1. This is an application under Article 236 of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus to release the applicant from his detention under the Privative Detention Act of 1950.
2. By an order dated 7.3.1950, the Chief Commissioner, Bhopal directed that the applicant Wahid Ali alias Buddha son of Ahmedali, resident of Bhopal be detained for one year from the date of the order. To applicant, however, could not be arrested immediately after this order and wag arrested only on 5.6.1950 and the Chief Commissioner, on 13.6.1950 forwarded to him the grounds of the order of detention.
3. The applicant filed this petition on 21.8.1950, alleging that the grounds for his detention were mala fide, vague and indefinite; and that the petitioner was a peaceful, respectable citizen and the encroachment on his fundamental rights of personal liberty given under the Constitution of India, by the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal was wholly an warranted and against law.
4. On 29.9.1950 the petitioner filed an affidavit in which he stated that the detention order was defective and inaugurate and invalid; and therefore his detention was illegal; that; the detaining authority had not applied its mind at the time of issuing the detention order; that the said authority had acted mala fide and indifferently; that before the detention order was issued, the call for one day taken strike of the Railways, on 9.8.1950 was withdrawn; that he never went underground nor concealed himself nor bad absconded after his release on 3.3.1950; that the authority had taken no steps under Section 6 of the Preventive Detention Act. On 30.9.50, the Home Secretary, Bhopal filed an affidavit in which it was stated that She detaining authority had care fully examined all the reports received against the applicant and which the authority believed to be true and accurate; and was perfectly satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was essential to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of tie State of Bhopal and the maintenance of public order therein; that the detaining authority had not acted mala fide in this behalf and the grounds of detention were bona fide and correct and were not vague and that the detention order was perfectly valid and legal.
5. On 18.9.50, at the first hearing of the petition, the counsel for the petitioner filed an application to treat the original application not only under Article 296, Constitution of India Act, but also as one under Section 491, Criminal P.C. Bat at the next hearing on 8.10.50 he filed another application that the petition be heard only under Article 326, Constitution of India Act, and not under Section 491 ibid. It is, therefore, clear that the application has to be dealt with only as one under the former provision of law under the Constitution of India.
6. On behalf of the State the learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Court, even as a High Court, to hear the application under Article 226 of the Constitution and urged that this Court had no such jurisdiction to entertain and decide such appellation. In Support of his contention he referred to the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Anant Bhaskar v. State A.I.R. (87) 1960 Madh. B. 60, The point for determination, therefore, is whether the Judicial Commissioner's Court Bhopal declared as a High Court, under the judicial Commissioners' Courts (Declaration as High Courts) Act, 1950, has jurisdiction to entertain, bear and decide the application. It was urged that Article 286 of the Constitution only provided for powers to issue such directions or orders as stated in the Article, but did not provide for jurisdiction; that is such of the High Courts, as had such jurisdiction, had alone powers to issue the directions or orders so long as the Parliament did not, under Article 32(3) of the Constitution, make law investing these High Courts With such jurisdiction. On the other side, it is contended that Article 226 gave additional powers as well as jurisdiction even to these High Courts besides those available under Section 491, Criminal P.C. and that Article 226(2) of the Constitution makes this position perfectly clear.
7. In this connection I have only to observe that after perusing the decision of the Madhya Btiarat High Court as referred to by the learned Government Advocate I must confess that I could not persuade myself to accept the contention in this behalf. The learned Chief Justice(Kaul C.J.) has dealt with the various points which arose for consideration and has discussed them at length. On the other side, however, my learned brother Tribeni Saran A.J.C. had an earlier opportunity; to deal with this matter; and in Govind Prasad Shrivastava v. Slate of Bhopal Misc. Cr cases Nos. 78 & 79 of 1950 51, D/- 4.10.50 he has dtalt with all the points and considerations at length and in an able and lucid manner refuted the observations as also the reasons stated by the Madhya Bharat High Court in its decision ibid. I have perused both the decisions carefully and for the reasons stated by my learned brother in the above casts I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the application, under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. I have only to add that to my mind it is not altogether safe to interpreter a provision of law simply on the consideration of its place in the legislation. Even if such consideration were to be made in this behalf, I would only point out that Article 226 cannot be said to have been misplaced, and that its place in chap. v of the Constitution does not militate against such jurisdiction to these High Courts as found that article. If provision is made for enforcement of the Constitutional remedies in Article 82(1) & (2) by guaranteeing the right to move the Supreme Court it would be found that Article 226 can be said to be at its proper place while dealing with chap, v in respect of the High Courts in the State. In the circumstances, to my mind, the fact that Article 236 does not find place in the Chapter on the constitutional remedies cannot derogate from the powers and the jurisdiction of the High Courts as found in chap V.
