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Barnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectElectricity
CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberMisc. Petn. No. 37 of 1962
Judge
Reported inAIR1963MP41
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226; Electricity Act, 1910 - Sections 4 (1) and 4(3)
AppellantBarnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd.
RespondentState of Madhya Pradesh and anr.
Appellant AdvocateA.P. Sen and K.A. Chitale, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateH.L. Khaskalam Government Adv. for Respondent No. 1 and ;B.L. Seth, Adv. for Respondent No. 2
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredLtd. v. New Surwana Transport Co.
Excerpt:
- - (c) .(d) where in the opinion of the state government the financial position of the licensee is such that he is unable fully and efficiently todischarge th3 duties and obligations imposed on him by his licence; 9 of 1910) (hereinafter referred to as the said act); and whereas the licensee has failed to execute such works as were required for purpose of a full and continuous supply in certain streets and thereby constituted a breach of condition 5 of the licence; and whereas the financial position of the licensee is such that he is unable fully and efficiently to discharge the duties and obligations imposed on him by his licence; that in the reply given to the show cause notice the company had not denied any of the charges levelled against it but had only endeavoured to explain its.....dixit, c. j. in this case the petitioner, the barnagar electric supply and industrial company ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the company,) seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing an order of the state government under section 4(1) of the indian electricity act, 1910, (hereinafter referred to as the act), revoking its licence.2. the licence was granted to the company under the gwalior electricity act, samvat 1995, on 28th march, 1938, by the government of the former gwalior state. the licence was for a period of twenty-five years and would have in ordinary course expired on 27th march, 1963. in january 1950 the madhya bharat indian electricity act, 1910 (adaptation act), samvat-2oo6 (no. 14 of 1950), came into force in madhya bharat. by that act the provisions of the indian electricity.....
Judgment:

Dixit, C. J.

In this case the petitioner, the Barnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Company Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Company,) seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing an order of the State Government under Section 4(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), revoking its licence.

2. The licence was granted to the Company under the Gwalior Electricity Act, Samvat 1995, on 28th March, 1938, by the Government of the former Gwalior State. The licence was for a period of twenty-five years and would have in ordinary course expired on 27th March, 1963. In January 1950 the Madhya Bharat Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Adaptation Act), Samvat-2oo6 (No. 14 of 1950), came into force in Madhya Bharat. By that Act the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act were adapted and brought into force in Madhya Bharat. The repeal and saving clause of that Act inter alia made licences granted under the Gwalior Electricity Act as licences deemed to have been granted under the adapted Indian Electricity Act, 1910. In 1951 the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951, came into force and by virtue of that enactment the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, was extended to Madhya Bharat and the adapted Act No. 14 of 1950 stood repealed. Section 6 of the Part B Sates (Laws) Act, 1951, also provided that licences granted under the repealed Act shall be deemed to have been granted under the extended Act. The effect of all these provisions is that the licence granted to the petitioner on 28th March, 1938, under the Gwalior Electricity Act, Samvat 1995, is now by fiction a licence granted under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Under Section 4(1) of the Act the State Government is empowered, after consulting the State Electricity Board, to revoke a licence, if in its opinion the public interest so requires, in the circumstances enumerated in Sub-clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). Section 4 of the Act, so far as it is material here, runs as follows-

'4 (1) The State Government may, if in its opinion the public interest so requires and after consulting the State Electricity Board, revoke a license, in any of the following cases, namely:-

(a) where the licensee, in the opinion of the State Government makes wilful and unreasonably prolonged default in doing anything required of him by or under this Act;

(b) where the licensee breaks any of the terms or conditions of his license the breach ot which is expressly declared by such license to render it liable to revocation;

(c) ............................

(d) where in the opinion of the State Government the financial position of the licensee is such that he is unable fully and efficiently todischarge th3 duties and obligations imposed on him by his licence; ... ... ... ...

(3) No license shall be revoked under subsection (1) unless the State Government has given to the licensee not less than three months' notice, in writing, stating the grounds on which it is proposed to revoke the licence and has considered any cause shown by the licensee within the period of the notice, against the proposed revocation.

