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Deoraj Bhikamchand Surana and anr. Vs. Rent Controlling Authority and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberMisc. Petn. No. 276 of 1961
Judge
Reported inAIR1962MP179
ActsMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 - Sections 18, 19 and 19(1)
AppellantDeoraj Bhikamchand Surana and anr.
RespondentRent Controlling Authority and anr.
Advocates:J.M. Sood, Adv.
DispositionPetition allowed
Cases ReferredBhanji Tejabhai v. Rent Controlling Authority
Excerpt:
- dixit, c.j. 1. the petitioners in this case pray that an order of the rent controlling authority, durg, allotting a house belonging to them and situate on chitnavis road, durg, to the opponent s'hri mahobe be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 2. the house in question was first tenanted by kumari kusum kaushai, education organiser, who was transferred from durg some time in february,1960. as she did not vacate the house on her transfer, the petitioners 'instituted a suit for ejectment against her, inter alia, on the ground that they needed the house for their own residence. a compromise decree was passed in this suit on 11th july, 1960. in pursuance of this decree kumari kaushai vacated the house ultimately on 15th july, 1961. the petitioners then commenced the work of repairing the house.....
Judgment:

Dixit, C.J.

1. The petitioners in this case pray that an order of the Rent Controlling Authority, Durg, allotting a house belonging to them and situate on Chitnavis Road, Durg, to the opponent S'hri Mahobe be quashed by a writ of certiorari.

2. The house in question was first tenanted by Kumari Kusum Kaushai, Education Organiser, who was transferred from Durg some time in February,1960. As she did not vacate the house on her transfer, the petitioners 'instituted a suit for ejectment against her, inter alia, on the ground that they needed the house for their own residence. A compromise decree was passed in this suit On 11th July, 1960. In pursuance of this decree Kumari Kaushai vacated the house ultimately on 15th July, 1961. The petitioners then commenced the work of repairing the house and reconstructing it in some parts So as to suit their own convenience.

On 15th July, 1961 itself the Rent Controlling Authority, Durg initiated proceedings for the allotment of the house and issued a notice calling upon the applicants to appear on 19th July 1961 for showing cause as to why the house should not be allotted to the opponent Shri Mahobe. The petitioners accordingly appeared on the date fixed and submitted that they intended to occupy the house 'themselves and that it was not vacant for letting. The Rent Controlling Authority did not accept this statement of the petitioners that they needed the house for their own use and made the impugned order of allotment.

3. The order of allotment passed by the Rent Controlling Authority cannot be upheld for the! reason that it was passed without: making an order under Section 18 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, asking the petitioner to give information in writing of the accommodation falling vacant and also for the reason that the accommodation had not in fact fallen vacant as explained in Bhanji Tejabhai v. Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur 1960 MPLJ 1131.

In this case a decree for ejectment having been passed against the tenant Kumari Kaushai and she having vacated the house thereafter the petitioners were under a statutory obligation to occupy it unless they themselves wished to re-let the accommodation with the written permission of the Rent Controlling Authority. The decree was no doubt a compromise decree; but it was none the less founded On the existence of one or more of the grounds of ejectment mentioned in Section.4. In the petitioners' suit for ejectment one of the grounds was that they needed the house for their own use. When, therefore, the tenant Kumari Kaushai did not dispute this averment and agreed to a consent decree, it meant that the existence of the ground of ejectment, namely, the landlords' needing the house for their own residence was undisputed. That being so, the consent decree was in fact and in law a decree for ejectment based on the ground stated in Clause (g) of Section 4 of the Act.

Now, section 19 of the Act prescribes that any landlord who gets a tenant evicted from any accommodation On any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4(g), (h) and (i) shall not, during the continuance in force of the Act, relet the same accommodation without the written, permission Of the Rent Controlling Authority. In the face of this provision the petitioners were bound to occupy the house when Kumari Kaushal vacated it. The provision that in such a case the accommodation shall not be relet without the permission of the Rent Controlling Authority does not mean that the Rent Controlling Authority can override the ejectment decree and Section 19 (1) and give an Order to the landlord to let out the accommodation, It only means that if after having obtained a decree for ejectment on the ground mentioned in Section 4 (g), (n) or (i) the landlord does not wish to occupy the accommodation himself, but desires to let it out, then he can do it only with the permission of the Rent Controlling Authority,

It thus depends on the landlord whether or not to occupy the vacant accommodation and not on the Rent Controlling Authority to dictate to the landlord whether after having obtained a decree of the kind specified in Section 19 (1) he should or should not occupy the accommodation, The petitioners having obtained a decree for ejectment on the ground of accommodation being need ed for themselves, the accommodation could not be regarded as having fallen vacant for the purposes of section 18. The Rent Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to enquire into the question whether the need of the petitioners was genuine or, as the Authority described it, 'bogus''.

4. For all these reasons the order dated 21st July, 1961 of the Rent Controlling Authority, Durg, allotting the house in question to the opponent Shri Mahobe is quashed. There will be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners,


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