9. My learned brother has, at p. 3 of his order, dealt with and considered the distinction between jurisdiction and power referred to in para. 12 of order of Madhya Bharat High Court. The significance and its importance of the expression by which Article 235 opens cannot be lost sight of and I am in entire agreement with Shri Saran A.J.C., in his observations in this behalf.
10. Dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its powers to enforce the right to constitutional remedies, read with the contention of the learned Government Advocate I lie question arises as to whether even the Supreme Court his such original jurisdiction to deal with these applications for enforcement of the above remedies. The gravies of the argument of the learned Government Advocate was that it is only the High Courts, which have original jurisdiction as distinguished from the appellate and revisional jurisdiction, that have the power to deal with such applications for the purposes all found in Article 226. It would, however, appear that if the same teat were applied to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in my opinion a similar difficulty would arise. It must appear that a provision is made in the Constitution for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Article 131 alone and a perusal of (bit article clearly shows that it is confined only to certain parties and to certain matters. Under Article 139 the Parliament is authorized to make law, conferring on the Supreme Court power to issue directions, orders or writs etc., for any purposes other than those mentioned in Clause (2) of Article 32, An examination of the provisions, in the matter of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts dearly indicates that the Supreme Court can be said to have no jurisdiction even to deal with these matters and it appears to me that Kaul C.J. was conscious of this difficulty as found in para 23 of the order wherein ho observes:
It was pointed out that there is no express provision in the constitution investing the Supreme Court with the original jurisdiction to entertain an application for the enforcement of fundamental rights. This is true. But the language if Article 32(1) by necessary implication coffer such jurisdiction on that Court.
He then goes on to refer to the absence of any such clause corresponding to Article 32(1), in Article 226 and feels that this indirectly lends strong support to the view taken by him. Clause (2) of Article 226 in my opinion however, makes it perfectly clear that the power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32, If it is only by implication that the Supreme Court can be clothed with such jurisdiction in these matters there is no reason why the same rule should not be applicable to these High Courts. In my opinion, however, it is not necessary to bank on the implication in view of the express provision as found in Article 226 read with Article 225 with pointed attention to the expression with which the Utter article begins or opens.
11. At pages 7 & 8 of his order, Tribeni Saran A.J.C. has dealt with the consideration of the anxiety and kaennesa of the legislature to preserve and protect the fundamental rights of every individual and afford a remedy to him whether be is at the farthest corner of the Republic of India Or whether he is a millionaire or a pauper. In my opinion, that anxiety and keenness of the legislature has to be borne in mind while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. It seems unnecessary for me to refer to the principle of construction of the Constitution as laid down by Sir Maurice Gwyer in In the matter of C.P. and Bear Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 A.I.R (26) 1989 P.C.I. referred to by Tribeni Saran A.J.C. at p 4 of his order. The contention of the learned Governments Advocate, that when the High Courts do not possess power to issue the high prerogative writs the Judicial Commissioners' Court which was not even a High Court could not be treated on a higher level, can be disposed of only by reference to Section 6, Judicial Commissioners' Courts (Declaration of High Courts) Act, 1950 and by the pointed attention to the fact that Articles 225 and 226 do not find place in the exceptions and modifications specified in the said section. Lastly, I have only to observe that I have given my best thought and anxious consideration to the points noted by the learned Judges of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Lagu's case A.I.R. (37) 1950 Madh. B. 60 F.B. and that with the greatest respect for the learned Judges I cannot persuade myself to accept their view and I find that the contention of the learned Government Advocate as stated in the earlier part of this order cannot be supported.
