J.P. Bajpai, J.
1. The appellant in this case succeeds if I am td turn on the splitting of a straw and read the quit notice in a hyper-critical manner. He must fail if I read the same in common sense way. The fate of this appeal is, therefore, obvious.
2. The facts giving rise to the suit out of which this appeal arises are that the respondent plaintiff-landlord instituted a suit against the appellant-tenant claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for non-residential purposes of his own. The courts below have concurrently found it as a fact that the plaintiff landlord did require the suitshop for the purposes of his own need and that he had no other alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the township for the said purpose. The claim was contested on various allegations before the courts below. It was also suggested that the partition was effected with the ulterior motive to create a situation that the other house belonging to the family of the plaintiff did not remain of his ownership and, as such he became entitled to lay a claim for eviction on the ground under Section 12 (1) ff) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by showing that he had no other alternative accommodation of his own. It was also suggested that the need was not bona fide. Various technical objections were taken regarding the admissibility of the decree passed by the Civil Court declaring that a partition had already been effected amongst the members of the family including the plaintiff-landlord and that the suit premises fell to the share of the plaintiff. The objection raised was that the aforesaid decree required registration. However, all those objections were found to be frivolous and without any basis. The decree in question was not a decree itself effecting partition. It was nothing but a purely declaratory decree holding that earlier there had been already a partition and in that partition the suit shop had fallen to the share of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the decree was rightly held to be admissible in evidence even in the absence of any registration of the same according td the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. This appeal was entertained by this Court only on the question of validity of the quit notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act. Under these circumstances no other point was urged.
3. The only point which needs determination is about the validity of the quit notice. It was not disputed that the tenancy commenced from the 10th of every English calendar month and ended with the expiry of 9th day of the next month according to the said calendar. The language used in the quit notice was that the tenancy will stand determined with effect from the 10th day of the English calendar month instead of saying that it was being determined by the expiry of the9th day of the said month. The objection raised was that in view of the language used in the quit notice the same did not determine the tenancy with the expiry of the month of tenancy and as such, was bad in law though the other requirement of giving 15 days' notice stood fully satisfied.
4. It would be significant to point out that the validity of the quit notice was not objected by raising this ground specifically in the written statement. The general bare allegation was that the quit notice was invalid. In any case, even if the objection as raised by the defendant is taken into consideration, it is ultimately found to be of no material consequence for the reasons stated below. It is true that the landlord, instead of saying that the tenancy was being determined on the expiry of the 9th day, i.e. the midnight of 9th had said in the quit notice that the same stood determined with effect from the 10th. As matter of fact, it ddes not make much difference. It appears that the notice was construed in the same manner by the defendant also and that is why no such specific objection was raised by him by pointing out that it did not determine the tenancy with the expiry of the last date of the month of tenancy or that he had been misled in any manner in that respect. This Court has repeatedly, in various decisions, held that the quit notice does not become bad merely on the ground that the language used in the notice of termination of tenancy was with effect from the 1st instead of saying that the same was by the expiry of the 30th or 31st as the case may be, according to the calendar month of tenancy. Actually, in substance, it determined the tenancy with the expiry of the last day of the month of tenancy. The decisions of this Court for being referred are (Hirjibhai Maojibhaj v. Balrambhai, AIR 1956 Nag 125) and (Tolaram v. Ayaldas 1965 Jab LJ 366). In the case of the Rochaldas Tikamchand v. Ratan-chand Baghmal, AIR 1954 Nag 292 Hon'ble Shri Sinha Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Hidayatullah, J. (as they then were), had observed that,--
'A liberal construction has to be put upon the notice so as to find out the true intention of the party giving the notice and whether the party served with the notice could understand itin the sense meant by the giver of the notice.'
The construction which the court should give, should be such as would not work hardship on the tenant and would not also strain the language too much against the landlord provided if the notice substantially satisfies both the requirements, i. e. 15 days time and determination of the tenancy with the expiry of the last day of the month of tenancy.
5. In the case of Hirjibhai Madjibhai v. Balrambhai (supra), this Court clearly held that notice to quit on a day which is a periodical recurrence of the day on which the tenancy began is not ineffective.
Thus, where a monthly tenancy commenced from the 1st of the month and ended with 30th or 31st of each month, as the case may be, and the tenant was asked by 15 days' notice to vacate on 1st, the notice was held to have terminated the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice ending with the calendar month of the tenancy. The reason behind is that since the tenant was entitled to remain in possession till the midnight of the last day of the month of tenancy, there was nothing wrong in asking him to vacate the premises with effect from the following day. It in no way, reduces the prescribed period of 15 days' notice required for a quit notice and also does not introduce the defect of not terminating the tenancy with the expiry of the 1st day of the month of tenancy. It is more or less a concession to the tenant who, instead of being asked to vacate immediately on the expiry of midnight of a particular date, is asked to do so on the following day.
6. Shri S. B. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dattonpant v. Vithalrao (AIR 1975 SC 1111). I have gone through the aforesaid decision and am of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the said case are clearly distinguishable from the present one. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that for a valid quit notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act, both the requirements i.e. 15 days margin and termination of the tenancy with the expiry of the last day of the month of tenancy are essential. In the case before theirLordships the last date of the month of tenancy happened to be the 9th day of the following months, The quit notice in the aforesaid case had neither terminated the tenancy with the expiry of the 9th or immediately thereafter with effect from the beginning of the 10th. It actually terminated the tenancy from the 8th day. Under these circumstances there was no scope to uphold such a notice as valid even by liberally construing the same.
7. It would be relevant to refer to a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bhagabandas Agrawalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu (1977) 2 SCC 646 wherein their Lordships have held that a quit notice must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat and the Court ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw. It has been further pointed out that it must not be read in a hypercritical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendan-tism. In the said case, their Lordships have clearly laid down that the notice to quit must expire with the end of the month of tenancy, i.e. it must terminate with effect from the expiration of the month of tenancy. It has been further held that if it determines the tenancy with effect from an earlier date, it would clearly be invalid. In the aforesaid case too, vacant possession was demanded on the first day of the following month and the month of tenancy commenced from the 1st and ended with last day of the same. Now, in the present case, from the language of the notice, it is apparent that the tenancy was sought to be terminated by the end of the expiry of the 9th day of the calendar month. It is true instead of saying that the tenancy stands terminated with effect from the expiry of the midnight, it was said that the tenancy stands terminated immediately after the same, i.e. with effect from the 10th day.
8. Does it make any difference if instead of saying that you are entitled to occupy till the last moment of the previous day, I say that you are not entitled to occupy with effect from the first moment of the following day? Actually speaking, the use of the words 'at' 'on' and 'on and from' in the context of the entire contents of the quitnotice read as a whole amounts to equivalent expressions and to draw a distinction between them on hyper-technical considerations will be far too subtle for practical use.
9. The sole ground on which this second appeal was entertained, therefore, fails. The judgment and decree impugned having been found to be valid otherwise are accordingly sustained. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee according to schedule if certified.
10. However, in order to avoid hardships due to sudden execution of the decree for eviction, it is directed that three months' time be given to the tenant for vacating the suit premises. On his failure to do so on or before the 15th June 1979, the decree-holder landlord will be entitled to put the decree for eviction in execution and obtain possession according to law through the process of the Court, The other part of the decree shall however, remain available for execution throughout.