Under Section 3(2)(f) of the Act, the provisions contained in the Schedule to the Act are deemed to be incorporated with, and formed part of, every license granted under the Act. Clause 6 of the Schedule makes it obligatory for the licensee to give a continuous supply of electrical energy within the time stated in the clause if a requisition to that effect is made by the owner or occupier of any premises situate within the area of supply. By Clause 5 of the licence the licensee was required to execute, within a period of twelve months from the commencement of the license, works to the satisfaction of Government for the purpose of a full and continuous supply of energy throughout the streets or parts of streets' specified in that clause. The licensee was also required to begin the commencement of these works within six months from the date on which the licence was issued.

3. On 30th June, 1961, the State Government issued a notice to the petitioner-Company under Section 4(3) of the Act asking the Company to show cause within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of the notice why its licence should not be revoked under Section 4(1). The grounds on which it was proposed to revoke the licence were stated in the notice thus -

'...... Whereas it has been reported that thelicensee of the last two and half years has not been giving power services to the public in spite of their persistent demands resulting in the wilful and unreasonably prolonged default in doing a thing required of him by or under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (No. 9 of 1910) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act);

And whereas the licensee has failed to execute such works as were required for purpose of a full and continuous supply in certain streets and thereby constituted a breach of condition 5 of the licence;

And whereas the financial position of the licensee is such that he is unable fully and efficiently to discharge the duties and obligations imposed on him by his licence;......'

In answer to this notice, the Company addressed a letter to the Government on 24th July, 1961. saying that it was more regular than other powerhouses in the supply of energy; that it was supplying electrical energy to the public to the maximum of its capacity; that the rates of energy fixed by the Government in 1954 were uneconomical to the Company and it was sustaining heavy losses; that the Company's entire capital had been used up in meeting the losses and it was also indebt-ed; that it was not possible for the Company to invest any money for expansion especially when it was uncertain whether on the expiry of the term of the licence in March 1963, the licence would be renewed in favour of the Company; and that it was not possible to make any increase in its capacity for giving electrical energy to the public until it received supply of energy from the Chambal Hydro-Eiectric plant.

The petitioner concluded the letter by the statement that 'the delay caused in giving new connections' was due to reasons beyond its control. The explanation given by the Company did not satisfy the Government. The Company's licence was revoked by the Government on 1st November, 1961, and a notification of revocation was issued. On the same day, (that is, ist November, 1961), the Government gave a notice to the petitioner-Company under Section 5(1)(a) revoking the licence granted to it with effect from 31st January, 1962 and directing the Company under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 5 to sell and deliver its undertaking to the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Jabalpur, 'on that date'.

4. The petitioner contends that the order of revocation is mala fide and contrary to the provisions of Section 4(1); that no grounds at all existed for the issue of a notice to the Company to show cause against revocation; and that after the petitioner had shown cause, the State Government held no enquiry into the allegations made against the Company and the order of revocation was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and without giving any hearing to the petitioner. In the return filed on behalf of the respondents opposing the petition, it has been averred that there had been several complaints from the public of Barnagar regarding the unsatisfactory supply of electrical energy given fay the petitioner; that the original rates for electrical energy fixed by the licence were revised long before 1961 when the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, became applicable, that thereafter the licensee was free to fix its own rates under the said Act and had actually moved for the appointment of a rating committee under Section 57Aof the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for the fixation of new rates but that later on the licensee withdrew its request for a revision of the rates; and that the obligations of the - licensee under the Act and the licence in no way depended on the supply of energy to the Company from the Chambal Hydro-Electric plant.

It has been further stated by the opponents that the show cause notice was based on investigations made by Government officers; that in the reply given to the show cause notice the Company had not denied any of the charges levelled against it but had only endeavoured to explain its default by blaming the Government for its unsatisfactory financial condition and for failure of the Government to supply the Company with power from the Chambal Hydro-Electric plant; that in view of the reply given by the petitioner to the show cause notice, no question of any further investigation arose; and that the order of revocation was made by the Government after satisfying itself that the public interest required revocationof the licence held by the petitioner-Company.