12. Turning then to the merits of the case the learned counsel of the petitioner attacks the order dated 7.3.50 tossed by the then Chief Commissioner, Bhopal. It is urged that it was obvious that the authority did not apply its mind to the case of the petitioner as the reference to the provision of law under which the order is passed is vague and cannot fit in with the preamble of the order. It is, therefore, necessary to quote the order passed. It runs as follows:
Whereas the Chief Commissioner is satisfied with respect to the person known as Wahidali alias Budhoo eon of Ahmed Ali, resident of Bhopal that with a view to preventing him from acting In a manner, prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the security of the Stats, it is necessary to make the following order:
Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section (3), Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (No. IV of 1950), the Chief Commissioner hereby directs that the said Whitely be detained for one year from the date of this order.Dated 7th March, 1950. Chief Commissioner,Bhopal.
It is urged that Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act contains two Clauses (a) and (b) and Clause (a) again contains three sub-clauses and it is not dear under which clause or sub-clause the order is passed. It is urged that this omission to state the exact clause or sub clause under which the order is passed indicates that the Chief Commissioner, Bhopal, while passing this order, had not applied his mind to the ease of fiche petitioner. Reference is made to the case of Keshav Gokhale v. Emperor A.I.R. (32) 1845 Bom. 212 and reading it at p. 214 it is urged that the care and meticulous investigation as required before such an order is passed are pointed out in the case of Benjmin Greene (1942) A.C. 284.
A perusal of the decision, however, of the Bombay High Court clearly shows that the District Magistrate who passed the order had not even looked into the case of Keshow Gokhale and bad signed it in a mechanical manner. Id appears that it was a cyclostyled form which the said Magistrate had merely signed.
In the case on hand, however, in my opinion, the preamble of the order clearly states the purpose with which the order is passed viz: to prevent Wahid Ali from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State. Nothing more, in my opinion, was required to be stated in the order. The only omission is found in the latter part of the order is that it should have stated that the order was passed under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3, of the Act and the fact that this was omitted does not indicate any carelessness on the part of the detaining authority. If at all it indicates anything it may be said to be a typing or clerical omission. In view of the definite wording used in the preamble of the order as pointed above, in the circumstances, this ground of attack on the order falls through.
13. It was then urged that the place of the activities of Wahidali has not been specified in the order and this again indicates that the authority Aid not apply its mind to the case. Reference is made, in this connection, to the decision in In Re Krishanaji Gopal A.I.R. (36) 1948 Bom. 360 at pp. 362 and 363. It is urged that this authority appears to require the detaining authority to specify the place of the activities which the authority desired or thought fit to prevent. It must be remembered, however, that it was an order passed by the Diatom Magistrate who had only limited territorial jurisdiction confined to his district; then again the order was passed under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act (no. VI 61 of 1947), under which a person's activities prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order and tranquility could be prevented. In the case on hand, it i3 the Chief Commissioner, Bhopal who has passed the order. The Chief Commissioner's authority in Bhopal is that of the State Government or rather the Government of the Bhopal Stats. Under the present Act, under which the order is passed, he has Bought to prevent the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the security of the State In my opinion, therefore the presumption that the authority acted within its jurisdiction and powers clearly arises and implies and indicates the place of the activities unless it is otherwise shown. In the circumstances, to my mind, the decision in Brahmes case is liable to be distinguished from the case on hand.
14. It was then urged that the order dated 7.8.50 was passed by Shri Bonnarji, the then Chief Commissioner, Bhopal, while the grounds were supplied by the present chief Commissioner, Shri V. Vighwanathan on 18.6.50 and therefore, It could not be said that these were the grounds which had satisfied the then Chief Commissioner, Shri Bonnarji in the matter of the requisite satisfaction before passing the order. In my opinion, the contention has no substance I am clear that it is not the satisfaction of the individual but of the authority that is required. If the contention of the learned Counsel of the petitioner were to be accepted then in case of unfortunate death of the person in authority immediately after the passing of the order would prevent the grounds being stated to the detenu. It is the authority and not the person who has to be satisfied and who has to furnish the grounds on which the order was passed. It would appear that the words used in Section 3(1) of the Act are, 'The Central Government or the State Government' and it cannot be deemed to be a person or an individual. The words used in Section 7 of the Act are, 'the authority making the order shall - etc.' These words clearly demolish the contention of the petitioner in this behalf. Then again a perusal of the Statement of the grounds dated 18.6.1950 would show that it was not Shri V. Vishwanathan that professed to ha ye been satisfied, in his personal private capacity, and stated the grounds for such satisfaction. It is the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal, who is the State Government of Bhopal that passed the order and it was the Chief Commissioner that furnished the grounds as required under Section 7 of the Act. In the circumstances, I am perfectly clear that the contention of the petitioner's learned Counsel has no substance.
