A.H. Khan, J.
1. The facts giving rise to this revision in short are that Mst. Marium Bai mortgaged her 8 anna share in the Zamindari village Bir Madhan with Col. Kashirao Pawar. On the abolition of the Zamindari, the village vested in the Government. According to Section 18 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act (Act No. 13 of 1951), Col. Kashirao Pawar filed an application before the Claims Officer, specifying the particulars of his secured debt. In the course of these proceedings Mst. Marium Eai and Col. Kashirao Pawar arrived at a compromise, the terms of which were that Mst. Marium Bai would sell her house situated in Phalke Bazar for Rs. 3500/- and that in addition to it she would pay him Rs. 1000/- out of the compensation of the mortgaged village.
This compromise was recorded by the Compensation Officer on 19-8-52 and an order was passed in terms of this compromise. On the basis of this order Col. Kashirao Pawar filed an application under Section 27 of the Act on 4-12-53 before the Civil Judge, Lashkar, and sought a decree for the sale of the house in question. A number of objections were raised by the other party.
The important ones were that the order of the Claims Officer sought to be enforced under Section 27 of the Act was not an order under Section 26 of the Act and therefore unenforceable. It was also contended that the application under Section 27 was filed beyond one year of the statutory period given in Section 27 of the Act. The trial Court decided both the objections against Mst. Marium, who has now filed this revision.
2. I shall first decide the question of limitation which appears to have received scanty attention at the hands of the lower Court.
3. The order sought to be enforced under Section 27 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was passed on 19-8-52. The application under Section 27 of the above Act was presented on 21-12-53. Section 27 of the said Act requires that an application under Section 27 should be given within a year of the order. A perusal of the above dates would show that the application was given about sixteen months after the order and thus it is clearly time-barred. The trial Court however has extended the period by applying Section 19 of the Limitation Act. But I am afraid that the decision is in clear breach of the provision of law.
4. The Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is a special law and therefore according to Sub-clause (b) Clause 2 of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 19 of the Limitation Act shall not extend the period of limitation prescribed for the application in the special law, namely the Zamindari Abolition Act.
5. Clause 2, Section 29 of the Limitation Act runs as follows :
''Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as,and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law;and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply,'
6. The phrase 'the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply' occurring in Sub-clause (b) restricts the scope of Section 19 and is a clear prohibition of the use of it in cases governed by the special law. See Madho RaoGhatate v. Ealaji Narayan, AIR 1926 Nag 236 (A).
Before the amendment of Section 29 by the Indian Limitation Amendment Act (Act No. 10 of 1922), none of the provisions of the Limitation Act were at all applicable to suits or applications under any special or local law, but the said amendment somewhat widened the scope and now Section 4 and Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of the Limitation Act apply to special laws, unless they are expressly excluded by the law. The restriction in respect of other sections of Limitation Act still continues as before.
7. In this view of the matter, the application submitted by the non-applicant under Section 27 of the Zamindari Abolition Act is patently time-barred and the decision of trial Court is not only wrong in its approach but is clearly against the law.
8. In this view of the decision on the point of limitation it is unnecessary to consider the other point in this case, namely, whether the order sought to be enforced under Section 27 of the Act is of is not one under Section 26 of the Zamindari Abolition Act.
9. For reasons stated above the revision is allowed and the application is dismissed as time-barred. Parties to bear their own costs.