M.D. Bhatt, J.
1. This is the defendants' second appeal after having lost in the two Courts below in the matter of their eviction from the non-residen-tial premises viz. the two gumtis (cablns) in question, on the grounds under Sections 12(1) (b) and 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
2. Present respondent-landlord's suit for eviction had been decreed by the trial Court on the grounds under Sections 12(1) (b) and 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. His claim for mesne profits was equally allowed, though all claim for interest and costs had been completely disallowed. The defendants' appeal filed against the trial Court's judgment, was dismissed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Morena and the trial Court's judgment and decree for eviction on the particular grounds were maintained in toto. Cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-landlord in the matter of interest and costs was equally dismissed. Being aggrieved with the lower Appellate Court's judgment and decree, the defendants have come in appeal against their eviction and the plaintiff-landlord has equally filed his cross-obiection in the matter of his claim for interest and costs.
3. The learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has candidly stated at the outset that he does not challenge any longer the concurrent findings of facts of both the Courts below in the matter of grounds of eviction and he restricts the appeal only to the question of law, pressed for the first time in this second appeal (See this Court's Order-sheet dated 4-2-1981). Law is settled that pure question of law can be raised at any stage of appeal; and as such, leave to raise the law point has been granted to the appellants-defendants. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has pressed before me the solitary question oflaw that the suit for eviction of the wooden gumtis placed on the plaintiff-landlord's chabutaras could not be governed by the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in-asmmuch as such gumtis were not covered under the definition of 'accommodation' as per Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. In support of this assertion, the appellants' learned counsel has placed reliance on Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarkadas, AIR 1975 SC 1758. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has tried to repel the arguments by contending that the rul;ng cited, has no application to the instant case. In the matter of cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent, it has been urged by the respondent's learned counsel that both the Courts below were wrong in not allowing the interest in the particular circumstance that payment of interest was one of the terms of the Agreement on lease. Disallowance of costs by both the Courts below has equally been assailed as being without any rational bas's. In the matter of the cross-objection, appellants' learned counsel has contended that discretion of the Courts below in the matter of interest and costs does not deserve to be lightly interfered with, without any cogent and substantial grounds.
4. Taking up at first the respondent's cross-objection, it may be observed that both the Courts below have disallowed not only the costs but also interest and have given their own reasons for the same. The concurrent findings of facts of both the Courts below cannot be agitated in the second appeal. The reasonings given for disallowance of such claim by both the Courts below are not found to be erroneous. Hence the cross-objection apparently deserves to be dismissed.
5. Now coming to the defendants' appeal, which is now limited only to the question of pure law, it is to be seen whether the cabins in suit (gumtis) were covered under the definition of 'accommodation' as given in Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. There is no dispute on the point that these two gumtis in question have been placed on the respondent-landlord's chabutaras and are used as non-residential premises for running petty shops. Thisfact is lucidly found mentioned in Para 1 of the plaint itself. AIR 1975 SC 1758 (supra) which has been pertinently cited before me, relates to the case under U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the subsequent amending Acts thereto. 'Accommodation' is defined in the said Act under Section 2 (a), as also defined under the corresponding same section of this State's Act viz. the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. Definitions of 'accommodation' in both these Acts are not found to be fully similar. Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act no doubt correspond to Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) respectively of the U. P. Act. Clause (i) under the definition as given in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act is not there in the U. P. Act. Furthermore, what is more important and relevant for the purpose of the present case, is the fact that a further Clause which was subsequently added by the amending Act viz. Act No. 17 of 1954 in the U. P. Act (III of 1947), is not there at all, in the definition of 'accommodation' of our State's Act viz. M. P. Accommodation Control Act. This relevant Clause added at the end of Clause (a) reads thus :
'but does not include any accommodation used as a factory, or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction'.
The Supreme Court ruling revolves round this Clause, added by the amending Act and its interpretation. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a cinema theatre equipped with projectors and other fittings and ready to be launched as an entertainment house, was an accommodation as per the definition of the U. P. Act, as stood duly amended by the subsequent amending Act. The Supreme Court was inclined to the view that a lease of an 'accommodation' must essentially be of a building and not a business or industry together with a building in which it is situated. In the light of the facts as they were, the Supreme Court held that definition of 'accommodation' in the U. P. Act as amended, encompassed leases of buildings only 'inclusive of what renders them more congenial butnot of businesses accommodated in buildings nor of premises let out with the predominant purpose of running ofbusiness.' It would, thus, be seen that this Supreme Court ruling has absolutely no relevance to the instant case. The gumtis in question in the present case were admittedly non-residential accommodation for being used as shops and obviously they are found to be covered under the definition of 'accommodation' of Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, wherein, the particular Clause has been subsequently added ini the U.P. Act by the amending Act No. 17 of 1954, is not at all there. In Nandu-lal v. Municipal Committee Simla, ILR 5 Lah 543 : (AIR 1925 Lah 252) it his been held in connection with the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 that wooden shed mounted on wheels and placed on a piece of ground is a building within the meaning of Section 3 (2) of the said Act. This analogy of the definition of 'building' as given in different context does well, fit in to the circumstance of the present case, to cover the wooden gumtis placed on chabutaras within the sweep of the definition of 'accommodation' under Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. I am, thus, of the opinion that gumtis in suit being apparently covered under the definition of 'accommodation', provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act are applicable on all fours in the matter of eviction of the tenants from the said accommodation. The law point raised, does not appear to have any merit.
6. Before parting with this appeal, it may be reiterated that although the concurrent findings of fact have no longer been challenged by the appellants' learned counsel; but as it is. on scrutiny of the record of the Courts below, it is noticed that these concurrent findings of fact are found to be based on due appreciation of evidence; and as such, call for no interference in the second appeal.
7. In the result, thus, the defendants' appeal and so also the plaintiff-respondent's cross-objection are dismissed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are maintained in toto. As for the costs of the present appeal, the appellants-defendants to bear the respondent-plaintiff's costs besides bearing their own. Plea-der's fee of Rs. 100/- allowed on either side, if certified.