15. It was then stated that the petitioner Wahidali was admitted by under detention till 3.3.1950 under an order dated 4.9.1949 under the Bhopal State Public safety Act of 1947 and was released on the former date i.e. 3.3.50 The order dated 7.3.50 does not specify the activities of the applicant between 3.3.50 and 7.3.50 which were considered to be prejudicial and therefore, there was no cause for reasonable satisfaction regarding his future cannot and therefore, the satisfaction required under Section 3 was mala fide as the detaining authority relied on the previous history of antecedents without giving the petitioner an opportunity to show that since his detention he had ceased bearing all thought of acting in a prejudicial manner. It would, however, appear that the detaining authority can take into consideration the proximate and immediate past of the detenu while pasting an order of detention. I am Supported in this observation by the decision in M.B.S. Mani v. District Magistrate Mathurai A.I.R. (87) 1950 Mad. 162. This consideration, however, will be further examined while dealing with the grounds.
16. It was urged that the grounds which were stated and furnished to the detenu were vague, indefinite and mala fide, A perusal of the statement of the grounds dated 13.6.50 clearly indicates that some of them were mere factual statements and it is the ground No. 6 that forms the gravies of the statement of the said date. In my opinion, it is necessary to quote the grounds which were furnished to the detenu. They are as follows:
(1) That a meeting of labourers was convened at Sabzraandi Bhopal on 18.2.1949 at 10 p.m., where you 'recited a poem inciting violence and death to capitalists:
(2) That the District Magistrate, Bhopal had by notification banned all meetings in Bhopal but you disobeyed the said orders and addressed a meeting of labourers held at the Textile Mill gate on 30.3.1949 at 3 15 p.m. You were accordingly arrested and challenged under the provisions of the Bhopal Public Safety Act for the contravention of the said orders and sentenced to 3 mouths rigorous imprisonment on 24th April 1949.
3.That after your release you again took active part in the labour movements encouraging the labourers to indulge in subversive activities. At a meeting of the labourers held at Bhopal on the night of 15.8.1919 you recited another poem encouraging revolution as against law and order;
4. That on 1.9.1949 you joined and took active part In a procession of labourers organized for being led to the Chief Commissioner's residence at Lal Kothi. The same day, the labourers of the Textile Mill observed a taken strike between 3 30 & 4 30 p.m. In between this time, you addressed the labourers inside the Mill area and exhorted them to continue the strike,
5. That you were therefore aureate on 4.9.1949 and detained under Section 3, Bhopal Safety Act for sis months with a view to prevent you from acting in any manger prejudicial to the security of the State and the public order therein;
6. That the reasons for which you were detained on 4.9.1949 continued to exist even when you were released on 3.3.1950 and there as every likelihood that you would once again indulge in activities prejudicial to the Security of the State and public order therein All India Railway Strike was expected to commence on 9.3.1950 and It was apprehended that you would continue to organize and take part in activities subversive of law and order. With a view therefore to prevent you from acting In any such manner warrants under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act were issued against you on 7.3.1950 but you could not be arrested as you went underground immediately after your release till 5.6.50 when you were arrested.
