Bishambhar Dayal, C.J.
1. This is a writ petition by three permit-holders of stage carriage permits. They applied for , extension of their route. These applications were published and objections were filed by respondent No. 3 to this extension. After hearing both the parties the Regional Transport Authority granted an extension which was to the extent of 53 miles. Against this extension respondent No. 3 filed an appeal. The appellate authority considered in detail the arguments advanced by the appellant (respondent No. 3 here) as well as the respondents (petitioners here). One of the questions raised before the appellate authority was that no appeal lay against an order merely extending the route over an existing permit. This argument was repelled on the ground that an extension of 53 miles was really not a mere variation of the permit but that it amounted to a new grant and hence respondent No. 3 who had opposed that grant was entitled to file an appeal under Section 64(1)(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act. After considering the arguments of both sides the appellate Authority also came to the conclusion that the arguments advanced by the appellant (respondent No. 3) were acceptable. It accordingly set aside the extension of the permit as granted by the Regional Transport Authority. Against that order the writ petition has been filed and the same two objections have been raised.
2. We have heard learned counsel. So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, since respondent No. 3 had opposed the grant of a permit over this extended route, an appeal clearly lay. In Jasram v. S. T. Authority, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 81 a Division Bench of this Court considered the same point and came to the conclusion that an appeal under Section 64(1)(f) would have been maintainable by the person who had opposed the extension but in that case he had not filed any objectionwithin time and hence he could not be taken to have filed an objection. It was observed in that case as follows: --
'In the instant case, the respondent 3 did not make its representation within the prescribed time and cannot, therefore, be regarded as having validly opposed the variation. That being so, he was disentitled to appeal under Clause (f) of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Since it could not appeal, the revision filed by it under Section 64-A of the Act was not incompetent.'
It has, therefore, clearly been held that in such a case where the grant of extension is opposed, an appeal is competent under Section 64(1)(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It has also been repeatedly held by this Court that a substantial extension of the route is not a mere variation in the condition of the permit but that it amounts to a grant of a new permit as the identity of the route is completely altered by such grant. We are therefore, of opinion that the decision of the appellate authority was right with regard to its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
3. The second question is a question of fact which has been considered in detail by the authorities concerned. The appellate authority has not given a very proper order as regular courts would do. But in view of the fact that the appellate authority has considered in detail the arguments of each of the parties and has ultimately come to the conclusion that the contentions raised by the appellant (respondent No. 3) were well founded, it cannot be said that the order does not disclose the reasons on which it is based.
4. We, therefore, see no force in this writ petition and dismiss the same with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 50/-. The outstanding amount of the security deposit after deduction of costs shall be refunded to the petitioners.