Iqbal Ahmed, J.
1. This is a defendants appeal and arises out of a suit for ejectment filed in the revenue Court under Section 58(a) of the Tenancy Act by three plaintiffs, Nath Prasad, Lalta Prasad and the latter's wife Mt. Chandra Kali. The defence to the suit was that the defendants were in possession of the plots in dispute not as a tenant but as a proprietor. In view of the defendants' plea that they were not tenants of the plaintiffs but had a proprietary right in the land, the Revenue Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 199(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act required the defendants to institute a suit in the civil Court for the determination of the question of title raised by them.
2. The defendants, did, in pursuance of the order of the revenue Court, file a suit in the civil Court within the time allowed by the revenue Court, but they arrayed as defendants to the suit only two out of the three plaintiffs, viz., Nath Prasad and Lalta Prasad and omitted to implead Mt. Chandra Kali as a defendant to the suit. It appears that Mt. Chandra Kali actually applied to the civil Court to be made a party to the suit, but her application was rejected. The suit filed by the defendants in the civil Court was decreed.
3. When after the decision of the civil suit, the revenue Court proceeded to decide the ejectment suit, Mt. Chandra Kali one of the plaintiff's maintained that the defendants had not complied with the order of the revenue Court inasmuch as that though the defendants had instituted a suit in the civil Court for the declaration of their proprietary title, they had omitted to implead her in that suit and as such the Revenue Court was bound in view of the provisions of Section 199(2) of the Tenancy Act (Act 2 of 1901) to decide that question of title against the defendants. This contention of Mt. Chandra Kali did not find favour with the learned Assistant Collector, and he field that the defendants had complied with his order and as such he was bound to decide the ejectment case in accordance with the decision of the civil Court. On these grounds the learned Assistant Collector dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs the lower appellate Court has reversed the decree of the learned Assistant Collector and has decreed the suit for ejectment. The lower appellate Court has held that the omission of the defendants to the ejectment suit to implead all the plaintiffs of that suit as defendants in the civil suit constituted non-compliance with the order of the Revenue Court passed under Section 199(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act. In my judgment, the lower appellate Court was perfectly right in coming to this conclusion. The suit contemplated by Section 199(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act is a suit filed by the defendant to an ejectment suit against all the plaintiffs of such a suit. If the defendant omits to implead some of the plaintiffs to an ejectment suit, he does not comply with the order of the Revenue Court. The issue as to proprietary title of the plots in dispute in an ejectment suit is an issue between all the parties to that suit, and unless all the parties to that suit are actually parties to the civil suit, that is filed in pursuance of the direction of the Revenue Court, there cannot be a complete and final adjudication of that issue of proprietary title. The mere fact of the institution of a declaratory suit in the Civil Court cannot be a compliance with the direction of the Revenue Court under Section 199(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act, unless all the plaintiffs to the ejectment suit are made defendants in the civil suit.
4. Then it is argued by Dr. Agarwala that the question of proprietary title having been determined by the civil Court in favour of the defendants-appellants, there was no decision of the Revenue Court on the question of proprietary title and as such no appeal lay to the District Judge against the decree of the learned Assistant Collector. I am unable to agree with this contention. As Mt. Chandra Kali was not a party to the civil suit she did urge in the trial Court that the plea of proprietary title raised by the defendants must be decided against them, and as such a question of proprietary title was clearly in issue in the Court of first instance and that question was also in issue in the lower appellate Court. Therefore an appeal lay to the lower appellate Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 177(e) of the Tenancy Act.
5. For the reasons given above, I dismiss the appeal with costs.