2. You are further informed that you have a right to make a representation to me in writing against the detention order.
17. It would appear that grounds Nos. 1 to 6 were obviously the grounds on which the previous order was passed. They are, however, liable to be examined in considering the order passed on 7.3.50 because in ground No. 6 it is stated that the reasons for which the detenu was detained on 4.9.1949 continue to exist even when he was released on 8.3.1950. In attacking ground No. 1, therefore, it is urged by the learned Counsel of the petitioner that the words 'Labourers' and 'Capitalist' used in that ground are so vague that they do not indicate anything. It is said that everyone who works for his a livelihood is a labourer while 'capitalist' is after all a relative term Reference is made to the two decisions of the Bombay High Court in In re, Anant M. hadeo A.I.R. (36) 1949 Bom. 95 and Mantben Liladhar v. Emperor A.I.R. (20) 1933 Bom. 65, It would however, appear that the first case is again liable to be distinguished from the case on hand as in the latter the labourers have been particularized viz: a meeting of labourers was convened at Sabzmandi, Bhopal, on 18.2.1949, at 10 p. m. In the circumstances, the case is clearly distinguishable from the Bombay case where it was only stated that 'the detenu had been inciting the workers to commit acts of violence and thereby acting in a, manner...etc.' It would also appear that under the Bombay Public Security Act, it was not merely the grounds but also the particulars which were liable to be furnished and it was, therefore, observed that
The notice (as required under that Act) was vague and indefinite and that the particulars given were not Bush as to enable the detenu to make a representation.
18. As regards the use of the word 'capitalist,' in my opinion, reference to the case of Maniben Kara A.I.R. (20) 1983 Bom 65 does not at all help the contention as made before me. It must appear that that was a case of an offence under Section 158(a), Penal Code, and what has been observed in that case is that the word 'capitalist' does not denote a definite class within the meaning of Section 153(a), Penal Code. I am dear that that test as required under the particular section of the Penal Code is not applicable to the case of ground No. 1. I would also add that whether the word 'capitalist' is a relative term or not the fact stands that violence and death to any capitalist or the whole class of capitalists was obviously liable to serious objection. In the circumstances, I am clear that it cannot be accepted that the ground No. 1 was vague or that it could not convey to the mind of the detenu the activity which was prejudicial in the eyes of the then detaining authority.
19. Ground No. 2 is obviously a mere factual statement and only indicates that the detenu had disobeyed the previous orders. It was urged that under the Constitution, a citizen baa the right of freedom of speech and expression, and therefore he had a right to address a meeting of labourers In my opinion, the significance of the ground has been misapprehended or at least misapprehended. As I have already stated it is not that the detenu bad addressed a particular meeting on 30.8.1949 which constituted a ground for his present detention. It only indicates the mental attitude under which the detenu acted in the past and points out that he was prone to disobey the orders then passed, banning all meetings in Bhopal. It was urged that on this ground every congress-man who disobeyed the then orders was liable to be detained and that the present detention of the petitioner on that ground was nothing but a fraud on the Act. In my opinion, all the vituperative nature of the contention is knocked out at the bottom by the view which I have-already expressed that it was not on this ground of his addressing a particular meeting then banned on account of which the present order was passed. I have only to repeat that the ground has been obviously stated to indicate the mental attitude of the detenu.
20. Going over to the ground No. 3 it was urged that the words 'subversive activities' were too vague and reference is made to the decision In re Krishnaji Gopal A.I.R. (85) 1948 Bom. 860 ad pp. 333 & 364, ibid. It is urged that the same question as was asked by the learned Judge in the matter of sufficient precision convoyed by the above word can be asked in this case also. It must, however, appear that in the case on hand the ground No. 3 does not stop short at the words 'subversive activities.' It goes on. further and points out that in a particular meeting the detenu recited a poem encouraging revolution as against law and order. The law as was applicable at that time has no doubt undergone a change but that change is only in be far as it was inconsistent with the present law. Here again, in my opinion, the same observation can be made viz., that the ground indicates the mental attitude of the detenu as can be deduced from the above ground. In the circumstances, in my opinion, mere refer, fence to the decision of the Bombay High Court ibid cannot avail the petitioner as it is liable to be distinguished in view of the latter portion of the ground No 3 as pointed out above.