5. It was argued by Shri Sen learned counsel appearing fur the petitioner, that an order with regard to revocation of a licence under Section 4(1) of the Act was not an administrative or a ministerial order but was a quasi-judicial order; that a licence could be revoked only in any of the rive cases enumerated in Section 4(1) if the Government was of the opinion that public interest required the revocation; and that the existence of the circumstances stated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 4(1) as an objective fact was under the main body of Section 4(1) a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of revocation. Learned counsel proceeded to say that this condition precedent being an objective fact had to be determined by the Government in a quasi-judicial manner; that the provision in Sub-section (3) of Section 4 that no licence shall be revoked without giving a notice to the licensee in writing stating the grounds on which it was proposed to revoke the licence and without considering the cause shown by the licensee against revocation, made it unmistakably clear that a decision about revocation under Section 4(1) was a quasi-judicial decision; and that, therefore, the Government was bound to hold an enquiry for substantiating the allegations against the Company on which the licence was revoked and for giving an opportunity to the petitioner-Company to refute them by tendering evidence on its behalf.

6. We are unable to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Company that in exercising its functions under Section 4(1) the Government is bound to act in a judicial manner and that its action of revocation of a licence is quasi-judicial in character. It will be seen that under Section 4(1) of the Act it is only in the circumstances enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) that a licence can be cancelled if the Government forms the opinion that public interest requires the revocation of the licence. If those circumstances exist, then the opinion of the Government whether the licence should be revoked is a subjective matter which is not open to an objective test. But, the Legislature has made the formation of opinion by the Government as to revocation of a licence subject to certain conditions precedent laid down in Clauses (a) to (e). These conditions must be complied with before the Government exercises its power of revocation under Section 4(1). Now the conditions specified in Clauses (a) to (e) are not of the same character. Under Clause (a), it is the opinion of the State Government on the question whether a licensee has made a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default in doing anything required of him by or under the Act which is a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of the Government to revoke a licence. It must, however, be noted that the opinion of the Government is conclusive only on the point whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default and not on the question as to the obligations imposed on. a licensee by or under the Act. This is a question of law.

No doubt, in forming opinion for the purpose of Clause (a) the Government is required to form its. opinion as to the obligations imposed on a licensee by or under the Act. But its view on this question would not be decisive. If the Government takes a wrong view of the obligations of a licensee, then the opinion formed by the Government under Clause (a) cannot be said to be such an opinion as is contemplated by the clause. (See Hubli Electricity Co. v. Province of Bombay, A1K 1949 PC 136). So also under Clause (d) the condition precedent is again the opinion of the Government with regard to the financial position of the licensee. That is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of revocation. Thus under Clauses (a) and (d) what is condition precedent is not the actual existence of the matters stated in those clauses but the subjective opinion of the Government as to the existence of those matters.

Clause (b) is, however, differently worded and under that Clause it is not the opinion but the actual fact of a breach of any of the terms or conditions of a licence which gives a right of revocation to the Government. The condition precedent laid down in Clause (c) is partly factual and partly a matter of opinion of the Government. Those laid down in Clauses (d) and (e) also depend on the opinion of the Government. The conditions precedent mentioned in Clauses (a) and (d) being left to the subjective opinion of the Government, it cannot with any degree of force be contended that the revocation of a licence by the Government in cases specified in Clauses (a) or (d) after forming an opinion that the public interest requires the cancellation of a licence is a matter to be determined in a quasi-judicial manner and that it would be open to the Court to enquire into the grounds of the opinion formed by the. Government or to consider the resonable-ness or otherwise of that opinion. If the Government has formed the opinion honestly and for the purpose specified in the Act, then the Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the Government or enquire into the validity of the grounds on which that opinion was formed.

The condition precedent laid down in clause (b) is an objective fact which has not been left to the subjective opinion of the Government. The Government must come to a decision as to whether as a matter of fact a licensee has broken any of the terms and conditions of his licence before proceeding to form its own opinion about the revocation of licence in the public interest. But from this it does not follow that the condition precedent mentioned in Clause (b), which is an objective fact, must necessarily and always be determined judicially by the Government. So to hold would be to make, an unwarranted assumption that an objective fact must always be determined judicially. The Government must no doubt decide the question of breach of any of the terms or conditions of a licence for its own purpose and its decision, if erroneous, can no doubt be questioned in a Court of law. But that is far from saying that the Government has a duty to decide the question judicially. There is thusnothing in the wording of the main body of Section 4(1) or of any of the Clauses (a) to (e) to show that the Government has a duty to act judicially in exercising its power of revocation under Section 4(1)

7. The fact that, as provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 4, no licence can be revoked under subsection (1) unless the State Government has given a notice in writing to the licensee stating the grounds on which it is proposed to revoke the licence and has considered any cause shown by the licensee against the proposed revocation, in no way affects the question of the construction of the language used in Section 4(1) or alters the nature or character of the order of revocation under that provision. Sub-section (3) has 'not the effect of making an order under Sub-section (1) a 'quasi-judicial order or casting a duty on the Government to decide the question of revocation judicially. The Governments' duty under Sub-section (1) is purely administrative. Sub-section (3) only prescribes a method in the dischargeof that duty.

