1. On 20th March 1949 the applicant was arrested by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Indore City, by the order of the District Magistrate, Indore District, made Under Section 3(2), Maintenance of Public Order Act (vil  of 1949). On 24th March were communicated to the applicant the grounds on which the order had been made against him as required by 8. S of the Act. The grounds as furnished to the accused were as follows:
Whereas you belong to R. S. S. which has been declared unlawful by the Government. You are a leader of the said Association and indulging in euch acts to bring into hatred the Government established by law in India and promoting or attempting to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of subjects and to prejudice the maintenance of public order on public safety.
On 1st April 1949 the petitioner made a petition to this Court Under Section 491, Criminal P.C. praying that an order for his release from custody be made as it was illegal and improper. Immediately after the application had been made another communication Under Section 5 of the Act stating the grounds of his detention was sent to the petitioner by the District Magistrate. The grounds furnished this second time were couched in these terms:
Whereas you belong to R. S. S. and Hindu rashtra Dal which were declared unlawful and their activities were banned by the Government; you are a leader of the said Association and indulging in such note to bring Into hatred the Government established by law in India and promoting or attempting to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different class of subjects and to prejudice maintenance of public order or public safety; you were found to circulate prejudicial documents (the statement of Nathooram Godse) in the city, copies of this have been seized from you and from your instance such copies were recovered from others also.
2. The petitioner was heard on 8th April 1949 and at the hearing the Public Prosecutor read out to the Court from a file in the custody of the District Magistrate an application dated 20th March 1949 made by Mr. Dube the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department asking for the detention of the applicant. He also read out the statement made on oath by Mr. Dube and the order made thereon by the District Magistrate. After the close of the arguments the original application, the statement made by Mr. Dube and the order Were removed from the file of the District Magistrate and were submitted with an application to this Court by the Public Prosecutor for being received in evidence. In the statement made by Mr. Dube and recorded by the District Magistrate be stated that the statement made by Nathooram Godse (in the well known trial for the murder of Mahatma Gandhi presumably) had been proscribed by the Government of India and that the copies of this statement had been distributed by the petitioner to others and this was likely to affect the maintenance of public peace. In a written statement filed in the Court on 3rd April 1949 the petitioner submitted that possession and circulation of Nathooram Godse's statement were not prohibited in Mud by a Bharat and was not an offence. It was not circulated by this petitioner but that he had five Copies of the statement which he gave to some of his friends.
3. These are the brief facts of the case. I may say at once that what purported to be grounds Under Section 5, Maintenance of Public Order Act and which were communicated to the petitioner on 24th March are no grounds at all. They are mere generalisations stating the effects which are likely to be produced on public peace, produced by what acts of the petitioner is not stated therein. The grounds for making an order under the section means the acts or consent (conduct?) of a person for which he can be held responsible as affecting the public peace. No such act of the petitioner was brought to his notice by this communication made to him. It was probably for this reason, on better advice tendered, that the District Magistrate made a second communication, to the petitioner on 2nd April. This also Buffers from the same defect except in one instance. In this communication the petitioner is definitely informed, that he himself was in possession of the statement made by Nathooram Godse and that he had distributed copies of this statement to other persona. This is a definite act which furnished one ground at least, to the District Magistrate for making the order in question. This fact is admitted by the petitioner himself. The learned Counsel for the petitioner raised two objections to this, as being insufficient for the detention of the petitioner. The first was that the District Magistrate who made the order of detention was succeeded by another on or before 24th March when the first communication of grounds for the detention was made by him to the petitioner and it was this Magistrate who made the second communication on 2nd April 1949. He was not, therefore; the per-son who could know the grounds on which the order of detention had been made by his predecessor in office. I am unable to accept this contention as good. There is on the record the application of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, his statement made to the District Magistrate and the order made thereon on 20th March 1949. From this office record the succeeding District Magistrate should be able to ascertain the grounds on which the order was made and he was in a position to communicate the grounds on which the order was made.
4. The second objection taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the grounds cannot be furnished by installments. All that ia required by 8. 5 of the Act is that the grounds on which the order of detention had been made shall be communicated as soon as may be after the order has been made. The order was made on 20th March. What were supposed to be the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu on 24th March and the amended communication of grounds was again made on and April. The communication of grounda made on 2nd April cannot be said to be too late, so late as to impute a malicious motive to the detaining authority, the intention to evade the law by not communicating the grounds in time or communicating them in a slovenly manner with the view to gain time. I am unable to hold in this case that there was any such intention on the part of the District Magistrate. It was further urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the statement made by Nathooram Godse in Delhi is not prohibited in Madhya Bharat. That is so. But the statement may be a highly objectionable one none the less. It is not for this Court to determine what effect by a perusal of this statement, would be produced on the mind of the reader. The District Magistrate did apply his mind to it and he came to the conclusion that this act of the petitioner was prejudicial to the public safety. The very fact that the petitioner had five copies of the statement in his possession and that he distributed these to his friends tells against him. He wanted that these five persons should read the statement and presumably should pass the copies on to others. The Deputy Superintendent of Police in his statement made to the District Magistrate stated that the statement of Godse would have the effect of inflaming communal passions. My conclusion, therefore i3 that Inure was a definite act, a conduct of the petitioner which was a ground present before the mind of the District Magistrate when he made the order of detention on 20th March. Neither he nor his successor in office had the wit to state a simple fact in simple language and communicate it to the detenue. The Detroit Magistrates (I say this from my experience of dealing with petitions under B. 491, Criminal P. C) appear to be under the belief that when making an order of detention Under Section 3 of the Act or when communicating the grounds for making the order of detention they should repeat verbatim the definition of act pro. judicial to the public safety or maintenance of public order' as given in Section 2 of the Act. This is far from what the law requires. The Magistrate should scrutinize the acts and the conduct of the person in question and judge whether his acts and conduct as brought to his notice would have any of the effects stated in the definition -of 'prejudicial act' and if he comes to the conclusion that public safety or public order would thereby be endangered he should proceed to make the order and when communicating the grounds of the order of detention he should state the acts of the detenue which in his opinion constitute a danger to the public safety or maintenance of public order. In this particular case I am satisfied that there was a ground for making the order of detention present before the mind of the District Magistrate and he acted thereon. It was communicated to the petitioner on 2nd April and it is for him now to make a representation to the District Magistrate explaining his conduct in relation to the statement of Nathooram Godse. The petition is dismissed.
5. I agree.