that the ruling of this Court in I.L.R. 13 All. 211, has not been followed; the presumption is the other way. It is undoubtedly a matter to be regretted that different views should be taken on this point by different High Courts, but the question we have to decide is whether an application put in under Section 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure is or is not an application in accordance with law to the proper Court to take some step in aid of execution of the decree. With the utmost respect for the learned Judges who have held otherwise, we fail to see how such an application can be held to lie outside the words we have just quoted. The fact that a decree-holder is prepared to bid for property and is anxious to purchase is, in the absence of a fraud which cannot be presumed, distinctly an act which modifies the conditions of the sale to the obvious benefit both of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and brings the decree within nearer distance of complete execution and satisfaction. In many cases it does make the difference between complete satisfaction and partial satisfaction. There are indeed three steps. There is the step of the application which the decree-holder makes; there is the step taken by the Court of granting permission, and there is the further step which the decree-holder again takes of availing himself of such permission by bidding at the sale.
2. The application before us was an application in accordance with law to the proper Court to take the step of granting permission, which step, in ordinary circumstances, would be a distinct step taken forward in aid of execution of the decree. For these reasons we give our approval, and adhere to the view which has hitherto been the view of this Court. We dismiss the appeal with costs.