The purpose of giving a notice to a licenseestating the grounds on which it is proposed to revoke his licence , and asking him to show cause against the proposed revocation is to enable theGovernment to have further information in order to decide finally whether the licence should or should not be revoked. It does not impose anyjudicial duty on the Government. The question as to what a licensee is required to do when he is asked to show cause and what he can claim to do has no reference to any judicial or quasi-judicial approach to the question of revocation of a licence. So far as the Government is concerned, all that Sub-section (3) enjoins is that a notice to the licensee to show cause against revocation must be given and the Government must consider the cause shown. An order of revocation made without complying with the provisions of Sub-section (3) would no' doubt be invalid and can be quashed fey this Court by a writ of certiorari as being one without jurisdiction.

8. The Supreme Court has, after consideringseveral English decisions, stated in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222, Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division, ATR 1958 SC 398, Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, ATR 1938 SC 578, G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P. S. R. T. Corpn., AIR 1959 SC 308 and Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 606, the criteria for ascertainingwhether a particular act is a judicial act or an administrative act. In all these cases, it has been held that the question whether an administrative body or authority functions purely as an administrative one or as a quasi-judicial authority has to be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder. The tests laid down in those cases are: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) authority should be given to determine the question affecting the rights of subjects; and (c) such a body should have the duty to act judicially. In AIR 1950 SC 222 (supra), Kania, C. J.. in paragraph 7 of his judgment, rejected as un-sound the proposition that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasi-iudicial. He observed :-

'...... every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of some one or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari ......... It seemsto me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an enquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed'.

In AIR 1950 SC 222 (supra). Das, J., (as he then was) emphasized that it is the duty to act judicially which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act, and in support he referred to the observations of Lord Hewart, C. J., in Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, 1928-1 KB 411, that -

'In order that a body may satisfy the required test, it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects; there must be superadded to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially.'

Das, J., then proceeded to say -

'(1) That if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (2) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially aSect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from, the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.'

He pointed out that the two kinds of acts, namely, quasi-judicial and administrative acts have many common features, by saying that -

'A person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to-enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up hismind to exercise his power just as a. person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which, may, nevertheless, be left to subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority.'

It was then stressed by Das, J., that a mere provision for an inquiry as a preliminary step in coming to a decision will not necessarily make the decision a quasi-judicial act, for the purposes of inquiry may only be to enable the deciding authority to make up its mind to do what may be a purely administrative act. In Moti Miyan v. Commissioner, Indore Division, 1960 MPLJ 100 : (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 157), also the distinction between a quasi-judicial and an administrative decision was considered by a Division Bench of this Court, and it has been observed in that case -

'...... a quasi-judicial decision is nothingbut an administrative decision, some stage or some element of which possesses judicial characteristics. The decision, whether quasi-judicial or administrative, is taken by the competent authority in the exercise of its discretion. But the distinguishing feature of the two kinds of acts is the mode or manner in which the opinion on the basis of which the act is done by the authority in the exercise of its discretion is formed. The decision would be quasi-judicial if in reaching that decision the authority is required first to ascertain certain facts by means of evidence and is then free to take such action as it may think fit on the facts so ascertained. In such a case the authority must consider the representations and objections of the parties affected and give them an opportunity to adduce and examine the evidence. On the other hand, the decision would be purely administrative if in taking that decision the authority is free to base its opinion on whatever material it thinks fit and howsoever obtained in the course of its executive functions or derived from the evidence at an enquiry, if there is any. One must, therefore, look to the particular provisions of the statute in order to determine the question whether the authority acting under those provisions acts in an administrative or a quasi-judicial capacity.'