21. Going to the ground No. 4, it deals with what the detenu did on 1.9.1949. It is said this he joined and took active part in the procession of labourers organized for being led to She Chief Commissioner's residence at Lai Kothi and that on that day the labourers of the Textile Mill observed a strike for an hour during which period the detenu addressed the labourers in the Mill area and exhorted them to continue the strike. In this case it must appear that it not stated in the ground that the strike was illegal; and also far as the present position of every citizen is concerned, he has a right, under Article 19(1)(a), to freedom of speech and expression; under (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; and under (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India, subject to Clauses 2, 3 & 5 of the Article, respectively. Article 19 provides for the protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc. In the circumstances the fact that the petitioner took an active part in the procession of labourers etc, cannot be a proper ground for reasonable satisfaction of the detaining authority as late as 7.3.1950. It was urged by the learned Government Advocate that every strike, in so far as it was affected by the Bhopal Industrial Trades Disputes Act (no. VI) 1946, was illegal. I am not satisfied with the contention of the learned Government Advocate in this behalf. On 7.8.1950 as the ground did not state that the strike was illegal under a particular Act or Law it was bound to be considered as vague. The Bhopal Industrial Trades Disputes Act, 1946 can be even called to he inconsistent with the present law since the constitution came into force and that makes the most important and substantial difference in the conditions as obtained on 1.9.1949 and 7.3.1950. It would also appear that as far bask as in 1942 when conditions in the country ware very stringent under the British rule, daring the war period, it has been observed by Horwill J. in In re Appalaswamy, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Mad. 735 that
Strikes and look outs, though clumsy and Injurious are the only existing means of deciding trade disputes, Toe calling of a strike is not illegal.
In Arun Kumar v. Province of Bihar A.I.R. (36) 1949 Pat. 236 it is observed that
It is now recognized in labour legislation and practice that labourers may resort to strikes, legally conducted, for the redress of their grievances. Consequently, merely stating in the ground a for detention that the detenu was responsible for strikes in some collieries, without mentioning whether they were legal or illegal is not a ground of such precision or adequacy as to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention.
If such was the freedom or liberty to persons in India in those days it is needless to point out that it has been augmented by Article 19 of the Constitution. In my opinion, therefore, ground No. 4 could not be an adequate ground for reasonable satisfaction for the detention of the petitioner on 7th March 1950.
22. Turning to the ground No. 5, it does nod appear necessary to consider it as it is nothing but the factual statement as to what was done to the petitioner on 4th September 1950.
23. As I have already said, ground No. 6 constitutes the greaten of the grounds stated, and it is necessary to closely examine it in the light of the law applicable. It was said that the reasons for which the petitioner was detained on 4th September 1949 continued to exist when he was released on 3rd March 1950. I have examined the reasons which existed on 4th September 1949 and as I have pointed out they appear to have been stated over again in the grounds for the present detention merely to indicate the mental attitude of the petitioner. To my mind it was impossible to gauge the mental attitude of the detenue as it existed between 3.3.50 and 7.8.50 merely by its comparison with that obtained six months before, early in September 1949. It cannot be said with confidence that human mind continues to be the same. Though there are changes in the psychology of every human-being, a human mind is still, in elite of all the advancement of Science remains as inscrutable as ever. In the circumstances it is difficult for me to hold that the detenu's mentality continued to be the same and the grounds which existed in September 49 could be proper and adequate grounds for the reasonable satisfaction of the detaining authority as late as on 7th March 1950,
24. It is here that the consideration which was deferred in para 16 of this order has to be examined in detail. It must appear that no activities of the petitioner between the 3rd and 7th of March 1950 which were found to be prejudicial or objectionable have been stated in these grounds so that it could be possible to examine 1 them and consider if the grounds, based on such activities could be adequate and sufficient for the reasonable satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is no doubt true that it has been stated in para 15 of the order that the detaining authority could take into consideration the proximate and immediate past of the detenu while passing an order of detention, but in my opinion, it is only the immediate past, the antecedents and the history of the detenu, that alone could be taken into consideration only if there be nothing between that immediate past and the order of detention. In the case on hand, it was more than six months that had elapsed since the time the petitioner had given grounds for his detention, and during this period of more than six months all his activities were prevented by his detention. As I have observed, if after his release the petitioner had commenced activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or the security of the State, then while considering such activities his antecedents also could be taken into consideration by the detaining authority for its reasonable satisfaction. In the absence of any statement of his activities in the grounds, therefore I cannot persuade myself to hold that merely the past mental attitude of the petitioner could afford a ground for such reason. able satisfaction of the detaining authority.
