Bishambhar Dayal, C.J.
1. This is a petition by Maharani Padmini Kun-war Ba Sahiba, who had been granted a lamberdari lease for 30 years in 1945. Under the Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (Vindhya Pradesh Act No. XI of 1952) these rights were resumed on the 1st of January, 1954. The contention of the petitioner was that these rights were not Jagir rights and, therefore, could not be resumed under that Act. There was litigation about it and ultimately the Supreme Court by its judgment dated the 21st February, 1961 reported in S. Padmini Kunwar Ju Sahiba v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh (now Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1961 SC 1204, allowed the contention raised by the petitioner. As a result of this decision the property was returned to the petitioner on the 30th April, 1961. Thereafter a new Act, Madhya Pradesh Act No. 41 of 1965 (The Madhya Pradesh Swatwa-dhartk Adhikar Sampatti (Vindhya Pradesh Kshetra) Adhiniyam, 1965) was passed by the Legislature of the State. By this Act certain other proprietary rights including the rights of lamberdari lessees were taken over. Section 2(b) defined 'proprietor' and included within Clause (ii) 'any person who holds village or part thereof under a lamberdari lease.' Section 4 of this Act applied the provisions of Act No. XI of 1952 for the purposes of resumption of these rights. Section 4 is as follows:--
'The provisions of Vindhya Pradesh Act and the rules made thereunder shall so far as may be, apply to, the abolition, of proprietary rights, under this Act as they apply to the abolition of Jagirs under the Vindhya Pradesh Act and for that purpose the expressions, 'proprietor' and 'land held by him' and 'date of vesting' occurring in this. Act shall be construed as 'Jagirdar' 'Jagir land' and 'date of resumption' respectively under the said Vindhya Fradesh Act.'
2. It will thus, be seen that for the purpose of applying Act XI of 1952 it was expressly provided that the word 'proprietor' as used in 1965 Act was to be equated with the word 'Jagirdar' and the land held by the proprietor was to be equated with 'Jagir land'. No. special provision was made ha this Act for paying compensation to the proprietors whose rights were abolished by this Act. The same provisions which were contained in Act XI of 1952 were made applicable. Paragraph 6 of the Schedule contained in Act XI of 1952; provided for the multiple of the net income which would determine the compensation payable to the Jagirdar. Admittedly in the present case the net income was more than Rs. 5000/- per year and the relevant part of paragraph 6 of the Schedule reads as follows :
''The compensation payable to a Jagirdar shall be-- (a) .....
(c) Where the net income from the Jagir-land exceeds Rs. 5000/-, ten times the net income calculated in accordance with the provisions herein before contained.....'
Thus the multiple applicable to the case of the present petitioner was ten times the net income. When the matter came up before the Collector for granting compensation he found that it would be unjust to grant compensation at ten times the income. He thought that since the lease was granted to the petitioner for 30 years and only 6 1/2 years had remained of that grant, he applied a new formula, i.e., 78/360 indicating that out of 360 months only 78 months had yet to be enjoyed and, therefore, instead of giving ten times the net income he calculated the compensation at 78/360th part of the net income, which would be calculated at ten times. He has, therefore, allowed 13/6 of one year's net income. This calculation was upheld by the Board of Revenue and consequently the present petition has been filed.
3. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the Collector and the Board of Revenue had no power to apply Act No. XI of 1952 in an amended form. All that has been permitted by the Act is to apply that Act as far as it is applicable and consequently when for payment of compensation the provisions of the Schedule are applicable it must be applied as they are. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the State is that the provisions of the Act are to be applied only as far as they are applicable and according to his contention the provisions of the Schedule for grant of compensation is not applicable to the full extent. It could be applicable only, in this case, to the extent of 78/360 x 10 = 13/6 the compensation provided in the schedule. The Legislature has not as we see it, permitted the executive, to apply the old Act to the abolition of the new rights, after a modification, according to the suitability decided upon by the officers concerned. All that has been permitted is to apply such provisions of the Act as are applicable and not to apply those which are inapplicable. The words used in Section 4 are--
'The provisions of Vindhya Pradesh Act and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply to the abolition of proprietary rights under this Act..................'
What has, therefore, been said is to apply the provisions of the old Act as far as they are applicable. If they are not applicable they are not to be applied, but such parts as are applicable are to be applied. This does not mean that every individual provision or every section of the Act has to be mutilated and to be applied only in such altered form as the officer considers to be equitable after amendment. Only those parts which are clearly not applicable to the abolition of the new rights are not to be applied. The rest have to be applied as they are.
4. The order of the Collector and the decision of the Board of Revenue in so far as the compensation is calculated on the basis of a new formula not given in the Act is without jurisdiction. We consequently quash the orders impugned remand the case for fresh assessment and allow the writ petition. The applicant will get his costs from the respondents. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 200/-. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.