9. Applying these principles here, it is evident on the language of Sub-sections (1) and (3) that an order of revocation of a licence is an administrative order. There is nothing in the language of these provisions to suggest that in making such an order the Government is obliged to act judicially. As already stated, the Government is no doubt required to determine the existence of the circumstances mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) before deciding whether in those circumstances it would be in the public interest to revoke a licence. But from this it does not follow that the Government must determine those circumstances or facts judicially. The provision in Sub-section (3) of a notice to the licencee to show cause against the proposed revocation is not any condition imposing a quasi judicial duty on the Government in passing an order of revocation. Learned counsel for the applicant is no doubt right in his submission that a notice to show cause to the licensee does not mean merely an opportunity to object to the revocation but also implies an opportunity for alleging a cause and proving it to the satisfaction of the authority.

In Rajmal v. Krishna, ILR 20 Bom 208, Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot, ILR 21 Cal 213 at pp. 222, 232 (FB) and Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram, ILR 17 All 21 at p. 26 {FB), it has been held, and in our opinion rightly, that the term 'to show cause' does not merely mean to allege cause, nor even to make out that there is room for argument, but to allege cause and to prove it to the satisfaction of the authority issuing the show-cause notice. But the giving of an opportunity to a licensee to show cause in this manner against the proposed revocation does not make the grounds on which it is proposed to revoke his license and the material in support of the intended revocation matters of issue between the licensee and the Government so as to make it obligatory for the Government to adjudicate upon them in a judicial manner after holding an enquiry. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 does not cast on the Government the duty to call evidence before the inquiry and justify the grounds on which it is proposed to revoke the license and prove them. It simply gives an opportunity to the licensee to state his objections and call such evidence to substantiate them as he may think it necessary. The purpose of giving an opportunity to the licensee to allege sufficient cause and prove it to the satisfaction of the Government is further to inform the mind of the authority proposing the revocation of the licence and not to determine any issue between the Government and the licensee.

10. In the present case, a notice to show cause against the revocation' of the licence was issued to the petitioner Company on 3oth June, 1961. The Company sent a reply to this notice on 24th July, 1961 In that reply, the Company did not dispute the truth of the allegations made against it on which the revocation of the licence was intended to be based. The Company only sought to explain that the default on its part in doing something required to be done under the Act and a breach of condition 5 of the licence and its unsatisfactory financial, position was due to causes beyond its control. There was, therefore, no question of giving any opportunity to the petitioner for proving certain facts to refute' the allegations made against it in the notice. There was also no question of giving to the Company an opportunity of proving a cause or causes for the position in which the Company found itself unable to fulfil its obligations under the Act and the terms of the licence. The two causes assigned by the Company for its failure to carry out is obligations and which the Government did not find convincing were the continuance of old low rates of electrical energy and the failure of the Government to supply power from the ChambalHydro-Electric plant. The revision of rates was entirely within the control of the Company; but it did not think it fit to take any step in the matter of revision of the rates.

The fulfilment of obligations under the Act and the licence in no way depended on the supply of power to the Company from the Chambal Hydro-electric plant. It is noteworthy that while replying to the notice to show cause the Company never asked for an opportunity to support by evidence the statements made in its reply. The petitioner's complaint, therefore, that the order of revocation was passed without complying with the provisions of Sub-section (3) and in violation of the principles of natural justice is altogether un-substantial. Indeed, there is no room for invoking the principles of natural justice. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in New Prakash Transport Co., Ltd. v. New Surwana Transport Co., Ltd., (S) AIR 1957 SC 232, AIR 1958 SC 398 and AIR 1959 SC 308, the rules of natural justice vary with varying constitutions of statutory bodies, and the rules prescribed by the Legislature under which they have to function, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. The matter here is governed by the specific provision contained in Sub-section (3), and the opportunity of hearing that has been given to the licensee consists in all that is comprised in the term 'show cause'.

11. The petitioner's contention that the revocation of the licence was mala fide is altogether baseless. There is no material to support it. The revocation was for the petitioner-Company's failure to give a continuous supply of electrical energy to the owners and occupiers of premises situate within the area of supply and for its failure to commence and execute certain works under condition 5 of the licence, the breach of which rendered the licence liable to revocation under the terms of the licence. It was also based on the admittedly poor financial position of the Company which prevented it from fully and efficiently discharging the duties and obligations imposed by the licence.

12. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no ground whatsoever for quashing the order made by the State Government revoking the petitioner-Company's licence. This petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs of each of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Counsel's fee for each of the respondents is fixed at Rs. 100/-. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner.


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