25. Examining the ground further it is stated that there was 'Likelihood that the petitioner would once again indulge in the activities prejudicial to the security of the State and public order therein.' This 'likelihood' obviously depended upon not the activities of the detenu between 3.8.60 and 7.3.50 but banked merely on the mental attitude of the detenu as obtained more than six months before the order was passed. In ray opinion after what I have stated, it is difficult to hold that such mere 'likelihood' could afford a proper ground for the re-atonable satisfaction of the detaining authority which was essential before the order was passed.
26. In my opinion, examining the ground still further, it appears that the consideration of the existence of this 'likelihood' was based not merely on the conditions or the reasons as existed on 4th September 49 but also on a certain apprehension which has been expressed in the next sentence of the ground, which states that 'All India Railway strike etc.... It was apprehended that the petitioner would continue to organize and take part in... etc...order'
It was urged that the expected railway strike did not come off and in fact was called off before 7th of March 1950. There is nothing on record except the affidavit of the petitioner dated 39th September 1950 in support of this allegation of fact. The affidavit of the officiating Home Secretary dated 3rd October 1950 filed on record does not contradict this statement of the petitioner. Whether, however, this All India Railway strike was called off or not before the date of the order impugned, it would be worth, while to examine the mind of the detaining. authority as obtained on 7th March 1950 in the matter of its reasonable satisfaction. While Sealing with the provisions of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act (vi of 1947) it has been observed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Shoilen Dey A.I.R. (36) 1949 Bom. 75 that
emphasis Is not as much on the accuracy, or on the nature or extent of the error; the emphasis is on the state of mind of the detaining authority. If the state of the mind of the detaining authority discloses that he has been casual in his approach and that he has not applied his mind with that diligence which is necessary when the question is of taking away the liberty of a subject, the Court will certainly interfere and will set at liberty the detenu arrested by the order of the detaining authority.
This in my opinion, lays down the principle for examination of the grounds for the detention of a citizen. In In re Bhaurao Karabhari A.I.B. (37) 1950 Bom. 126 it is observed that 'any vagueness in the grounds furnished was evidence of vagueness of the mind of the detaining authority.' In, Ram Bilas Gupta v. Rex A.I.R. (36) 1949 all 748, dealing with the U.P. Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act (IV  of 1947) it is observed that
If in the opinion of the Court the grounds supplied are vague, indefinite and insufficient, the Court must hold that further detention is illegal, or improper.
It is thus obvious that the grounds are liable to be examined not with a view to ascertain their existence as a fact, but with a view to examine the state of the mind of the detaining authority.
27. Bearing this principle in mind, therefore, when the sentence states 'all India Railway strike...etc.... Order,' it would appear that the detaining authority had a mere apprehension (not arising out of the activities immediately prior to the detention order) that 'the petitioner would continue to organize...etc.... The synonyms for apprehension are fear and dread The idea common to those words is expectation of future evil. These synonyms are discriminated in 'Synonyms Discriminated' by the late Charles John Smith, M.A. of the Balliol College, Oxford, It is stated 'A faint emotion is expressed by apprehend, a stronger by fear and a stronger still by dread. Apprehend denotes generally an anticipation and sometimes an anticipation of evil. Fear and dread are applicable not only to evens bat directly to persons, which apprehend is not.' It would, thus, appear that mere apprehension de-notes the smallest mental emotion in the matter of a possible future evil. The question, therefore, is whether such smallest mental emotion could afford an adequate and definite ground for a reasonable satisfaction to the detaining authority, which was essential before passing of the order impugned. I need not repeat that in the absence of the activities of the detenu between 3rd and 7th Mar oh 1950 such mental emotion of the smallest degree could not create the requisite reasonable satisfaction.
28. It must also appear that the grounds of the order of detention are to be disclosed to the person affected by the order for affording him an opportunity of making representation against the order. Examining the grounds therefore, it is difficult to find that it was possible for the detenu to comment or contradict the statement of the detaining authority, in the matter of its apprehension. To my mind, therefore, the grounds as might have been applicable in September 1949 and reiterated before the passing of the order were so vague and indefinite that it is difficult to hold that they afforded the requisite reasonable satisfaction to the detaining authority That being as, the very essence of the order under Section 3(1)(a)(ii), Preventive Detention Act 1950, was, in my opinion, absent before the order impugned and the detenu is entitled to be released from his detention.
29. I therefore direct that the petitioner be released.